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On the relationship between trust, 
transparency, and surveillance
Lora Anne Viola and Paweł Laidler
Introduction
Surveillance has become a defining characteristic of twenty- first- century 
society. Although surveillance, broadly understood as a set of data collection 
and information processing practices (Lyon 2015), has ancient roots, new 
information technologies and the advent of big data have created conditions 
for the pervasive, penetrating, and highly consequential role of surveillance 
in the everyday lives of individuals, corporations, and governments, leading 
to what has been called our “surveillance society” (Marx 1985; Gandy 1989; 
Lyon 1994, 2001, 2004) or, more recently, a “culture of surveillance” (Lyon 
2018). While new technologies and big data have enabled both a quantitative 
and qualitative shift in surveillance, these changes have been accompanied 
by a range of social, political, cultural, and economic processes that have 
made surveillance practices appear useful and even necessary. Surveillance 
appears not as a singular, top- down oppressive force, but rather as something 
done both to and by us in our everyday activities. On the one hand, surveil-
lance technologies are officially legitimized by the state as tools for enhancing 
public safety and security. Especially since 9/ 11 and the so- called “war on 
terror,” the state has enhanced its surveillance powers to enable law enforce-
ment and intelligence agencies to collect and use data in domestic policing 
and counter- terrorism cases (Wood, Konvitz, and Ball 2003). From CCTV 
(see e.g., Norris and Armstrong 1999) to bodycams (see e.g., Lippert and 
Newell 2016), to bulk data collection (Ferguson 2017), the surveillance state 
is omnipresent (Greenwald 2014; Harris 2011; Gellman 2020; Keller 2017). 
On the other hand, individuals regularly and more- or- less voluntarily pro-
vide massive amounts of private data to states and corporations through our 
use of smartphones, social media platforms, and other internet- based services 
(Harcourt 2015; Lewis 2017). This personal data has now become the raw 
material in the process of data commodification and behavior modification 














4 Lora Anne Viola and Paweł Laidler
Even though surveillance is normalized through its ubiquitous presence, 
growing awareness of the dangers that pervasive state and corporate sur-
veillance pose to freedom, equality, and other rights has also called forth 
critique and resistance (Lyon 2007). The surveillance studies literature has 
documented and theorized the ways in which surveillance can reduce lib-
erty, amplify (asymmetric) power, and be a technique of governmentality 
used to administer, manage, sort, and distribute (Lyon 2003; Richards 2013; 
Barocas and Selbst 2016). Using arguments of national security and public 
safety, governments have been expanding surveillance powers and, with 
them, the potential for violating rights and freedoms (Monahan 2006, 2010; 
Theoharis 2011; Glennon 2015; Lester 2015;). Furthermore, recent feminist 
theory and critical race scholarship have begun to investigate the ways in 
which surveillance practices and technologies are embedded in and further 
normalize existing systemic inequalities based on race, gender, sexuality, and 
class (see, e.g., the contributions in Dubrofsky and Magnet 2015 and those in 
Koskela 2012; Browne 2015; Van der Meulen and Heynen 2016; Selod 2018). 
Surveillance thus not only presents a threat to individual freedoms, civil liber-
ties, and privacy rights but can also reinforce, reproduce, and create structural 
inequalities.
Recent events have further exposed the ways in which surveillance is inex-
tricably linked to processes of social ordering and social control. Three con-
temporary episodes, in particular, have raised public awareness of the dangers 
and risks of surveillance: the rise of the national security surveillance state 
in the aftermath of 9/ 11, especially the secret practices revealed by Edward 
Snowden;1 the rise of big tech companies and social media platforms that 
sell data without consent or regard to privacy rights, especially brought to 
public attention through the Facebook– Cambridge Analytica data scandal;2 
and, most recently, the COVID- 19 pandemic, which has not only introduced 
a range of new surveillance practices largely accepted because of the public 
health crisis but has also accelerated the digitization of society and the con-
comitant expansion of digital surveillance tools in the workplace, schools, 
and in homes (see Lyon this volume; French and Monahan 2020). One of the 
main features of contemporary surveillance revealed through these episodes 
is its secrecy, which makes it difficult, or almost impossible, for citizens to 
understand the scope, purposes, and effects of surveillance. Furthermore, 
the asymmetric power and knowledge relationship between the institutions 
imposing surveillance and the subjects being surveilled gives rise to relations of 
domination and limits the instruments of accountability available to citizens. 
Through occasional high- profile scandals, usually thanks to disclosures made 
by whistleblowers or the press, societies gain knowledge about programs used 
to collect, store, and process enormous amounts of personal data (Greenwald 
2014; Snowden 2019; Stanger 2019). These disclosures, on the one hand, 
erode trust in institutions and, on the other hand, fuel calls for reforms and 












Trust, transparency, and surveillance 5
This book critically assesses one of the most common narratives used 
to encapsulate current debates regarding surveillance. According to this 
narrative, greater transparency is one of the most promising remedies for 
avoiding the negative effects of surveillance on liberty and, at the same time, 
for restoring the public trust in institutions that is at once necessary for good 
governance but that has eroded as the details of surveillance practices have 
become known (e.g., Schneier 2013). It is commonly asserted, for example, 
that excessive surveillance undermines citizens’ trust in governments and 
businesses and that the loss of trust is socially damaging— something that 
needs to be avoided (Sullivan 2016). Transparency, meanwhile, has become a 
mobilizing idea for resisting or overcoming the negative political, social, and 
economic consequences of surveillance (e.g., Feeney 2017). Harding (2018), 
for example, argues that the rise of the surveillance society has been enabled 
by a collapse of democratic oversight and transparency. Dominant in both 
the scholarly literature and public debate is the conviction that improved 
transparency can promote better- informed decisions and greater oversight, 
and that transparency can restore relations of trust damaged by the secrecy of 
surveillance and the potential abuse that secrecy makes possible (Peters 2013).
The contributions to this volume challenge this conventional narrative by 
critically investigating the theoretical and empirical relationships between 
surveillance, trust, and transparency. While trust, transparency, and surveil-
lance have each been studied extensively on their own, their dynamic inter-
action has received little sustained attention. Moreover, within the context 
of surveillance the positive relationship between trust and transparency is 
often taken to be self- evident. Studying trust and transparency in the con-
text of surveillance is particularly helpful in order to question established 
(usually positively laden) notions of these concepts and to think critically 
about the conditions under which trust and transparency have the effects usu-
ally ascribed to them. This book starts from the observation that an unre-
flective belief  in the virtues of trust and transparency obscures more complex 
dynamics and runs the risk of promoting not only simplistic but perhaps also 
counterproductive proposals for remedying the dangers to liberty that accom-
pany surveillance.
Accordingly, the contributions assembled here seek to shed light on 
urgent questions, such as: under what conditions is more transparency 
necessary to prevent the negative consequences of  surveillance practices? 
Is transparency of  contemporary surveillance practices possible at all? 
Under what conditions do what kinds of  transparency promote account-
ability and prevent oppression, and when does transparency lead to further 
obfuscation and concealment? When does transparency help to equalize 
power relations and when does it serve to entrench inequalities? When and 
under what conditions does trust facilitate the negative consequences of 
surveillance practices, and when does distrust need to be fostered? How can 
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democratic oversight? How do trust and transparency limit or enable the 
expansion of  surveillance practices? What are the legal tools that legitimize 
broad state/ corporate surveillance with little oversight? How do trust and 
transparency affect democracy and the rule of  law, and specifically, what 
opportunities do they present for holding powerful actors— governments 
and corporations— accountable?
What the studies in this book reveal are complex, ambivalent, and some-
times even contradictory pressures in the triadic relationship between trans-
parency, trust, and surveillance. They do so by considering how each in 
practice is modulated by underlying power asymmetries, by socio- historical 
legacies, by economic structures, by cultural distinctiveness, and by institu-
tional constraints. The approaches presented in these chapters suggest that the 
sources and consequences of trust and transparency can only be understood 
by taking into account how they are embedded and constructed in various 
social contexts, such as government institutions, market logics, racialized 
systems, and technological change.
Rethinking the relationship between trust and 
transparency
Contemporary responses to invasive surveillance practices are typically 
dominated by demands for greater protection of privacy rights (see, e.g., Solove 
2011; Angwin 2014; Kuntze 2018) and calls for greater transparency on the 
part of government institutions and corporations that collect and use mass 
data. While demands for privacy protections have been critically examined 
elsewhere (e.g., Allen 2000; Henry 2013; Weinberg 2017), this book builds 
on critiques of transparency as an “unconditional virtue” in contemporary 
society (Bianchi 2013, 2). Transparency is often juxtaposed with surveillance 
and pointed to as a remedy against its dangers, as captured by phrases such 
as “sunshine is the best disinfectant.”3 Transparency generally refers to dis-
closure, defined as a process of seeing through or having access to information 
about the activities undertaken by others, which in turn allows oversight and 
legitimation (Davis and Cuillier 2014; Cain 2015). Pozen (2020, 326) notes 
that “commentators routinely assert or assume that transparency is indispens-
able to government accountability, democratic deliberation, citizen empower-
ment, public- spirited regulation, and public trust in the policy process.” In 
theory, by revealing information that exposes discrepancies between rules 
and practice, transparency allows authority to be held accountable because 
exposed discrepancies can be punished (e.g., through judicial institutions), in 
turn providing incentives for cooperative behavior. But the emerging field of 
critical transparency studies (Koivisto 2019) argues that transparency is not a 
coherent normative ideal, nor is it a clear legal policy or governance practice 
(Pozen and Schudson 2018). Instead, the dynamics of transparency can only 
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and values and thus require a sociological approach (Pozen 2020; Alloa and 
Thomä 2018; McCarthy and Fluck 2017). In this critical spirit, the chapters 
in this volume complicate the positive and even “quasi- religious significance” 
that is often attributed to transparency (Hood 2006, 3).
Transparency is often approached from an epistemological standpoint as 
a condition that allows truth to reveal itself  (Alloa and Thomä 2018, 45). 
Transparency is thus typically understood as a property of information 
(McCarthy and Fluck 2017). But this view becomes problematic to the extent 
that “truth” and “information” never stand alone and are not objectively 
accessible. As Bianchi argues, transparency can have negative consequences 
for accountability and cooperation because it is susceptible to the manipu-
lation of information (Bianchi 2013, 10), rendering transparency a political 
accessory, a convenient “illusion” rather than an accountability mechanism 
(see also Roberts 2011). Building on this critique, Lora Anne Viola’s chapter 
in this volume shows that by considering transparency as a political practice, 
rather than merely as the disclosure of information, we can begin to under-
stand how transparency can come to have counter- intuitive effects, such as 
the legitimation, and even extension, of state surveillance powers. Similarly, 
Paweł Laidler in this volume discusses the political and legal relationship 
between secrecy and transparency in the history of US government surveil-
lance, showing how the rhetoric of “national security” enables a cat- and- 
mouse game between demands for secrecy vs. transparency, making a stable 
regime of true transparency impossible and leading, instead, to transparency 
“traps” that appear to offer (partial) disclosure but no true accountability. 
Mateusz Kolaszyński’s chapter, meanwhile, shows how existing political, 
legal, and institutional contexts in Poland have completely stymied transpar-
ency and oversight mechanisms, rendering them too weak to guard against 
the use of surveillance to curtail rights.
In light of these critiques, we should be cautious about claims that transpar-
ency can rebalance power relations and exert a positive influence on cooper-
ation and compliance. New research shows that transparency that successfully 
exposes the extent to which actors do not comply with rules and expectations 
can be corrosive of social and political order and even legitimate further non-
compliance (e.g., Carnegie and Carson 2018; Curtin and Meijer 2006, 11). 
As O’Neill notes, transparency can foster a “culture of suspicion” (O’Neill 
2002, 77), thus creating societies of control. Research shows, for example, 
that although many post- Communist societies, such as Poland, used exposure 
of former informants and surveillance collaborators as a way of enhancing 
public trust in new democratic institutions, such exposure, in fact, reduced 
public trust (Choi and David 2012). Transparency, in other words, can have 
chilling effects for the same reasons that surveillance does. Matthew Hall’s 
chapter in this volume draws on political philosophy to argue that transpar-
ency makes individuals more acutely aware of the power held over them but 
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Indeed, critical race and feminist theories have shown how transparency 
can become a technique of domination. Fischer (2019), for example, has 
shown how visibility can reinforce notions of “deviance” and thus justify 
state violence against trans people. Rachel Hall (2015), studying transpar-
ency practices on the traveler, theorizes the “aesthetics of transparency” as 
submission to surveillance. Critical race studies have shown how surveillance 
and transparency practices have been informed by colonialism and racial 
oppression that depended on policing black life under slavery (e.g., Browne 
2015; Rosenthal 2018). In a similar vein, Markus Kienscherf in this volume 
discusses how contemporary surveillance practices in the United States have 
their origins in settler colonialism and its system of racialized expropriation. 
The idea that greater transparency can have outright oppressive effects is 
underscored in Shaul Duke’s chapter on Israeli– Palestinian relations, which 
shows how imposed transparency can become a tool of social control and a 
weapon in societal conflicts. With a different focus, Abel Reiberg also explores 
the relationship between transparency and surveillant control by looking at 
how market incentives drive social media platforms to push users toward ever 
greater transparency and self- exposure.
These critiques of transparency do not amount to a wholesale rejection 
of the idea that transparency can bring benefits to democratic governance, 
but they do present a strong argument for thinking about transparency 
more specifically in its particular socio- cultural and political contexts. In 
this spirit, Thorsten Wetzling and Kilian Vieth’s contribution to this volume 
assesses a wide range of good practice recommendations to provide a more 
nuanced picture of how and under what conditions specific legal safeguards 
and transparency mechanisms can produce more effective— rather than 
illusional— oversight.
One of the central justifications for demanding transparency from 
governments and corporations is its perceived importance for restoring trust 
lost through secret, nonconsensual, or invasive surveillance practices. Trust, 
like transparency, mostly takes on a positive normative valence in current 
literature (Etzioni 2010, 389; Hardin 2002a). Trust plays a pervasive role 
in modern social relations and is considered crucial for sustaining social 
cooperation and democratic governance (Cook 2001; Hardin 2002a; Cook, 
Hardin, and Levi 2005; Seligman 1997). Trust is seen as facilitating relations 
between nation states (Kydd 2000), between elected representatives and citi-
zens (Hollyer, Rosendorff, and Vreeland 2019), between government agencies 
and citizens (Fung 2013), and between individuals. Surveillance practices, in 
turn, are seen as detrimental to public trust and corrosive of social relations 
that depend on trust.
Trust can broadly be defined as the belief  of one actor that another actor 
will reciprocate cooperation rather than exploit that cooperation. The “trust 
giver” cooperates with the “trust receiver” in the belief  that he or she will 
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the reaction of the trust receiver. Trust relations can be further distinguished 
based on the actor level (e.g., interpersonal or institutional trust) and on the 
relational distance (e.g., particularized trust or generalized trust). A cen-
tral feature of any trust relation is that it entails risk, a measurable degree 
of uncertainty about whether or not the other side will cooperate (Hardin 
2002a; Kydd 2000). Beyond these basic points, however, the literature on 
trust is divided into understandings of trust as a rational, strategic calculus 
and understandings of trust as a normative, moralistic relationship based on 
socialization rather than strategic interaction (Nannestad 2008). The ration-
alist view draws on insights from game theory and Bayesian analysis and sees 
trust, in Hardin’s (2002a) terms, as “encapsulated self- interest” or the result 
of the rational processing of information about which actors have reasons 
to act in our best interest (see also Hardin 2002a; Kydd 2000, 2007). But as 
others have pointed out (Rathbun 2012, 3– 7), this conception reduces trust 
to compliance based on cost assessments. A normative view, in contrast, sees 
trust as based on the socialized belief  that potential trustees will “do what is 
right” (Uslaner 2002).
The chapters in this volume that focus on trust pick up this debate 
and examine why a normative or sociological understanding of  trust is 
important in our surveillance society. Fredrika Björklund, for example, 
argues that a rational explanation of  trust fails to explain the contradic-
tion between empirical findings that show a positive correlation between 
public trust in institutions and acceptance of  surveillance practices, and 
those that show how surveillance leads to a deterioration of  public trust. 
Sara Degli- Esposti and David Arroyo similarly argue that in order for tech-
nical systems to earn our trust, digital authentication processes need to 
go beyond a rational information logic to include an ethic of  care built 
on the integrity and benevolence of  the operators of  such systems. These 
contributions go beyond game theory to think about the social contexts 
that promote or erode trust.
Although the conventional wisdom treats transparency as the currency 
of trust, there are good theoretical and empirical reasons to see trust and 
transparency as being in tension with one another. The logic of trust works 
through social beliefs that the other will cooperate and reciprocate in the 
absence of monitoring and punishment mechanisms, while transparency 
works through monitoring and punishment. Transparency aims to eliminate 
risk and uncertainty and to increase control, while trust is based on accepting 
a degree of vulnerability. In this sense, trust and transparency can serve as 
substitutes for one another, rather than as mutually reinforcing complements. 
Experimental studies on individuals, for example, show that the more trust-
worthy cooperation partners are perceived to be, the less monitoring is neces-
sary. Conversely, the reliance on monitoring mechanisms, such as among 
employees, inhibits the creation of trust (Schweitzer, Ho, and Zhang 2018). 
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state in this volume provides an example of how transparency can inhibit 
trust- building and foster suspicion and hostility.
What makes trust analytically interesting from the perspective of surveil-
lance practices is precisely that it captures willingness to cooperate even in 
the face of vulnerability to exploitation (Ostrom and Walker 2003). Some 
scholars have argued that surveillance is conducive to the creation of trust, 
since it allows actors to ensure that mutually agreed- upon rules of behavior 
are adhered to (Lombardi and Woods 2008, 723), while others have argued 
that trust is contrary to surveillance because surveillance is based on a logic 
of monitoring, whereas trust expects compliance with rules of behavior in the 
absence of monitoring (Cofta 2007, 20; Neyland 2006, 9). The trust literature 
has raised a number of important questions in this regard, including whether 
legal sanctions reinforce or undermine trust, whether too much trust renders 
the public vulnerable to government corruption or abuse, and whether dis-
trust can be healthy to democratic governance (see, e.g., contributions in 
Braithwaite and Levi 1998; and in Hardin 2004). Paradoxically, too much trust 
can enable the very kind of exploitation and abuse that leads to its erosion, 
and conversely, distrust can enhance the conditions that foster cooperation 
and trust (Sztompka 1998; Hardin 2002b, 2004). Some studies have shown 
that trust in government is a crucial permissive condition for allowing the 
abuse of civil liberties through surveillance because they find evidence that 
high levels of trust in government make citizens more likely to cede their civil 
liberty protections and accept government surveillance practices (Davis and 
Silver 2003, 28– 46). Other studies have shown that low political trust leads 
to greater political activism and involvement (Kaase 1999) or that trust is 
not necessary for cooperation and democratic governance at all (e.g., Cook, 
Hardin, and Levi 2005). These insights suggest a complex relationship between 
trust and distrust that the chapters by Matthew Hall and Miguelángel Verde 
Garrido in this volume consider in the context of surveillance. In different 
ways, both these chapters make a case that distrust is crucial for shoring up 
healthy democratic governance, promoting contestation and deliberation, 
and avoiding domination in a surveillance society.
The contributions of this volume
This book is intended to expose, illuminate, and go some way toward 
resolving the contradictions apparent in the triadic relationship between 
trust, transparency, and surveillance. Building on and integrating insights 
from existing literature, the chapters in this volume revolve around three 
overarching insights. First, they share a critique of “naturalistic” approaches 
to trust and transparency that take these concepts as having a straightfor-
ward meaning and emphasize, instead, the ways in which the meaning and 
implications of trust and transparency are contingent on intersubjective 
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the social construction of these concepts brings into sharper focus their sus-
ceptibility to relations of power, and all chapters touch on the ways in which 
trust and transparency can be tools of power and domination. Third, then, 
the chapters shed light on the conditions under which trust and transpar-
ency, shaped by power relations, technological capabilities, institutions, and 
socio- historical legacies, facilitate or regulate surveillance practices. Not all 
of the contributions address the interplay of all three core concepts, but each 
addresses some combination of them.
The book is divided into three parts. The chapters in Part I focus on trans-
parency and its relation to enabling or restraining surveillance. They stress 
the ways in which the effects of transparency are contingent on the social and 
political contexts and relationships in which it is deployed. Lora Anne Viola’s 
chapter begins this discussion by identifying and critiquing the arguments 
that underpin dominant claims about transparency’s beneficial effects for 
regulating surveillance practices. She then introduces three distorting effects 
of transparency conditioned by a political process that takes place in the 
context of asymmetrical power relations and conflicting strategic interests. 
Through a comparative analysis of legislative reforms meant to curtail sur-
veillance abuses in the United States, United Kingdom, and Germany, she 
shows how transparency can lead to the legitimation and even extension of 
surveillance powers, rather than their regulation. In Chapter 3, Matthew Hall 
similarly considers the chilling effects of transparency as it reveals, rather than 
regulates, the exercise of power. Considering trust and transparency from the 
perspective of neo- republican political theory, which emphasizes liberty as 
nondomination and citizen participation, Hall argues that transparency can 
expose the power of state surveillance but not reduce its harms. Indeed, trans-
parency makes citizens more aware of the power held over them and thus can 
contribute to domination. He considers, instead, alternative forms of trans-
parency and uses of distrust to avoid state surveillance’s infringements upon 
liberty and to foster public deliberation about the purposes of surveillance. 
In Chapters 4 and 5, Shaul Duke and Markus Kienscherf pick up on the 
relationship between transparency and domination in the cases of Israeli– 
Palestinian relations and neo- colonialism in the United States, respectively. 
Duke analyses the relationship between imposed transparency and sur-
veillance in the ongoing conflict between the Israeli state and Palestinians 
living in the West Bank. Transparency, he argues, can become a strategic tool 
that undermines trust, escalates conflict, and does not empower the weak. 
Kienscherf considers surveillance practices as central to the accumulation 
of capital and the formation of race, especially as these practices have been 
used in the process of expropriating and exploiting black labor in the United 
States. He argues that continuing contemporary practices of transparency, 
such as those that monitor workers or track welfare recipients, are part of 
a neocolonial logic of capital that reproduces racial divisions even under 
conditions of formal equality. The policy implication of these contributions 
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is that transparency cannot be blindly relied upon to reduce the harms of sur-
veillance or to restore trust.
The chapters in Part II consider the interactions of trust and transpar-
ency in specific surveillance contexts. In Chapter 6, Paweł Laidler considers 
the evolution of surveillance laws in the US national security state, pointing 
in particular to the perpetual tension between claims that security requires 
secrecy, on the one hand, and claims that transparency rules are required for 
democratic accountability, on the other. By tracing historical and contem-
porary US policies across the three branches of government, especially in 
the wake of Snowden’s leaks, he argues that the United States has never been 
able to reach a stable coexistence between demands for secrecy and demands 
for transparency, as there is a constant tendency to over- correct in one dir-
ection or the other. Picking up on the tension between government demands 
for secrecy and citizen demands for accountability through transparency, in 
Chapter 7 Mateusz Kolaszyński traces the legal and institutional legacies in 
post- Communist Poland that have rendered efforts to restrain the surveil-
lance powers of the state futile. Instead, he shows how institutional changes 
have strengthened the state’s surveillance powers even in the face of counter- 
pressures from internal (e.g., civil society) and external (e.g., EU) actors. 
Almost as if  in reply to Laidler and Kolaszyński’s concerns, in Chapter 8 
Thorsten Wetzling and Kilian Vieth propose a set of concrete best practices 
taken from real- world examples that can make transparency work to reduce 
the risks of harm from state surveillance. Sharing with us their think tank 
expertise, this chapter brings theoretical arguments into dialogue with current 
policy debates to yield concrete recommendations. In Chapter 9, Abel Reiberg 
turns to consider the role of transparency and surveillance in social media 
platforms. Using the example of Facebook, he teases out the market logic 
by which corporations pressure users to become increasingly transparent 
while creating incentives for platforms and their data use to remain inscrut-
able. Reiberg’s case study shows how transparency is used to develop “legit-
imate” regimes of surveillance in capitalist markets. Together, the chapters in 
this section shed light on the potentials (and pitfalls) of institutional change 
for achieving an acceptable balance between transparency and secrecy, and 
between trust and distrust.
The chapters in Part III turn to focus on the issue of trust and distrust 
by reflecting on the varied sources and types of trust, including mistrust, 
and their ability to reduce the harms that can be caused by surveillance. 
The contributions in this section argue that the causes and effects of trust 
beliefs are contingent rather than immutable and can only be understood 
as embedded in specific social and political contexts. Fredrika Björklund in 
Chapter 10 begins by considering the contradiction between the many empir-
ical studies that show a positive correlation between trust in public institutions 
and acceptance of invasive surveillance practices and the widespread argu-
ment that invasive surveillance practices erode trust in society. She argues that 
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we can go some way to resolving this contradiction by moving away from 
a rational understanding of trust as the result of good (or poor) perform-
ance to think instead about the shared social values and experiences that 
shape trust relations. By embedding trust beliefs into specific socio- cultural 
settings, we can better understand how trust relations change over time and 
space, and across different communities and issue areas. In this same vein, in 
Chapter 11 Sara Degli- Esposti and David Arroyo consider what trust might 
mean when we are increasingly dependent on machines and algorithms while 
having ever more limited knowledge and power to hold them accountable. In 
thinking about how notions of trust are affected by changing epistemological 
and technological standards, they argue that digital technology requires us to 
have mechanisms to ensure that the humans who design and operate digital 
systems are trustworthy. Rather than base these mechanisms on rational- 
instrumental motives, they argue for the importance of generating a pro-
fessional ethics of care among those who design and run digital systems. In 
Chapter 12, Miguelángel Verde Garrido considers the value of the public’s 
lack of trust for generating trustworthy democratic institutions. Through case 
study analysis of abusive surveillance practices in the United States, Poland, 
and Germany, he argues for a “militant democracy” that can ensure and 
enhance government trustworthiness through institutions of oversight and 
accountability and citizen engagement. His argument highlights the role of 
democratic institutions in providing corrections when breaches of trust occur 
and describes how, through its dynamic nature, healthy distrust can restore 
trust and support democratic norms. The volume is rounded out with a con-
cluding chapter by David Lyon, providing an outlook that opens the horizon 
to the larger issues at stake in the book. In particular, Lyon considers how 
human agency can be mobilized to bring forth an ethics of care and digital 
justice that allows the technological innovations underpinning surveillance to 
be used for, and not against, human flourishing.
This book grows out of two workshops, one held at the Freie Universität in 
Berlin in 2018 and a second at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow in 2019, 
as well as several conference sections and panels in 2019, through which we 
brought together a group of scholars from different disciplines interested in 
exploring the relationship between trust and transparency in the context of 
surveillance. Funding for our meetings and research was provided by joint 
grants from the German National Research Foundation (DFG, Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft) and the Polish National Science Center (NCN, 
Narodowe Centrum Nauki).4 The participants in this collaborative endeavor 
come from diverse fields, including surveillance studies, political science, 
security studies, constitutional law, sociology, and political philosophy. They 
bring to this volume disciplinary and interdisciplinary perspectives reflecting 
their academic backgrounds and also their personal expertise and different 
national contexts. The contributions also display a variety of research strat-
egies, including comparative case studies, country case studies, legal analysis, 
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policy analysis, and analytical political theory. The multidisciplinary and 
international character of the volume are key strengths that allow it to address 
political, legal, economic, historical, and cultural aspects of the relationship 
between trust, transparency, and surveillance.
This is not to say, however, that we have been able to address all the 
facets and aspects that deserve consideration. There is much work still to be 
done and many avenues for research that we have not been able to pursue 
here, including further work from the perspectives of gender, race, and 
intersectionality, research on specific technologies, and work on corporate 
surveillance and big data, especially as these intersect with state surveillance 
practices. Furthermore, the COVID- 19 pandemic began just as this project 
reached completion, so we have not been able to address the many associated 
challenges for surveillance, trust, and transparency that will most certainly 
emerge. Fortunately, however, in the concluding chapter David Lyon reflects 
on the challenges of the pandemic in the context of thinking about how we can 
promote human flourishing and justice in an age of surveillance. Especially 
because of all the work that still needs to be done, and that could not be 
undertaken here, our hope is that this volume brings attention to the import-
ance of thinking about the compatibilities and contradictions that arise in the 
interactions among trust, transparency, and surveillance, and that it sheds 
some light on the contingencies and complexities of these relationships.
Notes
 1 In 2013, the whistleblower copied about two million classified documents, relating 
mostly to the operations conducted by the NSA, which revealed several secretive 
surveillance programs and activities, as well as the scope of data collection by the 
US government.
 2 The scandal, first reported in 2015, involved the company Cambridge Analytica 
harvesting personal data from millions of Facebook users without consent and 
then using this data to create targeted political advertising that it sold to political 
campaigns. The scandal was an example of privacy breaches, the commodification 
of data, and the use of such data to influence democratic processes (Chen 2018).
 3 This phrase, quoted often in the context of surveillance, was famously used by US 
Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis in a 1913 Harper’s Weekly article entitled 
“What Publicity Can Do.”
 4 The project was titled Trust and Transparency in an Age of Surveillance: American, 
German, and Polish Perspectives (TATAS) led by Lora Anne Viola and Paweł 
Laidler, and was funded by grant numbers: DFG Project #381384607 and NCN 
Project #2016/ 23/ G/ HS5/ 01864.
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The limits of transparency as a 
tool for regulating surveillance
A comparative study of the United States, 
United Kingdom, and Germany
Lora Anne Viola
Introduction
In an interview with The Guardian, Edward Snowden explained that his dis-
closure of the massive scale of government surveillance was motivated by 
the conviction that greater transparency was necessary in order for citizens 
to properly hold government to account. Snowden was clear that “harming 
people isn’t my goal. Transparency is” (Greenwald 2013). Since Snowden’s 
revelations, greater government transparency has been touted as the only 
way to restore the trust so damaged by the secrecy of surveillance and the 
potential abuse that secrecy makes possible (see, e.g., Schneier 2013, 2015). 
Indeed, along with “privacy,” “transparency” has become a mobilizing idea 
for resisting or overcoming the negative consequences of surveillance. While 
the extent to which privacy should be protected and the best means for doing 
so are intensely debated, the idea of transparency is invoked almost reflex-
ively in a positive way in the public sphere, with little debate about how much 
transparency we need and what, exactly, we expect transparency to do to 
the politics of surveillance. However, a critical discussion of how and under 
what conditions transparency can temper the harms of surveillance seems 
necessary in light of the fact that Snowden’s public revelations appear to have 
normalized rather than curtailed state surveillance practices.
Beginning in early June 2013, Snowden’s leaks exposed the means and 
extent by which the United States National Security Agency (NSA) engaged 
in bulk data collection. Beyond the United States, the leaked documents 
also implicated the United Kingdom (UK), especially via the British 
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), and Germany, via 
the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), in mass surveillance practices. The 
revelations generated heated debates in all three countries and led to calls 
for reform and regulation of surveillance practices; specifically, reformers 
focused on ending or curbing bulk data collection and providing over-
sight mechanisms for surveillance activities. In all three countries, review 
committees and commissions were established and regulatory legislation 
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seemed to be underway: investigations produced public information about 
secret programs that in turn led to outrage, debate, and legislative reform with 
the intent to regulate and prevent abuses. Seen in another light, however, the 
United States, UK, and German cases present proponents of transparency 
with a puzzle. Neither the initial revelations nor the subsequent publicity of 
the extent of government surveillance practices led to rigorous limitations on 
surveillance in any of the three countries. In fact, the public debates around 
the surveillance practices, the outcomes of parliamentary investigations, and 
the subsequent policy changes had the effect of politically legitimizing, partly 
legalizing, and even extending surveillance practices. What is more, this was 
not only the likely effect but also the likely intention of some policymakers 
who saw the revelations as an opportunity to enable rather than to regulate 
surveillance. In these cases, it would seem, transparency had effects opposite 
to those anticipated by advocates. This chapter seeks to explain why this was 
so by thinking about the mechanisms and conditions that enable or limit 
transparency’s regulatory effects. Given the hope placed in transparency, it 
is crucial to ask whether, when, and to what extent public revelations about 
surveillance practices yield effective regulatory regimes.
Transparency is always embedded in expectations about what it can do or 
enable. I begin by identifying the various arguments that underpin dominant 
claims about transparency’s beneficial effects while critiquing the assumptions 
that underlie these claims in order to underscore the fragility and contingency 
of transparency. I argue that naturalistic approaches to transparency miss 
the ways in which its effects are linked to relations of power and embedded 
in socio- strategic contexts. Ultimately, transparency is not a coherent norm 
or practice, and so on its own it is inept at achieving sustainable regulatory 
outcomes (Pozen 2020). Second, I work out three alternative effects that 
transparency can have when we allow that transparency is subject to the 
politics of power: the condoning effect, the ratcheting effect, and the circ-
ling the wagons effect. By identifying alternative mechanisms through which 
transparency works, we can better understand its ambivalent nature. Third, 
I consider how disclosures about government surveillance practices affected 
surveillance legislation in three countries— the United States, Germany, and 
the UK. Snowden’s revelations have forced governments around the world to 
respond to public outrage over mass surveillance, but I argue that these cases 
illustrate the “transparency trap”— the ways in which the apparent revelation 
of previously secret surveillance practices can lead to their legitimation, and 
even extension, rather than limitation. When transparency is focused on the 
revelation of information, the incentives can become counterproductive to 
regulatory goals. Transparency on its own is insufficient, and calls for greater 
transparency can be nominally followed while substantively backfiring. 
Following recent arguments from the emerging critical transparency litera-
ture, I suggest that a more productive approach to transparency in the context 
of surveillance is to understand it not as the disclosure of information but as 
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an ongoing sociological and communicative practice whose effects are con-
tingent on the social, strategic, and power contexts in which it operates (see 
Pozen 2020; Koivitso 2019; Fischer 2019; Alloa 2018; Alloa and Thomä 2018; 
McCarthy and Fluck 2017).
The logics of transparency: a critical reconsideration
In contrast to surveillance, transparency has a strongly positive normative 
connotation as a means of preserving democracy, facilitating cooperation, 
preventing abuse of power, and promoting trust (e.g., see the critical dis-
cussion in Bianchi 2013; Peters 2013; Hood 2006). Transparency is often 
invoked as an inherent good and a self- evident remedy for countering gov-
ernment abuses by enhancing democratic deliberation and enabling govern-
ment accountability. But to assess these promises and potential pitfalls of 
transparency, we first have to understand how and under what conditions it 
can have such effects. By what mechanisms do claims about transparency’s 
beneficial effects work? How robust are these claims? Untangling the various 
logics— the chain of mechanisms that are presumed to lead to outcomes— 
upon which the claims of transparency’s effectiveness rest can help to under-
stand when, under what circumstances, and to what extent transparency can 
be regulative of surveillance. From prevailing arguments, we can identify 
several distinct logics of transparency based on its presumed normative and 
functional benefits. I outline these here and question the assumptions about 
information, effectiveness, and trust upon which common arguments about 
the good of transparency rest.
Transparency as an inherent normative good
In the first place, transparency is often endorsed on the basis of its presumed 
normative merits (Carson 2010); that is, on the basis of a logic of appropri-
ateness (March and Olsen 2011). In this usage, transparency is a good in itself  
because it is right and appropriate and it appears to correspond with other 
values we hold, such as truth- telling. This approach draws on a deep- seated 
cultural idea about the correlation between secrecy and lying on the one 
hand, and between openness and honesty on the other hand, with the former 
coded as bad and the latter as desirable (Carson 2010). Honesty and transpar-
ency, however, are not identical. Honesty is based on the prohibition against 
telling lies, and thus it is a negative rule that instructs us in what not to do. 
Transparency, in contrast, is a positive imperative that instructs us not only 
not to hide but also to be candid and to be willing to reveal information. This 
positive imperative seriously complicates the normative value of transparency 
in the absence of normative rules that adjudicate when there is harm or benefit 
in revelation. Moreover, such a normative justification would have to take 







24 Lora Anne Viola
conditions under which we can be assured that we have been transparent. 
This requires some judgment about what information is important to reveal 
in the first place and some way of ascertaining whether true transparency has 
been achieved. In other words, transparency can only take on meaning in an 
intersubjective context that is itself  subject to negotiation and renegotiation. 
For these reasons alone, we should be skeptical that transparency can carry 
the burden of being an inherently positive normative value.
Transparency as information: a condition for democratic 
decision- making
More often, though, transparency is acclaimed on the grounds of its func-
tional benefits and, in particular, for the functional role it plays in supporting 
democratic values and procedures. Rather than a logic of appropriateness, the 
virtues of transparency are in this approach based on a logic of consequences 
(March and Olsen 2011). We can identify at least two distinct consequentialist 
arguments. The first sees transparency as a condition that facilitates partici-
pation and choice via information sharing (transparency- as- information). 
Transparency here is related to a liberal understanding of democracy as rooted 
in popular participation, one that emphasizes transparency as necessary for 
choice. Democracies are expected to be open about decisions, to include the 
public in deliberation, and to seek the public’s consent. In order for the public 
to effectively participate in political decision- making, it requires publicly 
available information about government activities, goals, and procedures. The 
importance of transparency- as- information for democratic decision- making 
is defended on two distinct grounds: its efficiency- enhancing effects and its 
legitimacy- enhancing effects.
In the view of classical liberal thinkers such as Locke, Mill, Rousseau, 
or Bentham, transparency enhances the efficiency or effectiveness or, in 
Bentham’s terms, utility of democracy (see the discussion in Fenster 2006). 
Transparency is valued as pro- democratic because it allows citizens to make 
better choices and more informed decisions about which policies to support. 
Fung argues that “information should be publicly available in proportion to 
the extent to which that information enables citizens to protect their vital 
interests” (Fung 2013, 202). Transparency, in this account, means the dis-
closure of information that provides the public with clarity about the actions 
of government and provides the conditions to influence government priorities 
and steer policy outcomes in response to the public’s needs and preferences. 
It serves as a prerequisite for informed consent and, therefore, popular sover-
eignty (Dahl 1971; Hollyer et al. 2011).
A more critical version of  this argument sees transparency- as- information 
not in terms of  its efficiency- enhancing effects but in terms of  what we might 
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this view, is important because the disclosure and publicity of  information 
contributes to communication and rational deliberation, which, in turn, are 
crucial to successful participatory democracy. Information forms the foun-
dation for argumentation and common meaning- making. Habermas’s idea 
of  deliberative democracy, for example, rests on the principle of  transpar-
ency as a prerequisite for rational, critical public debate and communication 
in the public sphere (Habermas 1991, 208– 209; Guttman and Thompson 
1996, 100– 101). In theory, transparent deliberation can create an environ-
ment in which ideas are rationally proposed and probed and questioned, 
tested and rejected or accepted. In the ideal case, prevailing views can change 
when confronted with evidence and arguments, truth can be revealed, and a 
voluntary consensus can be achieved. A similar position is taken by Rawls, 
who identifies publicity as necessary for a just society because it allows indi-
viduals to choose and agree on common principles (Rawls 1971, 16, 454, 
1993, 35).
The transparency- as- information approach is problematic, however, insofar 
as it rests on a relatively naive assumption that the disclosure of information 
is a straightforward process and that transparency is indeed informative. This 
link between transparency and democratic decision- making assumes that 
information can be fully and comprehensively disclosed and that more infor-
mation will get us closer to the accurate truth (Albu and Flyverbom 2016, 14). 
The assumption here is that the transmission of information is a mechanical 
process that does not require interpretation and cannot be manipulated. This 
stands in contrast to an understanding of information as always situated, that 
is only meaningful as it is processed, interpreted, and mediated (McCarthy 
and Fluck 2017). Information is subject to power, to instrumental use, to stra-
tegic interaction, and simply to social discourses, conventions, and practices. 
In this understanding, then, transparency cannot refer simply to the unveiling 
or making visible of what is already there. Transparency as a practice is 
already implicated in constructing what it is that becomes visible. In this way, 
transparency can reinforce dominant narratives of what we think we “see.” 
Fischer (2019), for example, shows how the visibility of trans people has 
normalized their representation as deceptive, deviant, and threatening— thus 
legitimating their violent disciplining. Another large body of empirical lit-
erature has shown that transparency can lead actors to distort their decisions 
by engaging in herding and conformism such that the tendency to engage 
in dissent decreases (Prat 2005), or by engaging in strategic “gaming” and 
antiherding (Levy 2004, 2007). Empirical literature that studies the effects 
of transparency on deliberation emphasizes the strong and negative effects 
that transparency has on producing conformity— not the Habermasian ideal 
of enlightened consensus but rather the pressure of concealing disagreement 
and diversity (Fehrler and Hughes 2018). In this sense, transparency produces 
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Transparency as monitoring: a condition for democratic 
accountability
A second consequentialist logic understands transparency as a condition 
for accountability that operates via a monitoring mechanism (transparency- 
as- monitoring). Indeed, some have argued that the most significant conse-
quence of transparency is that it allows the public to monitor government 
activity and hold it accountable (Meijer 2014). The assumption underpinning 
this approach is that governments (or authoritative powers more generally) 
have the power and ability to act against the will of the people or harm the 
collective welfare. Transparency enables monitoring government activity for 
transgressions that can then be corrected or punished. Transparency, on this 
account, works both via an ex ante disciplining effect and an ex post puni-
tive effect. The deterrent effect is that the fear of consequences of exposure 
should induce self- disciplining and, therefore, more favorable behavior. The 
punitive component is that exposure should make punishment more likely— 
either directly through reputational costs (e.g., shaming, shunning, etc.) or by 
activating procedural measures (e.g., due process).
This view of transparency rests on an adversarial approach that emphasizes 
not public collaboration (or participation) in ruling but a rebalancing of 
power between the government and the public (Pozen and Schudson 2018). 
On these grounds, McCarthy and Fluck criticize advocates of transparency 
for promoting “the creation of monitory democracy, rather than participa-
tory democracy” (McCarthy and Fluck 2017, 422). In this logic, transparency 
becomes indistinguishable from surveillance itself  in that it works as a mode 
of control. To the extent that both transparency and surveillance operate on 
the basis of monitoring in an effort to deter or punish certain behaviors, trans-
parency would have the potential to evoke the same kind of social distortions 
as surveillance— including chilling effects, self- monitoring, and reduction of 
liberties. Moreover, making transgressions transparent can reveal them as the 
“norm,” and transgressions that are revealed but left unsanctioned can be, 
paradoxically, legitimized and made acceptable through transparency.
Transparency as a condition for trust
Taken together, the above arguments in favor of  transparency are often 
pushed one step further to claim that transparency— precisely because 
it enhances efficiency and accountability— also promotes trust. To the 
extent that public trust is considered crucial to governance and, in par-
ticular, democratic governance (Cook 2001; Hardin 2002a; Cook et al. 
2005), transparency is promoted as a policy goal of  its own. In these 
arguments, trust is directly linked to access to information and the possi-
bility of  public scrutiny. Transparency provides a costly signal because it 
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transgressions, and so our confidence— or trust— should be greater toward 
those willing to be subject to scrutiny (Brugger et al. 2013, 67; Kydd 2000; 
Hardin 2002a).
This theorized relationship between transparency and public trust is prob-
lematic on two counts. First, it assumes again that transparency is somehow 
neutral or objective and not subject to interpretation, meaning- making, 
manipulation, and counterintuitive reactions. Second, this view conceives of 
trust as the result of the risk management that transparency affords, reducing 
trust to a notion of compliance based on cost assessments (Rathbun 2012, 
3– 7; Bugger et al. 2013, 74). But if  trust is to have any independent theoret-
ical leverage beyond instrumental calculus, then it needs to be conceptualized 
as willingness to cooperate under conditions of vulnerability to exploitation, 
rather than under conditions of verifiability. In this view, trust works through 
social beliefs that others will cooperate and reciprocate in the absence of 
monitoring and punishment mechanisms (Uslaner 2002). Trust, unlike trans-
parency, is not a mode of control. Transparency, then, cannot restore or estab-
lish trust, but rather, it substitutes for it by providing a monitoring mechanism 
that enables enforcement. Indeed, transparency can be a powerful signal of 
distrust to the extent that it is used as a monitoring mechanism (O’Neill 2002; 
Hardin 2002b). Even more, greater transparency can reduce trust in part-
ners by exposing deceptions as the norms— e.g., “they’re all crooks”— or by 
fueling fears of punishment. In the foreign policy world, recent work shows 
that greater transparency in international relations can actually reduce trust 
in partners by exposing deceptions and “normalizing” them (Carnegie and 
Carson 2018).
The ready embrace of transparency as a watchword for normative and 
instrumental ends masks difficult questions. In particular, does transparency 
always promote accountability and cooperation? Under what conditions does 
it do so or fail to do so? If  transparency, understood as disclosure, is a way of 
regulating behavior, then how is conduct disciplined or normalized by trans-
parency, under what conditions, and with what consequences?
Three distorting effects of transparency
The broader problem with standard views on the beneficial effects of trans-
parency and the mechanisms by which transparency achieves them is that they 
are rooted in an understanding of transparency as the objective disclosure of 
information, without paying much attention to the intersubjective and stra-
tegic contexts in which transparency as a communicative act occurs. Critical 
transparency studies, in contrast, see transparency “as complex communica-
tive, organizational, and social processes rife with tensions and negotiations, 
and largely unsettles the assumed positive effects of information disclosure” 
(Albu and Flyverbom 2016, 10). Transparency does not “merely” disclose 
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power, in turn, condition the kinds of effects transparency can have on socio-
political relations.
If  we take transparency to be embedded in social relations, then we should 
expect complex strategic interactions to arise. Indeed, empirical works 
on transparency from a variety of fields ranging from labor economics to 
psychology to criminology have noted this. Drawing on insights from crit-
ical transparency studies, in this section I discuss three dynamics through 
which transparency might lead not to the regulation of surveillance, but to its 
wider use, undermining accountability and reducing the effectiveness of civil 
society critique to shape policy. These three dynamics, resulting in what I label 
the condoning effect, the ratcheting effect, and the circling the wagons effect, 
are based on a notion of transparency not as the simple revelation of infor-
mation but as a strategic and political process of negotiation over meaning 
that takes place in the context of asymmetrical power relations. The idea is 
both to offer a corrective to the positive/ progressive bias implicit in dominant 
understandings of transparency and also— importantly— to better grasp how 
demands for transparency might promote rather than restrain state surveil-
lance practices.
First, what I call the condoning effect is triggered when high levels of 
revealed noncompliance reduce the perceived social opprobrium for violating 
the norm and lead instead to demands for normalizing or legitimizing the 
behavior. The revelations that follow from transparency offer an opportunity 
not only to condemn the behavior, as an accountability approach might argue, 
but also to discuss and normalize it.1 In the case of surveillance, exposure of 
illegal surveillance led both to public outrage and to debates about how to 
legalize it. Thus, under the guise of reform legislation, many illegal surveil-
lance practices exposed by Snowden were given a legal basis and, therefore, 
legitimized. Arguably, the widespread revelations of surveillance— not just by 
the NSA but also by private firms such as Facebook— have normalized the 
idea of collecting and utilizing mass data. Exposure and disclosure imply that 
the behavior is more widespread than anticipated, thus removing the taboo.
Second, the ratcheting effect is activated when disclosure of specific 
violations of the rule or norm creates incentives for more of the same behavior 
because of revelations that “others are doing it too.” This can happen, for 
example, when asymmetries are disclosed that appear threatening or that 
appear to require a response in kind. In this case, the reaction might be not to 
sanction the violation with greater legal restrictions but to allow something 
like “self- defense” by engaging in the same violations and thereby removing 
the asymmetry. In the gun law debate in the United States, for example, cases 
of gun violence often have the counterintuitive effect of leading not to greater 
gun restrictions but rather to calls for more widespread use of weapons, such 
as by arming teachers. In the surveillance debate, this might be illustrated 
by calls to engage in ultraexposure or ultraexhibitionism as a way to reclaim 
control over the externalization of information and as an act of resistance 
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against the profiling, sorting, and categorization that surveillance performs. 
In the case of counterterrorism this often takes the form of “we need all the 
tools at our disposal” to fight the perceived threat, and even more so now 
that our tools have been revealed. In the case of US– German relations, there 
was a lot of anxiety about the greater technological capacity of the United 
States. A number of German politicians argued that Germany needed to step 
up its own surveillance practices in order to meet the threat of the Americans 
rather than engage in greater regulation that would hamper its ability to com-
pete and leave it exposed to the power asymmetry. The “everyone is doing it” 
argument was used as rhetorical justification for the empowerment of BND 
surveillance in the German case. In all three cases considered below, once 
exposed, the intelligence community used the exposure and transparency to 
argue for even greater measures.
Third, the circling the wagons effect is at work when the anticipated exposure 
that comes from transparency creates incentives for complicity in opacity. At 
the level of the government, the monitoring implications of transparency 
might trigger a fear of evaluation and lead to self- censoring or strategic dis-
closure, such that the presumed benefits of transparency are not attainable 
and surveillance programs are protected. This is familiar on the individual 
level as the chilling effect, when, for example, the recording of deliberations 
leads participants to alter their utterances or engage in self- censorship in 
anticipation of possible negative consequences (see Hall, this volume). In the 
case of state surveillance, transparency requirements might lead to the cre-
ation of a double- move of partial revelations combined with greater secrecy, 
for example, through the increasing usage of top- secret classifications or 
through resistance to rules of oversight, thereby enabling and empowering 
the circumvention of transparency (Priest and Arkin 2011; also Laidler, this 
volume). This backlash effect creates practices that restrict information dis-
closure, minimize oversight, or entrench ineffective programs in anticipation 
of the negative effects of transparency and the desire to protect the surveil-
lance programs in question.
All three dynamics highlight processes by which transparency can have a 
distorting effect on democratic demands for regulating and restricting sur-
veillance. In the next section, I argue that all three are present in the public 
debates and government responses to Snowden’s revelations in the United 
States, UK, and Germany.
The transparency trap: legislative reform of 
surveillance in the United States, UK, and Germany
The public disclosures by Snowden were wide ranging and implicated not only 
the United States but also surveillance in the UK and Germany. Arguably, 
public outrage and the government response were strongest in these three 
countries. Governments in all three countries came under intense pressure to 
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investigate Snowden’s claims and to offer policy reforms. All three countries 
indeed passed legislation at about the same time aimed at regulating surveil-
lance practices. While the details in each case differ, I argue that they follow 
a similar pattern for the period under investigation, 2003– 2019. First, out-
rage over revelations led to calls for greater transparency, leading to further 
revelations and calls for regulation. Second, in the process of formulating 
legislative measures to restrict surveillance abuses, (1) the state ends up con-
doning the condemned surveillance practices by providing them with a legal 
basis, (2) the state ratchets up surveillance practices by legislating even more 
extensive surveillance powers in order to be “competitive” against threats, and 
(3) some actors succeed in circling the wagons— i.e., promoting protections of 
surveillance practices and surveillance agencies against too much transpar-
ency, oversight, and regulation.
The US case: the USA Freedom Act (2015)
While Snowden’s disclosures had global reverberations, they were primarily 
concerned with the surveillance programs of the US government and, in 
particular, the NSA. Snowden’s leak of massive amounts of information 
regarding government surveillance practices generated an intense debate 
about the extent, methods, and secrecy of surveillance. In response to public 
outrage, President Obama initially defended the importance of surveillance 
for counterterrorism measures and for ensuring the security of the country 
while downplaying its costs. In his first statement on the revelations, he 
quipped, “You can’t have 100% security and also then have 100% privacy 
and zero inconvenience” (Obama 2013). Slowly, and pushed by the nature 
and extent of the revelations, Obama acknowledged that secret mass data 
collection programs were problematic due to the lack of a legal basis for many 
NSA activities. He appointed an expert panel, the President’s Review Group 
on Intelligence and Communications Technologies, to review surveillance 
practices and laws. In addition, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight 
Board (PCLOB), in response to Snowden’s leaks, engaged in a comprehen-
sive review of warrantless surveillance allowed under the Patriot Act. Both 
of these investigations confirmed the need for surveillance powers to thwart 
terrorism but also recommended proposals to introduce some limits on and 
greater transparency of government surveillance. The PCLOB concluded that 
the Patriot Act did not provide a legal basis for the NSA to collect bulk meta-
data. Although Obama had previously signed extensions of the Patriot Act, 
he responded to the new concerns by signing a new law— the USA Freedom 
Act— that was meant to restrict bulk data collection and enhance transpar-
ency of surveillance practices. The Freedom Act is the central legislative 
reform response to the Snowden revelations in the United States.
Although the Freedom Act is seen by many, especially outside the United 
States, as a significant effort to limit surveillance powers, the law in effect 
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reaffirms and even expands the government’s legal surveillance powers. In a 
clear example of the condoning effect, Snowden’s leaked information led the 
government to seek a stronger legal basis to legitimize the revealed surveil-
lance practices. The expiration of the Patriot Act sunset provisions would have 
ended the legal basis for continued surveillance programs, but the Freedom 
Act reprises and extends that legal basis. As Obama (2015) put it:
After a needless delay and inexcusable lapse in important national 
security authorities, my Administration will work expeditiously to ensure 
our national security professionals again have the full set of vital tools 
they need to continue protecting the country. Just as important, enact-
ment of this legislation will strengthen civil liberty safeguards and pro-
vide greater public confidence in these programs, including by prohibiting 
bulk collection through the use of Section 215, FISA [Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act] pen registers, and National Security Letters and by pro-
viding the American people with additional transparency measures.
The Freedom Act did reform the telephone metadata collection program, for-
bidding the data from being transferred to and stored on government servers.2 
The data stays with telephone companies and is kept for 180 days, and it 
can only be transferred to intelligence agencies on the basis of a Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) court warrant. Such warrant requests 
must be based on specific criteria to avoid bulk collection. In addition, warrant 
requests are made in a FISA court in the presence of citizen privacy advocates, 
and the requirements for publication of FISA court rulings were expanded. 
Nevertheless, it remains trivially easy to obtain a FISA court warrant, and 
according to the government itself, the Freedom Act greatly expanded the 
overall volume of call detail records subject to query pursuant to court order.3 
According to the “Statistical Transparency Report,” created to comply with 
the terms of the Freedom Act, 2017 tripled the number of call detail records 
(543 million) collected compared to the previous year (Office of the Director 
of National Intelligence 2018). This is still far less than the billions of records 
swept up before the Freedom Act, but it indicates that mass telephony data 
collection has hardly stopped in spite of Obama’s promise of “prohibiting bulk 
collection.” Moreover, while the Freedom Act addressed some of the concerns 
connected to the Patriot Act, it did not address the broader statutory basis for 
security surveillance. Most importantly, the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 
(FAA), which authorized the NSA’s PRISM surveillance program, remains 
in place.4 The FAA was itself  a response to whistleblower revelations in 2005/ 
2006 that the NSA under the Bush administration was involved in warrantless 
wiretapping (Risen and Lichtblau 2005; Cauley 2006). The exposure of sur-
veillance to public scrutiny in 2005 and 2006 led to the passage of the FAA in 
2008. While the FAA was nominally meant to restrict surveillance and pro-
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legal basis for expanded surveillance powers and reduced restrictions on the 
targeting of persons. The FAA has been repeatedly reauthorized by Congress 
with bipartisan support, most recently in January 2018 for six years. Overall, 
the public discussion about previously secret surveillance practices, enabled 
by whistleblowers, did not lead to the disavowal of those practices, but rather 
to an acknowledgment of their existence and a bolstering of their legal basis, 
providing them official legitimacy.
Another consequence of revealing secret surveillance practices has been 
the ratcheting effect. The intelligence community has continued to argue that 
transparency over secret surveillance programs has left the country exposed 
to security threats, thus justifying greater surveillance measures. US intel-
ligence agencies have carried out numerous classified assessments of the 
damage caused by Snowden’s disclosures. The counterintelligence center con-
tinues to claim that damage has been observed or verified, including putting 
US personnel or facilities at risk, damaging intelligence collection efforts, 
exposing surveillance tools, and destabilizing US intelligence capabilities 
(Riechmann 2018). The disclosure of information through whistleblowers 
has provided ammunition for some to argue for even greater, rather than 
more restrictive, surveillance powers. Senator Mitch McConnell criticized the 
passage of the Freedom Act, stating that “It surely undermines American 
security by taking one more tool from our war fighters, in my view, at exactly 
the wrong time” (quoted in Strobel and Zengerle 2015). When the November 
2015 Paris attacks occurred a few months after the bill’s passage, Director 
of the CIA John Brennan called the attacks a “wake- up call” for the United 
States to continue controversial surveillance practices, including those that 
had been mildly limited under the Freedom Act. Brennan asserted that efforts 
to curtail surveillance practices “make our ability to collectively, internation-
ally, to find these terrorists much more challenging” (quoted in The Editorial 
Board 2015). Even a modest limit on surveillance practices with dubious 
effectiveness is seen within the intelligence community as an impediment to 
counterterrorism.
Within the intelligence community, Snowden’s revelations triggered a 
move to “circle the wagons”— that is, to reduce the anticipated damage that 
might come about through transparency by protecting existing programs and 
maintaining secrecy where possible, leading in turn to further distortions 
of policymaking (Lester 2015). Before Snowden’s disclosures, there was 
already concern within the intelligence community that the massive amount 
of data collected was inefficient and ineffective. Ironically, the call detail 
record program that was reined in but not discontinued by the Freedom Act 
was probably prolonged by the legislation. According to some intelligence 
officials, “If  Snowden hadn’t revealed it, NSA probably would have dumped 
it on their own.” It did not, because “There was a great desire to circle the 
wagons …” (Nakashima 2019). Indeed, the NSA continued to defend the use-






The limits of transparency 33
program was ineffective and advised the government to discontinue it (Strobel 
and Volz 2019). Nonetheless, on August 14, 2019, the Trump administration 
asked Congress to permanently reauthorize all provisions of the Freedom Act, 
including the controversial call detail record program.5 Outgoing Director of 
National Intelligence, Dan Coats, acknowledged that the program had been 
suspended on the grounds of its ineffectiveness but argued that it should 
nevertheless be renewed to give the government every possible tool to con-
front its adversaries. In a letter to Congress, he argued that “as technology 
changes, our adversaries’ tradecraft and communications habits will continue 
to evolve and adapt. In light of this dynamic environment, the Administration 
supports reauthorization of this provision” (Savage 2019; Guariglia 2019).6 
The logic here seems to be defensive and conservative in the fear that some-
thing might be taken away— even if  that program is demonstrably not useful.
The UK case: the Investigatory Powers Act (2016)
The Snowden revelations implicated the GCHQ in mass surveillance practices 
and began a debate about the legal basis of bulk data collection, use, and 
retention policies in the UK. Snowden’s information on secret govern-
ment practices and the connections between the NSA and GCHQ framed a 
public debate and a policy environment in which the reconsideration of data 
collection legislation became necessary (Hintz and Brown 2017, 788, 792). 
In this sense, Snowden’s disclosures led to a public debate that likely would 
otherwise not have happened, and it led to the creation of review committees 
that raised concerns about the legitimacy and legal grounding of surveillance 
practices (Anderson 2015). Several different laws regulated various aspects 
of UK surveillance practices, including the Telecommunications Act (1984), 
the Data Protection Act (1998), and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers 
Act (2000). The reviews concluded that the absence of a cornerstone piece of 
legislation produced regulatory gaps and overlaps, as well as regulatory opa-
city. Moreover, it was unclear whether some of the newly disclosed practices 
of UK intelligence agencies had any legal basis at all under existing legis-
lation. In this context, the government decided to introduce new legislation 
to provide a statutory basis for ongoing surveillance practices. After laws 
proposed in 2013 and 2014 were defeated,7 the Investigatory Powers Act (IPA) 
was introduced and then enacted into law in November of 2016.
As in the US case, the UK government’s legislative action was meant to pro-
vide a legal basis that would defend and legitimize its contentious surveillance 
powers. The Act aims to stipulate the electronic surveillance powers of the 
UK intelligence agencies as well as to impose some checks on those powers. 
The validation of wide- ranging surveillance powers was justified on the basis 
of the threat they are supposed to secure citizens against. When the draft IPA 
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We know these powers are needed as technology changes and terrorists 
and criminals use ever more sophisticated ways to communicate. But we 
need to give people the reassurance that, not only are they needed, but 
that they are only ever used in a necessary, proportionate and account-
able way. That is what this bill is all about.
The law has been praised for being “the most transparent bit of legislation that 
Britain’s ever had” (quoted in Hintz and Brown 2017, 795), on the grounds 
that it provides a clear legislative framework for surveillance activities. Critics, 
in contrast, have argued that the opportunity for fundamental change to sur-
veillance practices and tighter regulation was lost and that the main purpose 
of the law is to legitimize what was previously secret practice, now that it has 
come to light (see Hintz and Brown 2017, 795 and similar statements by their 
interviewees). In the words of Hintz and Brown (2017, 797), “Policy reform 
in the UK has not led to a fundamental revision of surveillance practices, nor 
to a broader public debate that would help to democratically legitimize these 
practices.” Rather, the new legal framework reflects and reinforces the power 
of the state. As The Guardian reported, “A bill giving the UK intelligence 
agencies and police the most sweeping surveillance powers in the western 
world has passed into law with barely a whimper, meeting only token resist-
ance from inside parliament and barely any from outside” (MacAskill 2016).
The IPA, which has come to be called the “Snoopers’ Charter,” provided 
a statutory basis for practices relating to the bulk interception, collection, 
use, and storage of communications data, including the metadata of emails, 
texts, and cell phone calls. The IPA obliges internet service providers to 
store the internet connection records of their customers for 12 months. 
Moreover, designated officers in intelligence, law enforcement, and tax or cus-
toms agencies can grant their analysts access to this data on a wide range 
of grounds, including “public health,” “financial stability,” and “national 
security” (Investigatory Powers Act 2016, Part 3, 63(7)). The law further 
provides a legal basis for agencies to remotely access digital communications 
devices and legally requires third parties to assist in doing so when neces-
sary; in other words, corporations can be forced to circumvent their security 
features to allow access to communications (UK Home Office 2017). So- 
called “equipment interference” is allowed in the course of preventing or 
investigating a criminal offense, furthering the national security interest, or 
furthering the national economic interest when related to national security. 
As a concession to privacy concerns, the IPA gives judges the power to veto 
surveillance requests, but intelligence agencies can request “thematic” rather 
than individual warrants, limiting this judicial oversight. Moreover, while the 
relevant minister and a judicial commissioner need to agree in domestic cases, 
“bulk equipment interference warrants” can be issued in the case of “overseas- 
related communication.” A bulk interference warrant authorizes “any conduct 
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or required by the warrant” (Investigatory Powers Act 2016, Part 6, Chapter 3, 
177(5)). In light of this permissiveness, Snowden called it legalization of “the 
most extreme surveillance in the history of Western democracy” that even 
“goes farther than many autocracies” (MacAskill 2016).
Not only did the IPA condone existing practices by providing a statutory 
basis, but the IPA also extended the state’s surveillance powers (Hintz and 
Brown 2017, 789; see also Loftus 2019). As the ratcheting effect expects, 
the opportunity to draw up surveillance legislation was seen by intelligence 
and law enforcement agencies as a chance to further enhance their powers. 
Importantly, many of these powers were sought by law enforcement agencies 
not directly related to counterterrorism (Gallagher 2015). In fact, the IPA 
grants these powers not only to British intelligence agencies; hacking and 
secret warrants can be used by law enforcement agencies including the police 
force and tax and customs agencies. The IPA reflects the oft- articulated 
argument that surveillance practices need to remain flexible given a rapidly 
evolving technological environment. In the assessment of David Anderson, 
the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, “If  the new law is to 
have any hope of accommodating the evolution of technology over the next 
10 or 15 years, it needs to avoid the trap of an excessively prescriptive and 
technically- defined approach” (Anderson 2016). According to Hintz and 
Brown, the Investigatory Powers Bill “constituted a significant shift in British 
surveillance policy by opening up many of the traditionally secret surveil-
lance measures to public scrutiny and oversight. However, the substance of 
surveillance powers largely remained and partly expanded” (Hintz and Brown 
2017, 789).
Once passed, the IPA was challenged in court by civil liberty organizations. 
Liberty, a civil rights organization, brought a lawsuit against the govern-
ment for noncompliance with the law and abuse of rights, stating: “This is a 
clear- cut example of how the supposed safeguarding and oversight system is 
failing to protect us from the excessive and unwarranted surveillance and data 
retention powers created under the ‘snooper’s charter’ ” (Bowcott 2019a).8 
The head of the official oversight body, Investigatory Powers Commissioner 
Lord Justice Fulford, confirmed that MI5 had been noncompliant, including 
illegally acquiring and storing bulk data and obtaining surveillance warrants 
on the basis of false information (Bowcott 2019b). In response to the suit, 
Home Secretary Sajid Javid acknowledged the existence and continuation 
of serious problems but argued that these were internal matters and, fur-
ther, that the flagging of them by the watchdog was a vindication of existing 
safeguards. He explicitly argued against further transparency and applied 
for closed proceedings that would exclude the public and the media, saying, 
“I have concluded that such material cannot be disclosed in open [court] 
because of the damage such disclosure would cause to the interest of national 
security” (Bowcott 2019a). In July 2019, the UK courts rejected Liberty’s 
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with the government that the IPA includes sufficient “safeguards against the 
possible abuse of power” (Perraudin 2019). Counsel representing the govern-
ment argued that “[t] he powers under challenge are of critical importance to, 
and are effective in securing, the protection of the public from a range of ser-
ious and sophisticated threats arising in the context of terrorism, hostile state 
activity and serious/ organized crime” (Perraudin 2019). Rather than engage 
in debate and reform in the face of disclosures about ineffectiveness and 
abuse, the government circled the wagons and defended not only its broad 
powers but also argued against further disclosure.
The German case: the BND Reform Bill (2016)
Among Edward Snowden’s many revelations regarding the United States’s 
surveillance program in 2013 was information that the NSA carried out illegal 
surveillance not only of Americans but also of citizens of many other coun-
tries, including Germany. The leaks notoriously indicated that the NSA was 
monitoring Chancellor Angela Merkel’s private cell phone. These revelations 
unleashed a heated debate in Germany about the extent of surveillance and 
also the state of the transatlantic relationship. The public was furious about 
the implications of the Snowden revelations for privacy. Pundits called the 
surveillance of Merkel’s phone “a game changer in Europe” (Knigge 2013). 
Merkel famously remarked that there should be no spying “among friends,” 
telling reporters, “We need trust among allies and partners … an alliance can 
only be built on trust. That’s why I repeat again: spying among friends, that 
cannot be” (Spiegel International 2013a). And, indeed, public opinion polls 
showed that German citizens’ trust in the United States plummeted after the 
revelations (Spiegel International 2013b). Beyond Merkel’s cell phone, the 
public— in Germany just as in the United States— was outraged that they 
were subject to unchecked surveillance.
In response to the outcry, in March 2014 the Bundestag launched a parlia-
mentary committee including representatives from governing and opposition 
parties to investigate the spying accusations.9 One of the driving questions 
was whether the United States had betrayed Germany’s trust. But, in spite 
of the public’s outrage and the government’s initially strong negative reac-
tion, it soon became apparent that the investigatory committee was unlikely 
to take a hard line. By 2015, officials were dismissing the specific claim 
that Merkel’s cell phone was tapped, even though— at Merkel’s request— it 
was never forensically examined.10 The Chancellor herself  testified before 
the committee that it was never proven that US intelligence agencies had 
listened in on her conversations, and she emphasized that President Obama 
had assured her that her phone was not tapped (Chase 2017). In May of 
2017, when the committee wrapped up its three- year- long investigation, its 
final report concluded that there were “no reliable grounds” for the accus-
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and massively monitor German telecommunications and internet traffic.”11 
Moreover, it claimed that the documents provided by Snowden contained “no 
solid evidence about espionage activities in or against Germany.” Although it 
is clear that the NSA has the capacity to engage in surveillance of Germany, 
the conclusion was that it never specifically targeted Germany. Indeed, the 
report reached many “surprisingly positive” conclusions, including that: “The 
committee is of the opinion that despite all the difference concerning NSA 
spying in the past there is relatively large agreement about the rigor and estab-
lishment of intelligence service oversight by the parliaments in Germany and 
the US” (Deutsche Welle 2017a).
Despite political attempts to dampen public concern about surveillance, 
the investigation unearthed and made public critical information about the 
nature and extent of surveillance that had hitherto been publicly unknown. 
The investigation revealed that the German intelligence agency, the BND, 
actually cooperated with NSA surveillance programs, supporting the NSA 
in its surveillance of allies and providing data to aid US drone warfare in 
other parts of the world. German media also reported that the NSA had 
provided German intelligence services with spy software in exchange for 
data sharing. Pointing to Germany as an example, Snowden argued that 
“[t] he countries whose citizenries were most opposed to American mass 
surveillance were those whose governments had most cooperated with it” 
(Snowden 2019). Moreover, documents first reported on by Der Spiegel and 
then also confirmed by a parliamentary report showed that from 1998 until 
2013 the German intelligence services were also operating their own sur-
veillance programs targeting state officials and private citizens. The BND 
was surveilling hundreds of foreign embassies, including EU and NATO 
member state diplomats, as well as heads of state, ministers, and ministry 
staff  (Deutsche Welle 2016). Among many other countries, this included sur-
veillance of US government officials (and their emails) from the White House, 
State Department, Department of the Treasury, military offices, and else-
where, as well as the surveillance of US businesses (Deutsche Welle 2017b). 
Moreover, according to the report, the BND was also engaged in surveillance 
of officials at international organizations, such as the International Monetary 
Fund, as well as nongovernmental organizations and industries connected 
to— among other areas— arms trade, aviation, and space. It was because 
of Snowden’s revelations that Germans came to discover the extent of the 
BND’s surveillance.
The 2016 leaked report by Data Protection Commissioner Andrea Voßhoff 
became a key impetus for policy reform debates. In addition to detailing 
BND surveillance activity, it argued that those activities should not continue 
without a legal basis. According to the report published by netzpolitik.org, 
the “BND has collected personal data without a legal basis and has processed 
it systematically. The BND’s claim that this information is essential cannot 
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need to be based on law” (Meister 2016a). The government came under 
public pressure to provide better oversight and accountability mechanisms 
even before the parliamentary inquiry into the Snowden affair ended. Thus, 
in 2016 the Bundestag debated and swiftly passed legislation aimed at com-
prehensive reform of the BND- law (BND- Gesetz or BNDG). The reform 
proposals were passed despite extensive critique by civil society organizations 
(Meister 2016b).12 As with the United States and UK cases outlined above, 
the legislative response had the effect of legalizing heretofore illegal surveil-
lance activity and even expanding and protecting the work of the BND.
The stated purpose of the new BND reform legislation was to strengthen 
 government monitoring of intelligence activities by, for example, subjecting 
them to an independent panel of judges and a permanent commissioner 
from the Interior Ministry, making the surveillance of international 
communications subject to authorization by the Chancellor’s office, and 
making annual BND oversight hearings public rather than private. The legis-
lation also prohibits economic and industrial espionage and offers protections 
for whistleblowers. At the same time, however, the legislation for the first time 
explicitly allowed the BND to cooperate with foreign intelligence services, and 
it explicitly permitted the BND to engage in surveillance of EU institutions 
and other EU member states when the purpose is to gather “information 
of significance” for Germany’s foreign and security policy. The law allowed 
the strategic surveillance, including collection, storage, and evaluation, of 
the telecommunications data of foreigners in foreign countries even in the 
absence of specific suspicion or cause and allowed for the sharing of this data 
with foreign intelligence agencies. In other words, the legislation meant to 
reform and rein in the BND now provides a legal basis that condones the very 
surveillance activities that had been the source of civil society outrage over 
the abuse of state power. Critics of the law have said that it rewards the BND, 
with Amnesty International calling it “nothing but a free pass to intrude into 
people’s private spheres” (quoted in Chase 2016).
In addition to the condoning effect, the reform bill also expanded the 
BND’s power. In light of the Snowden revelations, concern grew that 
Germany was technologically behind the United States and, as a result, at 
a strategic disadvantage. Proponents of the legislation argued that it brings 
the BND into the twenty- first century. The former Chairman of the NSA 
investigatory committee, Clemens Binninger, asked rhetorically, “How else 
is the BND supposed to protect us against terrorism other than listening in 
on conversations between people outside of Germany?” (quoted in Chase 
2016). While previously the BND was restricted to listening in on 20% of the 
traffic that ran through specific internet cables, the new law allows the BND 
to store and analyze all traffic running through any cable (BND Reform Bill 
2016, §6 Absatz 1).13 The communications of foreigners can be stored and 
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act” (ibid.). Moreover, metadata, as long as it cannot be identified as coming 
from German citizens, can be stored for six months and transferred to foreign 
“partners” (BND Reform Bill 2016, §15).
Another concern raised by policymakers in this period was that the 
revelations about BND surveillance shouldn’t lead to the kind of “over-
reaction” that would limit the BND and compromise security. Indeed, 
although the stated goal was to “rein in” the BND, this was complemented 
by a circling- of- the- wagons mentality that tried to protect the powers of the 
BND. Rather than framing the law as a restraint on the BND, supporters 
argued that the law should promote the BND. Accordingly, the head of the 
Inquiry Committee and Christian Democratic Union (CDU) parliamentary 
member Patrick Sensburg assured the parliament that “the BND will not be 
put in chains” (Deutscher Bundestag 2016, 18280C). The Federal Minister for 
Special Affairs, Peter Altmeier, underscored the point, adding “we don’t want 
to limit the work of the BND. We want to base it on a clear and publicly trans-
parent foundation” (Deutscher Bundestag 2016, 18274D).14 Although the law 
added an “independent” institution to carry out oversight of the BND, none 
of the oversight bodies was allowed a complete picture of the BND’s activ-
ities and they are dependent on BND reporting. Gerhard Schindler, presi-
dent of the BND from 2012 to 2016, critiqued the oversight mechanisms for 
being insufficient, arguing that the BND’s control over what information gets 
reviewed defies the logic of independent oversight (Steinke and Pinkert 2016).
The BNDG reform has since been subject to legal contestation, particu-
larly from civil society organizations and journalists claiming that the law 
violates the German Basic Law with respect to the collection of  personal 
data and freedom of the press. On May 19, 2020, in response to a suit 
brought by Reporters sans frontières, the German Constitutional Court 
ruled that the law regarding the telecommunications surveillance of  foreign 
nationals abroad does violate fundamental rights and ordered the law to be 
amended in conformity with constitutional rights.15 The judgment was sig-
nificant because it affirmed for the first time that German authorities are 
bound to respect fundamental rights not only at home but also when acting 
abroad vis- à- vis foreigners. At the same time, it declared telecommunications 
surveillance of  foreigners abroad to be fundamentally permissible on the 
grounds of  the overriding public interest. In response to the judgment, the 
Bundestag passed a new BNDG reform law on April 19, 2021.16 The central 
goals of  the reform are to provide a stronger legal basis for the collection 
of  telecommunications of  foreigners abroad and to introduce new con-
trol mechanisms. A newly created Independent Control Council is to be 
introduced to monitor the legality of  BND investigations. In the view of 
the government, the overall aim of both of  these measures is to legitimize 
the collection of  foreign information abroad and to make the surveillance 
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Conclusions
The goal of this chapter has not been to argue against transparency, but rather 
against a naive notion of transparency as a remedy to surveillance abuses and 
a boon to democracy. Because transparency works as a social practice, we 
need to be sensitive to the ways in which it interacts with power to redistribute 
risks and vulnerabilities. While the hope may be that transparency can pro-
mote honesty, enable accountability, and limit transgressions, I argue that it 
can have the effect of condoning, promoting, and protecting state surveillance 
practices. In each of the cases considered here— the United States, UK, and 
Germany— the government response to public outrage over revelations about 
the extent of surveillance has been to investigate, reveal, and then legitimize 
those practices. Public responsiveness to surveillance concerns ultimately 
allowed governments to defend and expand their surveillance powers.
Transparency, understood as the practice of disclosure, is, on its own, 
insufficient to do the work of regulating the surveillance state. Transparency 
should not be attributed independent agency that somehow naturally delivers 
a rebalancing of power. Disclosure does not have automatic consequences but 
is subject to power, negotiation, and cooptation. To preserve its democratic 
power, transparency needs to be understood as an ongoing negotiation over 
the meaning and value of competing social goods. This ongoing negotiation 
does not end once transgressions are revealed, nor when pressure is mounted 
to elicit a government response, but it requires constant vigilance and active 
contestation.
Notes
 1 In my particular case, I am assuming that surveillance is an activity that the public 
wants checked; but it would be perfectly consistent with my argument to claim 
that, for example, the condoning effect can lead to normatively desirable outcomes. 
This might be the case, for example, when the condoning effect leads to the break-
down of a taboo or norm that was restrictive of rights (e.g., undermining norms 
against homosexuality).
 2 www.intelligence.gov/ index.php/ ic- on- the- record- database/ results/ 787- fact- sheet- 
implementation- of- the- usa- freedom- act- of- 2015. See also Snowden (2019).
 3 www.intelligence.gov/ index.php/ ic- on- the- record- database/ results/ 787- 
fact- sheet- implementation- of- the- usa- freedom- act- of- 2015.
 4 This is also true of other legal instruments that sanction government surveil-
lance, such as the 1981 Executive Order 12333, which authorized expansive data 
collection and provided the basis for subsequent surveillance- related Executive 
Orders (see, e.g., Tye 2014).
 5 Provisions of the Freedom Act were set to expire in December 2019 pending 
reauthorization.
 6 Coates’ argument is particularly unconvincing, since one reason for the ineffect-
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 7 The Draft Communications Bill was defeated in 2013, and the 2014 Data Regulation 
and Investigatory Powers Act (DRIPA) was passed but legally challenged and then 
suspended.
 8 Because the European Court of Justice ruled that the provision for bulk data 
collection in the 2014 DRIPA was unlawful, many observers thought a similar 
case could succeed against the IPA.
 9 This was the “Erster parlamentarischer Untersuchungsausschuss des 18. 
Bundestages,” or colloquially, the “NSA- Untersuchungsausschuss.”
 10 She claimed she did not want to jeopardize the privacy of her communications.
 11 The report, however, was not endorsed by all parties. The opposition wrote its own 
report in dissent that was never released.
 12 This is the Gesetz zur Ausland- Ausland- Fernmeldeaufklärung des Bundesnachri-
chtendienstes vom 23. Dezember 2016. Herein referred to as the “BND Reform 
Bill.”
 13 For the previous restrictions, see Meister (2015).
 14 The original German of the italicized text is “öffentlich nachvollziehbare.”
 15 The judgment can be found here: www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/ e/ rs20200519_ 
1bvr283517.html.
 16 Available here: www.gesetze- im- internet.de/ bndg/ BJNR029790990.html#BJNR0
29790990BJNG000403377.
 17 See the Bundestag statement here: www.bundestag.de/ dokumente/ textarchiv/ 
2021/ kw04- de- bnd- gesetz- 817444.
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A neo- republican critique of  
transparency
The chilling effects of publicizing power
Matthew Hall
Introduction
Democratic legitimacy of some kind has been produced by the transparency 
regulations brought in to oversee state surveillance in the wake of Edward 
Snowden’s revelations about the secret and often unlawful practices of the 
NSA in the United States and GCHQ in the UK. Granting citizens know-
ledge over the scope of the rules governing surveillance, providing oppor-
tunities to identify abuses of power, and highlighting unfair or unjust uses of 
surveillance all go some way toward repairing what is considered to be one of 
the key harms produced by Edward Snowden’s denunciation: a breach of the 
public’s trust.
Viewing the harm of surveillance practices and transparency regulations 
instead through a perspective of freedom as nondomination – the neo- 
republican conception of freedom – however, illuminates something missing 
from the debate, which is this: making state surveillance practices more trans-
parent may in fact compound surveillance’s harmful effects on freedom. This 
is because publicizing surveillance power through transparency regulations 
amplifies surveillance’s “chilling effects” on individuals already susceptible to 
being targeted by surveillance.
From the liberal perspective, publicizing surveillance’s existence and its 
parameters makes it less harmful and more legitimate. This justification, how-
ever, fails to account for the arbitrary capacities inherent to surveillance and 
the effects this produces in those subject to it. My argument, instead, is that 
for it to be legitimate we would need to be able to contest why surveillance 
is conducted – explicitly, contesting the reasons behind the justifications for 
using surveillance over certain populations – not merely be informed about 
how surveillance is being conducted. Such an ability would also reduce the 
harmful effects produced by surveillance in certain populations, effects which 
are exacerbated by transparency as it is commonly understood.
The chapter will unfold as follows. I will firstly sketch what appears to 
be the primary justification for embedding practices of transparency into 





Investigatory Powers Act (IPA) passed in 2016 by the British government. 
I will argue in the next section that the real problem concerning surveillance 
and transparency is the harm being done to our freedom as nondomination. 
This is the core of my argument, showing from a neo- republican perspective – 
a perspective within political theory which maintains that liberty is being free 
from domination – how surveillance and the transparency practices overseeing 
it impact our liberty as nondomination. I will diagnose existing proposals as 
instances of what I will call “hierarchical transparency,” which a republican 
framework reveals to be inadequate. This will provide an analytical frame-
work for demonstrating that the characteristic problem with the version of 
transparency on offer is not an issue of information or openness, but rather 
one of the power represented by surveillance practices. I will then distinguish 
between the “demos” and the “demoi” to show that “the public” from whom 
transparency practices are seeking approval is not the same constituency as 
the one being harmed by surveillance. Finally, I will offer a route out of these 
problems by offering my own conceptual innovation to the debate on trans-
parency, the concept of “horizontal transparency” – an analytical framing 
and political proposal at the same time.
Snowden’s “denunciation,” transparency proposals, and 
public trust
While security services by their nature need to act secretly, the discovery that 
they were operating not only secretly but also in a way that appeared to be 
unrestrained, excessive, and unregulated, as the public learned from Edward 
Snowden’s revelations (Bauman et al. 2014), brought the legitimacy of these 
types of surveillance practices into question. Characterizing the problem as 
a breach of trust between citizen and government led to a recognition that, 
to rebuild trust, maintain public confidence in institutions, and guarantee 
continued consent for security agencies, some kind of increased transpar-
ency was needed. Despite welcome democratic by- products of transparency 
proposals – such as norms of openness and procedures to limit the uses of sur-
veillance, which can act as a benchmark and mechanism for holding abuses of 
power to account – foregrounding public trust as the justifying principle for 
surveillance regulations contributes to the hierarchical structure of transpar-
ency, which reproduces dominating effects on certain groups, as I will show.
In the aftermath of the Snowden revelations John Naughton, Emeritus 
Professor of The Public Understanding of Technology at the Open University 
and prominent journalist of technology and surveillance in the UK, was 
invited to contribute to the inquiry led by the UK’s Intelligence and Security 
Committee of Parliament and stated:
What it comes down to in the end is essentially a proposition “trust us,” 
and in the past two or three years we have seen a number of startling 
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examples of where serious British public institutions have demonstrated 
vividly that they are not worthy of trust.
(Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament 2015, 108)
The then Shadow Home Secretary, Yvette Cooper MP, argued that the 
work of the Agencies
depends on the framework of consent, and that depends on there being 
a level of knowledge and understanding as well. I think if  we try to keep 
everything behind closed doors, the danger is that we will undermine the 
trust that we need for the Agencies to be able to do their work.
(ibid., 107)
The report into the inquiry concluded that “the Government acknowledged 
the requirement for greater transparency and openness … placed great value 
in public confidence, recognising that without the public’s support they cannot 
fulfil their functions” (ibid., 107).
While increased clarity with which to restore public confidence was deemed 
important, the fact that this is inherently partial was concurrently recognized, 
with the report stating that
[i] t could also be argued that it may be beneficial for adversaries to be 
“kept guessing” about the range and scale of the Agencies’ capabilities: 
terrorists’ behaviour may be constrained if  they believe that the Agencies 
have more access than they do.
(ibid., 108)
This demonstrates a recognition that unclear yet present surveillance has 
the power to cause effects in subjects whether they are under surveillance or 
whether they are not. When those subjects are deemed to be “criminal,” this 
is classed as deterrence; “chilling” begins when lawful behavior is affected 
(Stoycheff  et al. 2019). However, the line between what is deemed to be “crim-
inal” by the security services, and what is not, and therefore who as a result is 
considered to be “deterred” and who is “chilled” cannot be so clearly drawn.
The assumption underpinning transparency practices and regulations is 
that citizens now know what the security agencies are doing (to a certain 
extent), know that surveillance and data collection are regulated, and know 
that legally underpinned guidance with penalties is attached to the use of citi-
zens’ data. Citizens can therefore trust the surveillance practices more fully, 
because we can trust that surveillance is being conducted in a way that is 
clearly defined for reasons we, the public, find acceptable.
What the republican perspective brings to light, however, is that greater 
trust does not necessarily equal greater democratic legitimacy. Social trust is 




assumed good faith on the part of the other party. Placing such good faith 
in a relationship implies we believe that the other party will be “trustworthy” 
toward us (Hardin 2006). For authorities, trust has been described as “the 
invisible institution” that grants legitimacy to other institutions and govern-
ment actions. Rebuilding trust is, in a sense, a way to rebuild the legitimacy of 
institutions that may have lost it (Rosanvallon 2008). Trust also has a relation-
ship to risk. Trust anticipates and has expectations of the future. Risk is wary 
of it and seeks to reduce probabilities that the future will not be like we do not 
want it to be. Transparency, in an important sense, is the act of making the 
practices and operations of power visible and reducing an aspect of unknow-
ability, thus inviting those subject to state power to trust it on the basis that 
the consequences of trusting it are now more knowable. In this way a rela-
tionship between transparency and risk is apparent, and reducing a perceived 
risk that institutions will behave badly increases public trust in, and hence the 
democratic legitimacy of, those institutions.
Yet, distrust, rather than trust, is in fact a vital component of maintaining 
liberty in democracies. Surveillance itself  as a concept was not always under-
stood as something that authorities and organizations did to citizens and 
individuals, but rather, surveillance, invigilation, and denunciation are his-
torical methods for citizens to “oversee democracy.” Benjamin Constant, a 
republican thinker, spoke in 1819 of conducting “surveillance in hatred” when 
asserting that “[e] very [good] constitution is an act of distrust” (Rosanvallon 
2008, 7), grounding the principle of liberty in the reality that power needs 
invigilating because office holders cannot be trusted with that power, putting 
our liberty is at risk.
Desirable political arrangements from a neo- republican perspective are not 
to ensure that goodwill and good faith flourish in order to buttress social 
trust in institutions. Rather, the motivation is to ensure that citizens and their 
liberty are not dependent on the goodwill and good faith of political actors 
and institutions. Being distrustful of the potential consequences of relying 
on another’s power to treat you in the way you wish to be treated is healthy 
for democratic freedom. The key point for republicans is to secure against 
the possibility of interference by other actors, not trust that they will behave 
in good faith toward you and your interests. The desire is to have some kind 
of control and input so that your life is not subject to the whims of officials, 
authorities, or rules which you have no say over and no possibility to contest.
Of course, a complete lack of trust is dangerous for democracy as it 
erodes the preconditions for negotiating a shared life. The antivaccination 
movement, for example, tries to persuade parents to refuse inoculations for 
their children, premised on skepticism of authority figures such as doctors 
and medical professionals and denying the credibility of science. This type of 
distrust is unpolitical in the sense that it offers no shared grounds for coopera-
tively resolving such a conflict of competing beliefs. Republican distrust, 
on the other hand, can be characterized as a healthy guardedness against 
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political power and authority, not a distrust that seeks to eradicate all faith 
in an authority.
Rather than responding to the breach of trust by state surveillance agencies 
revealed by Edward Snowden by trying to rebuild faith and confidence that 
security agencies are now doing what it is we want them to – to mend the dis-
trust – we can instead use this breach of trust to ask deeper questions about 
surveillance’s effects on those subject to it. For example, we can ask questions 
about surveillance’s purposes, to generate a healthy distrust of state surveil-
lance activities with more depth and breadth. My contention is that, when 
interpreting the harm of both surveillance and transparency regulations 
through the concept of freedom as nondomination, embedding distrust toward 
power in a politically constructive way like this seems a more realistic approach.
In order to make this argument, it is first necessary to explain the concept 
of freedom as nondomination and how we can use it to understand some of 
the harms of mass surveillance which the mainstream debate occludes.
Surveillance and freedom as nondomination
Freedom as nondomination differs conceptually from negative liberty in a 
number of important ways. The conception of negative liberty tells us we are 
free to the extent that we are not interfered with by humanly imposed external 
obstacles to our choices, classically demonstrated through laws or physical 
coercion. For republicans, on the other hand, it matters not only whether we 
are interfered with in this way but also whether we could be interfered with 
in some way, and whether the ability to shape or prevent that interference is 
beyond our control.
The classic example used in the literature to demonstrate this is the figure of 
the Roman slave who is relatively free on a day- to- day basis if  they happen to 
have a benign master. In this context the slave may be able to freely socialize, 
visit the market, have free time throughout the day to be in town, and so on. 
However, the extent of their unfettered free choices comes at the grace and 
favor of their master. At any time, the ability to freely act can be removed 
if  the master’s mood changes, or if  the master simply decides to restrict the 
slave’s freedom in some way. This is a status of domination, no matter the 
amount of day- to- day negative liberty this slave enjoys. Not only is this a 
status of unfreedom, but it also engenders freedom- reducing behavioral and 
psychological impacts. Not knowing what behaviors may bring censure from 
the arbitrary power held over you, embodied in the master, or what the limits 
to your free behavior are, and having no control over those limits or when 
they could be imposed, induces effects such as self- censorship, toadying to 
authority, deference, second- guessing, anxiety, and fear (Skinner 1998). These 
effects then further limit the capacity to act freely within the space of the free 





This accurately characterizes part of  the problem with mass state surveil-
lance. The key factor for republicans is not whether surveillance constitutes 
a violation of  privacy, nor whether it directly coerces your choices or is 
used by someone to directly interfere in your life in some way, although this 
is important. It is the very possibility that “arbitrary” interference in your 
life could occur, due to the gathering of  information about you, that is the 
offense to liberty. In this scenario, all surveillance can be liberty- reducing in 
certain ways if  we cannot know for sure what surveillance is conducted and 
why, have no meaningful control over the rules governing its practice now 
or in the future, have no meaningful control over what may be done with 
our data at some future point, and have no resources to contest surveillance 
practices.
Importantly, these types of “arbitrary” capacities to use our data or inter-
fere in our choices may produce the freedom- reducing impacts documented 
in republican literature. These types of effects are demonstrated today in the 
“chilling effects” caused by surveillance (Stoycheff  et al. 2019). Those who 
suspect they are subject to surveillance may engage in avoidance strategies 
designed to offset potential or perceived consequences.
In the context of  post- Snowden security surveillance, the limits of  free 
inquiry on the internet, for example, are unknown, but it is known that 
you are watched and monitored in some way. If  it is unclear what types 
of  communication are definitely allowed or disallowed, or what would be 
of  interest or not of  interest to authorities, but it is known that searching 
for these (currently unknowable or unclear) things online may produce 
a response from authorities of  some kind, then this can be interpreted 
as a situation of  domination parallel to that of  the controlled Roman 
slave, and a range of  chilling effects may be likely. Chilling effects are well 
documented, but republican conceptions of  freedom as nondomination 
bring a hitherto missing dimension to explain why it is that our free activ-
ities are “chilled.”
More broadly, if  you know that there is the capacity to use the data you gen-
erate through your day- to- day internet activity and that that data can be used 
in ways that are opaque or unclear, it seems plausible that this may also cause 
some of the impacts observed by republicans when individuals are exposed 
to power of this type. The machine learning and algorithmically driven Big 
Data processes that are not directly interfering in your choices now but are 
building a potential capacity to interfere in your choices at some future point 
by accumulating knowledge about you represent another version of this type 
of potential harm. That surveillance and data are so often used for reasons 
other than those originally justified means that reassurances about data use 
remain unconvincing in the face of justified skepticism about the future reli-
ability of those reassurances because of the lack of meaningful control over 
both why and how surveillance is deployed and data is collected. This type of 
power, for republicans, is considered to be arbitrary power.
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Arbitrariness and chilling effects
I will now lay out precisely what arbitrariness means in this context, and why 
we have reason to be concerned that increases in transparency alone will be 
insufficient to curtail the arbitrary power that state surveillance represents. 
Arbitrary means something quite specific in political theory, beyond simply 
signifying random or unpredictable. Power can be procedurally arbitrary, 
meaning that the limits and aims of that power are not effectively stipulated, 
restrained, and fixed and are not made common knowledge to all parties 
potentially affected by that power (Lovett 2010). Substantive arbitrariness is a 
power that does not suitably track or, more specifically, is not “forced to track” 
the welfare and world- view of agents affected (Pettit 1997, Lovett 2010).
Procedural arbitrariness can be offset if  sufficient democratic over-
sight is applied to the scope of the rules governing surveillance, and this is 
made common knowledge to all. The important aspect of state surveillance 
considered here, however, is that it produces effects distinct from the proced-
ural basis of its justification. These “chilling effects” are produced regardless 
of whether democratic oversight is sufficiently applied. This demonstrates 
that a substantively arbitrary aspect to surveillance remains – that which 
potentially acts against the interests of the subject under surveillance – even if  
the rules governing it are common knowledge and clearly stipulated. Keeping 
in mind these distinctions between procedural and substantive arbitrariness 
is relevant for understanding the distinct approaches to transparency I will 
unpick below and the solutions I believe can be offered to offset the domin-
ation produced by them.
Firstly, a type of transparency that addresses the legal basis and scope 
of rules to which surveillance practices must adhere mirrors the version of 
securing “procedural non- domination” espoused by the republican theorist 
Frank Lovett in his influential book, A General Theory of Domination and 
Justice (2010). He claims that completely eradicating “procedural arbitrari-
ness” – making the rules that govern power absolutely clear, stringently 
regulated, and common knowledge to all subject to that power – eliminates 
or radically reduces domination, diminishing uncertainty and other freedom- 
reducing impacts (Lovett 2010). In such a scenario, he claims, individuals with 
full and detailed knowledge of the rules of power could then “plan around” 
those rules and navigate an authority with power over them, because they 
now know what precisely is proscribed, and what is not. This, it is claimed, 
increases freedom of the individual by granting them the capacity to avoid 
knowable consequences (ibid.). This type of procedural nonarbitrariness 
requires the rules restraining that power to be effective, external, and common 
knowledge.
Criticisms of this approach have noted a problem, however. This type 
of procedural transparency could mean that a fully rationalized and well- 





and nonoffending to freedom. An example used to make this point is the 
“pass laws” that existed in apartheid- era South Africa. There was a well- 
defined and strict monitoring system that dictated where black citizens could 
or could not go at certain times of day. Procedural nonarbitrariness, or pro-
cedural transparency, would mean that individuals in this scenario are not 
dominated. Knowing precisely what is allowed, by whom and at what times, 
eliminates uncertainty and unknowability. However, publicizing the rules of 
power clearly, making them common knowledge to all, does not in and of 
itself  reduce the harm of that power, simply because its operation becomes 
transparent and clearly defined. Lovett swallows these criticisms, asserting 
instead that not everything that is bad about power means that it is domin-
ating. The situation in apartheid- era South Africa could be described as unjust 
and oppressive, but that does not mean it is dominating in the republican 
framework he is offering, he claims. For my case, while a clear distinction can 
be drawn between the oppressive enforcement of rules in apartheid- era South 
Africa and state surveillance of citizens in liberal democracies, the same pro-
cedural issue is relevant.
In the example of internet activity, if  it is clear and transparent that very 
specific and perhaps illegal internet activity would be monitored by security 
agencies, such as activities for aiding and abetting terrorism, and security 
agencies were strictly limited to that task alone, then this would seem to 
produce more areas of activity in which we could operate free from uncer-
tainty, reducing domination and its freedom- limiting effects.
Since the time of the Snowden revelations, and the resulting legal over-
sight and transparency, the chilling effects have in fact expanded, however. 
Jon Penney has studied search traffic to what he terms “privacy sensitive” 
Wikipedia articles, and he found that they experienced statistically signifi-
cant declines. These declines were not only apparent in the immediate after-
math of the Snowden revelations in 2013, but also demonstrated a downward 
trend over the long term, up to and including the same year that the IPA was 
passed into law, 2016 (Penney 2016). Longer- term trends will be interesting 
to study, but the processes since the Snowden revelations – public awareness, 
consultation on security activities, and, finally, legally embedded transpar-
ency practices – have evidentially generated further chilling- type effects.
Paradoxically, then, Snowden’s denunciation has in fact reduced the lib-
erty of citizens in an important way. Prior to Snowden’s revelations and the 
increased transparency they created, citizens at large were exposed to arbi-
trary power but without their knowledge. This means that “free” action, such 
as searching at will for privacy- sensitive articles online, was less hindered than 
it is now. Such activity was conducted without the clear knowledge that state 
agencies were gathering and collecting information on what one was searching 
for – knowledge that now exists. To use the omnipotence metaphor, to a cer-
tain extent the public was in the panopticon prior to Snowden’s denunciation 
but was not aware that the guard tower watching over them was a guard tower 
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at all. Those subject to state surveillance without their knowledge prior to 
the Snowden revelations would not have felt as compelled to limit their own 
freedom of choice, as they had less knowledge of the capacity of the state to 
watch over them.
This is a status recognizable to republicans, and even with the apparently 
increased freedom to act and make choices that comes with the ignorance 
of a power watching you, you cannot be considered free under the concep-
tion of freedom as nondomination. This situation is what Philip Pettit calls 
“alien control” (Pettit 2008). Alien control is the condition in which you are 
exposed to a power with an arbitrary capacity to interfere in your life, but 
you are unaware of that capacity. As such, you operate as if  you are not being 
watched or controlled. Limits to your free action, based on the preferences 
that a power has over what you choose to do, mean that you are unfree, how-
ever. In many ways alien control is more conducive to negative liberty, as 
described, insofar as your liberty is not limited by your knowledge of any 
power with an arbitrary capacity to interfere in your life. Chilling and self- 
censorship are absent. However, unknown to you, there are still limits to your 
choices, the boundaries of which you may one day bump up against, produ-
cing consequences from the surveilling power of which, until that point, you 
were unaware. With security surveillance in the shadows, unconstrained and 
unregulated, citizens at large were previously dominated in this way because 
of these unknown yet present consequences attached to certain behaviors and 
choices, yet they more “freely” made their choices about how to behave under 
the surveillance of which they were unaware.
Bringing state surveillance practices into the light, then, through surveil-
lance practices that are now more publicized, can produce more chilling 
effects. Now enlightened to the knowledge that you are exposed to a power 
with an arbitrary capacity to interfere in your life in some way, avoidance 
strategies, self- censorship, and second- guessing pertain.
Hierarchical transparency
The problem with this type of transparency offered in Western liberal dem-
ocracies is that it is hierarchical transparency. By this I mean, firstly, that the 
imbalance of power represented by surveillance is made clear to those subject 
to it through practices and processes of transparency, producing the chilling 
effects discussed above, and secondly, what is made knowable to the public, or 
which rules are given clarity and why surveillance is used, and over whom, is 
still decided by the surveilling power, not those subject to it.
The amplification of chilling effects produced by transparency practices 
can be explained if  we consider these practices to be only “partial transpar-
ency.” It may be that it is still not quite clear enough to the public, activists, 
and journalists what definitely is and what definitely is not allowed. What 
is “criminal,” what is “extremism,” what is “radicalism,” who are “enemies,” 
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and what is considered a “threat to the state” by security agencies all remain 
ambiguous. Is it really true that a journalist’s sources will not be tracked down 
in some way if  they release sensitive information? Is the line between what 
is considered “sensitive” and what is a “threat to state security” really clear? 
Are political organizations, curious citizens, journalists, and certain minority 
groups susceptible to state surveillance really clear about what may be of 
interest to state agencies that may produce unwelcome attention for those 
groups? It seems that publicizing the scope of the rules by which the public 
are being monitored on a mass scale, for reasons now apparently clear but 
importantly open to interpretation, provides only enough knowledge to gen-
erate uncertainty among those who feel they may be subject to surveillance. 
Becoming aware of a power held over you, but without a full knowledge and 
understanding of its operation and the consequences for certain types of your 
own behavior, is to realize you live in a status of domination. Procedural trans-
parency of this type cannot completely eliminate the uncertainty associated 
with surveillance practices that produce chilling effects.
Of course, total transparency cannot eliminate uncertainty either. If  every-
thing state security agencies did could, in principle, be made public, it might 
well encourage the opposite of what is sought by calls for transparency. For 
state surveillance agencies to remain effective, they would be compelled to 
engage in something like a massaging of the truth, deliberate ambiguity 
of surveillance aims, or bland descriptions of operations. These types of 
evasions or half- truths are the symptoms of a hierarchical transparency that 
must protect the operative capacities of whatever authority is being trans-
parent (O’Neill 2002, 64).
Philip Pettit develops the conception of freedom as nondomination fur-
ther in a way that is helpful for understanding hierarchical transparency. 
Pettit describes the difference between negative liberty on the one hand, and 
freedom as nondomination on the other, as the difference between freedom 
and free rein (Pettit 2014). When a horse is given free rein, the rider allows it 
to go where it wills. It may turn left, right, slow down, and speed up, appar-
ently free as the reins hang loose. However, those reins are still held by a rider, 
and the reason the horse has free rein is not due to the horse’s preference, 
but the preference of the rider. While running freely may feel like freedom, 
someone is still in the saddle. True freedom is not free rein, in which you have 
a wide range of choices to enact; true freedom is unbridled freedom, with no 
one in the saddle granting you license to have free rein (Pettit 2014).
To be free in this unbridled way we must be able to choose the options that 
we prefer, despite the preference of others over us. This has three compo-
nent parts. Firstly, we can choose freely if  we have the capacity to choose an 
option and choose it without the interference of others. Secondly, we must 
have the room and resources to choose what it is we prefer to choose, not 
just the choices available. For example, a prisoner cannot liberate herself  by 
choosing not to want to walk in the park and therefore “choosing” to stay in 
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her cell. Altering your preferences to fit the options offered by others is no 
freedom. Finally, you must be able to be free to choose despite the preferences 
of others. For example, ingratiating yourself  with a prison guard in order to 
be allowed license to walk in the park – even though this is your preference 
this time – is still no freedom because it depends on the will of another (Pettit 
2014, 28– 54).
This conception of  freedom as nondomination, as may be clear by now, 
is constitutively linked to how nondomination is secured. In other words, in 
order to be free to choose a range of  preferred options you must have the 
room and resources to secure that range of  options for yourself. This requires 
the power to do so, despite the attitude of  the more powerful toward you. In 
republican terms this is secured through “anti- powers”: public laws, norms, 
and the capacities of  citizens to participate in governing, and to contest, 
impede, and block arbitrary uses of  political power in order to enforce those 
democratically determined laws and norms. This driving principle does not 
identify clear, unambiguous cases of  freedom but rather offers a roadmap 
to liberate individuals from harmful forms of  dependence on others, based 
on the security of  norms, laws, and antipowers with which to defend their 
liberty.
In this context, then, hierarchical transparency, a process which sets the 
scope of the rules and the purposes behind those rules and then publicizes 
them, making them common knowledge to all subject to that power, 
demonstrates the limits of our freedom. Transparency regulations allow us 
to “liberate” ourselves by choosing new options on the basis of the newly 
available information. However, choosing new options because our preferred 
options may prove too risky (because we are not sure about what is surveilled 
and for what reason, or what may be done with our data) is no freedom at 
all, as we have just seen above. Unless we have the political resources to exer-
cise choices beyond the preferences of the surveilling authorities, set out in 
the transparency regulations determining the scope of the rules, we remain 
dominated. Hierarchical transparency regulations simply set out more clearly 
the boundaries to the free choices we have; they set out the extent to which 
our free rein runs.
Defending the “demos,” dominating the “demoi”
In response to my argument above, it might be objected that existing demo-
cratic procedures can counteract the dominating tendencies of publicized sur-
veillance. If  the demos is considered to fully participate in the rulemaking of 
the state, then the power represented by state surveillance counts as authorized 
interference and is therefore nondominating. If  we can consider the UK as 
democratic to a certain extent, then this could be considered sufficient to 
prevent us from being dominated. The rules are governed by a recognizably 
democratic mechanism in this version, and it could be claimed that we have 
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sufficient rights to defend ourselves from undue intrusion by state surveil-
lance authorities.
Surveillance scholars have long noted a particular problem with surveil-
lance, however, one that is relevant for claims such as this: namely, the dif-
ferential treatment under surveillance between individuals and groups, a 
tendency most famously espoused as “social sorting” (Lyon 2003). This 
problem reasserts itself  in the question of who the demos is – to whom 
justifications about surveillance are given. Surveillance is engaged in sorting 
within the demos; it does not monitor and defend a homogenous demos in 
order to keep it free and safe from the private domination of others.
In doing so, state surveillance is in fact monitoring the demoi. The term 
“demoi” is used in other republican theories to discuss the delineation that 
can be drawn within political entities between different peoples. For example, 
the European Union is discussed in republican terms as a demoi- cracy, which 
is to say, different peoples engaged with one political authority in a way 
that grants that authority political legitimacy (Bellamy 2019). Applying this 
thinking to surveillance reveals the inherently differential nature of the effects 
produced by surveillance.
A relationship of power involving surveillance of a different type can dem-
onstrate the problem that surveillance represents for the demoi. Consider 
the case of police body cameras, or “bodycams.” The filming of encounters 
between police and citizens, it is claimed, increases trust in officers by 
making those encounters transparent and concomitantly produces up to 
93% reductions in complaints about the police from the public (Ariel et al. 
2016). The implication in transparency claims of this type is that either the 
dishonesty on behalf  of some of “the public” is addressed – they now no 
longer make complaints they know are spurious – or that the police now 
behave in a manner more befitting their role, now that they know they are 
being monitored. However, what may look like a way of making the police 
more accountable doubles as a means to use surveillance over groups already 
subjected to more intensive policing and surveillance practices – those groups 
and classes in society likely to encounter the police.
This brings into question whether the declared purpose behind police 
bodycams – improving the accountability of the police – is the true motiv-
ation and outcome of this type of surveillance encounter. Transparency in 
this instance is not only for the population who are subject to more surveil-
lance but is also used to build trust with a public not involved in the encounter 
but whose confidence is required to secure the trust that maintains the legit-
imacy of the police.
The questions here from a republican perspective would be: do the trans-
parent practices now overseeing encounters between the public and police 
through police body cameras in fact represent domination of the individual 
being filmed? And is the reduced volume of complaints and contestation of 
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seems to underpin those claims, but rather a result of surveillance produ-
cing conforming behaviors among those subject to surveillance in those 
interactions, through domination, fear, self- censorship, and anxiety?1
Surveilling more of the demoi in this way does produce transparency, but 
not necessarily for “the public” (or demoi) upon which the police directs its 
surveillance cameras. Instead, encounters between the police and surveilled 
subjects are made transparent to another “public” not susceptible to the 
potential conformity produced by being under surveillance: the demos that is 
not involved in the encounter, but on whose trust the police rely.
Up until now I have offered a critique of the transparency of surveillance 
practices, showing how it compounds the core harm of surveillance, which 
I interpret as domination. In what follows I will return to questions of trust 
and liberty in order to develop my horizontal transparency proposals, which, 
while necessarily incomplete, are driven by a principle of constructive mis-
trust of  the purposes of surveillance and the harmful effects it has on those 
it monitors.
Horizontal transparency
Horizontal transparency is a way of fleshing out what meaningful control 
might look like, which we could build toward in the present. My notion of 
horizontal transparency is premised on the reality of state surveillance and 
transparency argued for thus far, namely the fact that even democratically 
authorized surveillance with regimes of transparency and oversight dominate 
individuals in ways that are prima facie unjustifiable – as demonstrated by 
the chilling effects they produce. It is not sufficient to transparently expose 
the scope of rules governing surveillance practices; the justification of the 
purposes for which surveillance is used must be transparent as well, in order 
for them to be challenged.
To address this reality, constitutionally embedded mechanisms of mistrust 
can secure our liberty under surveillance (Rosanvallon 2008). In practice, 
this could mean an array of citizen invigilation mechanisms and organiza-
tional forms that act as “editorial” rights (Bellamy 2013) and “anti- powers” 
to impede power that has already been democratically authorized.
There are two aspects of state surveillance that can be impeded with invigi-
lation mechanisms: the harmful effects of surveillance, even when demo-
cratically authorized – the “chilling effects” – and the purposes for which 
surveillance is conducted. Such an alternative framework of demands requires 
not just more regulatory proposals but normative resources with which those 
subject to the most intensive state surveillance practices can challenge the 
basis on which they are under surveillance and the chilling effects produced.
The key to horizontal transparency is a recognition that substantive inequal-
ities produce differentiated harms under surveillance. This is demonstrated 





desirable end state is beyond the discussion held here, there are strategies we 
can discern from societies that were both chronically antiegalitarian yet pro-
foundly pro- liberty, such as the Florentine republics in which republican pol-
itical philosophy was born. If  we accept that surveillance’s character is to 
identify and distinguish between unequal sections of society (to sort them) we 
can draw on strategies that pull back the veil of formal equality to reveal the 
class structure of society to combat the sorting inherent in surveillance’s logic.
Thanks to Snowden, an opportunity to challenge the imperatives by which 
mass state surveillance is driven presents itself. This goes significantly further 
than simply regulating and publicizing already existing surveillance practices. 
Snowden’s denunciation could be considered a first step in an activity of 
democratic mistrust that could engineer a basis for holding security agencies 
and government institutions to account for the justifications they offer for 
putting certain groups and individuals under surveillance, not only their legal 
basis for doing so. Horizontal transparency not only looks through to the pur-
pose of surveillance but also seeks to see the effects surveillance produces in 
the populations it monitors, even when democratically authorized.
The difference between democratic oversight that legitimizes surveillance 
practices (which may be harmful) and republican nondomination is the 
difference between “authorial” and “editorial” rulemaking (Bellamy 2013). 
This distinguishes my approach from participatory, deliberative, and liberal 
approaches. The capacity to impede and block political power that has been 
democratically authorized but turns out to be dominating (like state surveil-
lance) is a prerequisite for freedom in the view I am articulating here: freedom 
as antipower, in Pettit’s term (Pettit 1996). This constitutes a bottom- up, 
“monitorial” (Schudson 1999) and “contestatory” (Pettit 1999) approach, in 
order to challenge the legitimate limits of what can and should be watched, 
even if  democratically authorized. Horizontal transparency, unlike hierarch-
ical transparency, constitutes “editorial” rights over the political power that is 
expressed by surveillance, following its authorization, rather than “authorial” 
rights concerning its legal basis, no matter the harm it presents for certain 
groups and members. In manifestly and profoundly unequal societies, there 
needs to be a normative basis for contesting things that have passed through 
existing “democratic” procedures (even leaving aside the question of how 
“democratic” these are, given how many are excluded from the rulemaking 
procedures). This is the point of the “editorial” control requirement.
Transparency implies “looking through” or “seeing through.” Making this 
line of sight nonhierarchical is to enable people to see through to the purposes 
behind the surveillance, and to see clearly the consequences and harmful 
effects that are produced. Doing this holds not only the rules and legal basis 
of surveillance to account – as is currently the case – but furthermore holds 
the purposes and effects of state security surveillance to account. This more 
widespread and comprehensive vision of surveillance – inward to its purposes, 
and outward to the chilling effects it produces – is the key to horizontal 
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transparency. Mass state surveillance would need to be not only transparent 
in its proclaimed aims but also transparent in the effects it produces in certain 
populations and activities, and in why those effects are produced.
What these types of proposals require, to widen lines of vision of political 
power and the antipowers to then contest political power, is not the separation 
of powers at an institutional level, as is common to liberal democracies, but 
the separation of political power at the ground level. Such an approach focused 
on ground- level political power accepts that enforcing formal equality in an 
environment of substantive inequalities does not reduce the harm generated 
by unequally applied surveillance. To both recognize the dominating impact 
of democratically authorized surveillance, while simultaneously being able to 
act against it, necessitates a series of antipowers; antipowers such as inde-
pendently constituted invigilation task forces (Hoye and Monaghan 2018), 
community panels with political oversight of police practices, tribunals, and 
the right to block, impede, and challenge surveillance.
In the context of security surveillance specifically, avenues for citizen con-
testation into the actual categories, classifications, and descriptions of surveil-
lance – of “radicals,” “threats,” and “extremists” – that surveillance’s “sorting” 
is premised on, can provide horizontal transparency. The recent “Spycop” 
scandal in the UK, where mass police infiltration was revealed to be taking 
place into a huge array of peaceful, noncriminal political organizations and 
civil society groups (Woodman 2018), seems to demonstrate that the state 
security agencies and police’s interpretation of what constitutes a “threat,” 
what is “radical,” “extreme,” or “criminal,” needs to be opened up to public 
debate, not left to the police and security services to define, classify, and then 
use to monitor those they deem fit that category.
Of course, democratic and liberal approaches could also reflect on the harm 
caused by surveillance practices and adjust accordingly. To promote repub-
lican freedom, however, it is necessary to equalize power imbalances among 
citizens in order to defend against dominating power. This requires the pro-
duction of political arrangements to contest those surveillance practices and 
the antipowers necessary to defend oneself  against surveillance.
Conclusion: freedom, self- government, and the 
eyeball test
The primary purpose of this chapter has been to argue that transparency 
practices may in fact produce new harms to the freedom of certain groups 
and individuals under surveillance, demonstrated by chilling effects and 
articulated through freedom as nondomination. I have also begun to make 
suggestions as to how this could be countered, with a new line of vision and 
contestation: horizontal transparency.
This is underpinned by a republican account of power and freedom, 





reemphasizing. Being able to participate in the way described above, and 
enact antipowers successfully, is premised on having more or less equal power 
to do so, whereas those most susceptible to harm by surveillance are often 
precisely those with less societal and political power. Some type of political 
equality is a precondition for freedom from a republican perspective. While a 
full account of political equality is beyond the scope of this chapter, I will end 
by sketching what I take to be a key republican insight into what substantive, 
as opposed to merely formal, equality requires.
Social sorting points to the fact of a chronically unequal society being one 
reason why surveillance is necessary from the state’s point of view. The “eye-
ball test,” however, describes the basis of self- government as premised on 
equalizing power as far as is possible so that citizens can look one another 
and the government “in the eye” without deference, fear, or favor (Pettit 2012). 
Enacting horizontal transparency without first doing something about the 
power imbalances that produce much surveillance over certain individuals, 
groups, and communities in society in the first place would be insufficient.
To do so would require taking seriously the ability of those in the demoi 
subject to liberty- reducing surveillance and domination to defend themselves. 
And this requires the political capacities to normatively contest their condi-
tion. For example, opening up public contestation only to ask the question 
“who is it that ought to be watched by police body cameras and why?” may 
not provide the desired result. Would it be the case that “we,” the public (the 
demos), would decide we are in fact happy with the people the police are 
currently monitoring, compounding the problem? In a society of unequal 
resources, classes, and groups, the logic of the state to categorize and monitor 
these groups – to sort them (Lyon 2003) – produces surveillance, even if  it is to 
treat those groups in a formally equal way. Opening up participatory avenues 
to contest state surveillance needs to ensure that those who come forward to 
participate do not embed the problem being addressed; imbalances of power 
ricochet through institutional proposals designed to overcome imbalances 
of power.
To reduce domination by surveillance, actual economic and political power 
external to surveillance practices needs to be equalized to lessen the divisions 
between citizens that drive much surveillance and to grant those citizens who 
are subject to surveillance the political capacities necessary to challenge the 
justifications for the surveillance to which they are subjected. Such societal 
and historical realities are obviously beyond the reach of this conclusion, 
but they should not be beyond the considerations of how state surveillance 
and transparency are deployed, and the domination and chilling effects they 
produce.
What my argument does show, however, is that transparency practices as 
they are currently constituted – as hierarchical flows of information – exacer-
bate the chilling effects experienced by certain groups exposed to surveil-
lance. To secure liberty under surveillance, meaningful participation in the 
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production of society’s information, which produces the justifications for sur-
veillance, is necessary. I have tried to show how the concept of horizontal 
transparency could contribute to this project.
Note
 1 Rachel Hall promotes a similar idea in her excellent work on the “transparent 
traveler” (2015), in which those subject to procedures such as airport security are 
forced into certain types of docile and submissive behaviors as they are compelled 
to be transparent for security officials. The same type of coerced submissiveness 
could be said to be at play here. However, whereas in the case of the transparent 
traveler it is the subject being forced to perform an “aesthetics of transparency” for 
authority, here the issue is the effects produced in the subject by an authority itself  
performing transparency.
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The term “transparency” lives a double life. On the one hand, it has the clean- 
cut image of a universal standard of proper operation in a free society, an 
image that seems to be accepted by most; on the other hand, however, it has the 
rougher image of a power move that tries to expose its target to scrutiny and 
undermine some of its actions. In this chapter I differentiate between the two 
and analyze the dynamics of the much less studied “imposed transparency” 
strand. In particular, I analyze how transparency is imposed as a strategy in 
a preexisting social conflict characterized by a low level of trust between the 
relevant parties from the start. In such conflict situations, when the parties do 
not trust each other, transparency is almost always forced by one party on the 
other (via surveillance) and almost never willingly adopted by either party. 
I am interested in: the reasons why individuals/ organizations turn to imposed 
transparency as a political strategy, the ways imposed transparency is carried 
out, the degree to which these targets tend to accept imposed transparency 
or resist/ evade it, the dynamics that mutual attempts to impose transparency 
create, the role that power asymmetries have in such attempts, and the effect-
iveness of forcing transparency in order to achieve specific goals.
In this examination, I will first analyze some of the existing writing on 
transparency and chart some of its weaknesses as a social change tool. 
Next, I will turn to differentiate between voluntary universal transparency 
and imposed targeted transparency, and identify three defining features 
on which they diverge. I will then proceed to scrutinize the dynamics of 
imposed transparency as it pertains to two cases (designated A and B) within 
the Occupied Palestinian Territories (henceforth OPT): (A) the case of the 
large checkpoints (“terminals”) operating within the West Bank to restrict 
Palestinians’ movement and (B) the case of Israeli NGOs operating to safe-
guard Palestinians’ human rights. Both cases will help clarify how and why 
imposed transparency is deployed, the reactions that such attempts provoke, 
and the end result with regard to political struggles, asymmetry, colonialism, 
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The transparency concept
The term transparency has become widespread both among scholars and lay-
people around the world (Bertot et al. 2010; Bessire 2005). It is the solution 
suggested to a variety of social problems that usually revolve around lack of 
trust (e.g. Auger 2014; Jackson 2015; Kanagaretnam et al. 2010; Rawlins 2008; 
Schnackenberg and Tomlinson 2016). Transparency’s popularity seems to 
echo a human fascination with “seeing through” opaque things, yet traversing 
from this alluring/ aesthetic notion of transparency to its actual application in 
complex human reality is not an easy process, and indeed transparency as a 
solution to social problems has been found to be very problematic in a variety 
of fields (Bac 2001; Bannister and Connolly 2001; Bauhr and Grimes 2014; 
Bessire 2005; Brucato 2015; Drucker and Gumpert 2007; Grimmelikhuijsen 
2010; Grimmelikhuijsen et al. 2013; Kolstad and Wiig 2009; O’Neill 2002; 
Schnorf et al. 2014).
Most of the scholastic attention to the concept of transparency is focused 
on its relation to trust and the building/ sustaining of trust. What many 
studies on the relations between transparency and trust suggest is that, in a 
variety of settings, transparency does not increase trust and sometimes actu-
ally reduces it (Allen 2008; Grimmelikhuijsen 2010; Grimmelikhuijsen et al. 
2013; Margetts 2011). Yet this research thread still assumes that trust is a 
desired social good of its own. But as pointed out by O’Neill, this is not neces-
sarily the case; while we should trust some individuals/ organizations on some 
issues, we should be highly skeptical toward others (O’Neill 2002). Moreover, 
when referring to nontrust positive effects of transparency (e.g. fighting 
corruption), there are scholars who point out that if  the public does not have 
the willingness and the means to force social change, transparency in itself  is 
ineffective (Kolstad and Wiig 2009; Lindstedt and Naurin 2010; Marsh 2011).
Feminist surveillance literature, for its part, places a strong emphasis on the 
differential ways in which making things transparent affects different people 
(Abu- Laban 2014; Dubrofsky and Magnet 2015; Hall 2017). Transparency 
technologies/ practices that might be considered positive or neutral may be 
detrimental to certain groups, such as the way full- body scanners can be 
disturbing for transgender or disabled people, as well as for individuals from 
certain religions. Nevertheless, transparency still carries a positive connota-
tion in our society and is still widely used.
Two types of transparency
Transparency can be categorized as either imposed or adopted. Imposing 
transparency on a person/ organization usually entails some sort of surveil-
lance (Brucato 2015); it requires monitoring the target to achieve disclosure 
that is not voluntary— monitoring to which the target has not agreed (e.g. 
public space CCTV). In these cases, transparency is dictated by others, and 
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imposed transparency “weaponized visibility” (e.g. Trottier et al. 2020; Young 
2020). In our current social reality, some of these one- directional demands for 
transparency can be resisted, but many cannot.
The second category of transparency is that which people/ organizations 
adopt willingly. Once a disclosure process is initiated, its adopters may 
be subject to new types of monitoring that can easily be perceived as sur-
veillance. Workers who sign a consent form allowing their own electronic 
communications to be monitored are one such example of opening the door 
to their own surveillance. Not in every instance will such surveillance actu-
ally take place, but the potential is clearly there. We should note that con-
sensual adoption of transparency does not necessarily mean it is adopted 
willingly. Demands to adopt transparency often involve a great degree of 
pressure, offering individuals or organizations deals they cannot realistically 
refuse. Indeed, the question of willingness to adopt transparency is tricky 
when transparency can expose one to scrutiny, criticism, and attack (Rawlins 
2008). Once our words and/ or actions become public record they can easily 
be misunderstood, misrepresented, or decontextualized (Bannister and 
Connolly 2011).
One way to mitigate some of the risks of disclosure is if  the individual/ 
organization that was made to be transparent controls the disclosed infor-
mation. For instance, with regard to substance abuse monitoring, a worker 
may be asked to periodically sign a declaration as opposed to being subjected 
to urine testing. While in the former instance the individual controls the dis-
closure process, which allows her/ him room to maneuver (e.g. by omitting 
information), in the latter it does not. This control in turn may reduce the 
risks resulting from exposure that transparency entails and may also create 
a mode of good faith between the disclosing and the disclosed parties. What 
is especially important in understanding the legitimacy of transparency is 
to know toward whom the transparency procedure is applied; that is, if  it is 
applied universally or if  it is targeted. When transparency is applied evenly 
to all, it is much more palatable. Being asked to start swiping your employee 
card when entering/ exiting work may seem arbitrary if  it only applies to some 
workers. Thus, universal application is another necessary element for volun-
tary transparency.
Conceptually, we are left with two archetypes of transparency: voluntary 
transparency and imposed transparency (see Table 4.1). While they both 
Table 4.1  Two archetypes of transparency
Voluntary Imposed
Consent Sought Not sought
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expose an individual/ group/ organization to scrutiny and criticism, one is 
adopted willingly on the basis of some sort of social agreement and trust, 
while the other is imposed in a unidirectional fashion, does not rely on its 
targets for disclosure, and may be applied selectively according to the interest 
of the imposing party. The fact that both are considered “transparency” seems 
to benefit those practicing imposed transparency, since it attaches the positive 
connotations of the voluntary transparency term to what they actually do, 
which is almost identical to surveillance. Last, it should be noted that these 
are two archetypes of transparency and that actual cases of transparency may 
shift from one category to another or be hybrid cases.
The dynamics of imposed transparency
Imposed transparency tends to appear in situations in which there is an 
existing conflict and low levels of trust between the parties. Given that trans-
parency can expose one to criticism/ attacks, in conflict situations voluntarism 
is low and self- disclosure is regarded as highly unreliable. In such settings, 
forcing transparency on the other side may be a powerful strategy to achieve 
a desired outcome that is at odds with the other party’s wishes. In cases like 
these, transparency is used in a utilitarian and targeted way. For instance, in 
certain settings transparency may be forced on a political rival or a business 
competitor in order to weaken them and undermine their goals (Sperling 
2011). As will be shown in the empirical section, this process of enlisting 
transparency for a strategic goal may be undertaken by a group/ organization 
that may be committed to transparency (as a social value) but also may not.
Moreover, imposed transparency may be initiated not only by strong groups 
or organizations but also by weak ones (Koskela 2012; Mann 2013; Wilson 
2012; Wilson and Serisier 2010). This may seem counterintuitive since unidir-
ectional power moves are usually associated with powerful social forces, yet 
marginalized groups and the advocacy organizations that represent them may 
also enlist certain resources (such as the courts) in order to force transparency 
on the powerful. For example, a weak community may impose transparency 
on a wealthy chemical plant in order to disclose the suspected dumping of 
known pollutants.
It is precisely because imposed transparency may be the weapon of the 
weak as well as the strong that we can talk of the phenomenon of “cycles of 
imposed transparency”— that is, a dynamic in which two sides increasingly 
use transparency in order to combat each other. Imposed transparency, as it 
so closely relates to surveillance, adheres to surveillance’s overall pattern of 
move and countermove (Wilson 2012; Wilson and Serisier 2010), of being 
contingent upon the actions of other players. In a dynamic where several 
players are influencing each other, an account must be given of how each 
move influences the subsequent one in a sequential fashion. Accepting the 
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may resist or evade transparency. Thus, while a nontrivial part of the sur-
veillance studies literature follows Foucault’s (1991) panopticon reasoning 
and would expect these targeted parties to accept and internalize the imposed 
transparency, another part of the surveillance literature suggests resistance 
is the norm (e.g. Gilliom and Monahan 2012; Marx 2003). We thus might 
encounter a dynamic in which the panoptic gaze is not accepted but defied.
I will examine imposed transparency by focusing on the dynamics that 
emerge from the historical sequence that revolves around the restriction of 
Palestinian movement in the OPT and the defense of their human rights. My 
study is based on a qualitative analysis of both primary and secondary data, 
website content, reports and documents, and ten semi- structured interviews 
and correspondences with NGO activists/ personnel working in the field of 
Palestinian human rights, some of whom have firsthand experience with new 
hi-tech terminals operating in the West Bank.
Imposed transparency in the OPT
Imposed transparency is at the heart of what has been occurring in the OPT 
since the beginning of the 2000s, and to a lesser degree since these territories 
were occupied in 1967. In line with what scholars who link surveillance with 
colonialism have found in other places/ times (e.g. Monaghan 2013; Zureik 
2011), contemporary OPT is also a locus for intense implementation of sur-
veillance technologies on indigenous people. Israeli government agencies 
implement a deep- reaching surveillance of Palestinian movement and actions 
that is pervasive and affects virtually every Palestinian (Handel 2011; Handel 
and Dayan 2017; Lentin 2017; Zureik 2001, 2011, 2016). They frame trans-
parency as being carried out in the name of security considerations. The high 
price that ordinary Palestinians have to pay in order to provide assurance 
that they do not pose a threat is framed as the collateral damage of past 
Palestinian terrorist acts, and thus as legitimate. Although this justification of 
the pervasive practice of surveillance is somewhat contested, the overwhelming 
majority of Jews in Israel agree with it and endorse it (Avni 2006; Kuntsman 
and Stein 2015).
This process of forced transparency, coupled with other processes that 
pertain to maintaining the military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, 
entails the violation of Palestinians’ human rights on a large scale. These 
consistent violations, in turn, have provoked the emergence of several dozen 
advocacy groups and NGOs, some Palestinian, some Israeli, and some inter-
national, focused on stopping the violations. These advocacy groups conduct 
“empowering surveillance” against Israeli government agencies (Duke 2019) 
and impose transparency on them in turn. Since they impose transparency 
for policies that are seen as legitimate by most of the Jewish population, these 
NGOs themselves come under attack, and the Israeli NGOs in particular are 
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It is clear that trust between the parties is absent from the outset, and that 
it is not likely that these steps of forced transparency will produce trust. 
Instead, transparency is imposed in case A to produce security and control of 
movement, which are necessary to deepen and perpetuate the occupation, and 
in case B to protect Palestinian human rights and help end the occupation. 
This case study will be analyzed by examining the dynamics of the two sets of 
transparency cycles as a series of moves and countermoves.
Case study A: the dynamics around checkpoints in the 
West Bank
First move: deploying the checkpoints
In the early 2000s, and specifically after the second Intifada erupted in 
September 2000, Israel began establishing a new regime of checkpoints 
crisscrossing a large part of the West Bank (Handel 2011). These checkpoints 
were erected not only to monitor and control the entry of Palestinians into 
pre- 1967- border Israel, but also in order to monitor/ control the movement 
of Palestinians between Palestinian villages, towns, and cities within the West 
Bank. Both the army and the border police were put in charge of deploying 
and running these checkpoints, which placed young enlisted soldiers in charge 
of carrying out the actual monitoring of the Palestinian population. In 
accordance with the racist purpose of facilitating the occupation, Jews— both 
settlers in the OPT and nonsettlers— were exempt from inspection at these 
checkpoints and thus from any control of movement.
The checkpoints themselves have evolved significantly over the years. They 
began as no more than roadblocks (“a block, a few sand bags, with a sol-
dier behind them,” as described by Barag 2017) and grew into large- scale 
constructed open- air checkpoints, whose physical design serves the surveil-
lance demands of Israeli security agencies and the desire to run the check-
point in an orderly fashion. The checkpoints also reinforce the perception that 
all Palestinians pose a security threat (including to the checkpoint personnel) 
and create a number of human rights issues that derive from the problems 
that arise when masses of people are made to wait for a long time in order to 
pass. Beyond the checkpoints themselves, a variety of steps have been taken 
to prevent Palestinians from bypassing the checkpoints (Braverman 2012), 
such as the construction of the West Bank barrier and the establishment of a 
strict permit system.
Once the checkpoints had transformed into Israel’s main surveillance and 
movement restriction tool in the OPT, they required the investment of a sig-
nificant degree of resources for their operation. Beyond the capital drain 
of constructing and maintaining permanent checkpoints that “service” the 
entire West Bank Palestinian population, there was a need for trained per-
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efficiently. The fact that these facilities enable unwanted control over a large 
ethnic/ national group has made them a potential target for attack, which fur-
ther increases their resource drain on state agencies. The well- documented 
chronic unwillingness of the Israeli government to allocate the required 
resources (State Comptroller of Israel 2011) has exacerbated the stress on the 
checkpoints, increased the crossing time, and produced further human rights 
violations.
From the perspective of ordinary Palestinians, avoiding the checkpoints 
is not motivated primarily by a desire to avoid the imposed transparency. It 
is more about preventing the significant time loss and discomfort that these 
checkpoints entail, and their tendency to arbitrarily prevent free movement. 
Waiting in long lines, sometimes for more than an hour or two, with other 
people who also want to make it through promptly, produces major discom-
fort, and sometimes even triggers pushing, fainting, and incidents of violence. 
Movement is denied for any number of reasons, most of them unknown to 
the person passing through until s/ he is actually refused passage.1 Beyond the 
“lawful reasons” (if  we can call them that) for denying movement, the fact 
that the soldiers/ border police tasked with running these checkpoints have 
little relevant training, are overworked, and work under harsh conditions, 
means that many denials are made for unlawful reasons or due to ignorance 
of the rules (Hallward 2008; Mansbach 2009). This adds still more arbitrari-
ness to a process that is arbitrary to begin with.
Despite the fact that these checkpoints immediately became loci of massive 
human rights violations, and despite Israel’s and Palestine’s small size (which 
makes the checkpoints more accessible for observation), what went on in them 
remained largely unknown to both the Israeli public and the international 
community (Barag 2019). This opaqueness granted the Israeli security forces 
virtually free rein to operate the checkpoints as they pleased.
Second move: monitoring checkpoints by human rights NGOs
The reaction of human rights NGOs to the creation of this checkpoint regime 
was to impose transparency on the government agencies managing and oper-
ating it. These surveillance efforts in the name of Palestinian human rights 
were part of well- established practices of empowering surveillance whereby 
NGOs monitor Israeli agencies operating in the OPT (Duke 2019). These 
practices date back to the end of the 1980s and were spearheaded by Jewish– 
Israeli NGOs, which, due to their inclusion in the dominant community, were 
(and still are) in a special position to gain the cooperation of Israeli agencies.
With the new checkpoint regime in place, some existing NGOs turned 
their attention to these checkpoints, while in 2001 one new organization 
was created specifically with the purpose of monitoring them, appropriately 
named Machsom (checkpoint in Hebrew) Watch. This organization’s activists 
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the unmediated observation of what goes on in the checkpoints in real time, 
and affords the opportunity to intervene in the actions of soldiers/ officers 
operating the checkpoints in order to prevent human rights violations as they 
unfold (Hallward 2008; Kotef and Amir 2007; Mansbach 2007). Their con-
stant presence at the varied West Bank checkpoints and their intense contact 
with officers in the Israeli army enabled Machsom Watch activists to pressure 
the army into making changes in both the checkpoints’ procedures and their 
physical design (Barag 2017; Helman 2015; Hirschfield 2007; Kotef and Amir 
2007; Mansbach 2007).
At its peak, Machsom Watch numbered hundreds of activists across Israel, 
distributed among several different geographical regions, with most of them 
engaged in checkpoint observation in the West Bank on a weekly basis (Bar 
2017; Barag 2017; Braverman 2012; Hallward 2008; Mansbach 2007). This 
created a situation in which large checkpoints would be monitored at least 
once a day, while smaller checkpoints would be examined at least once a 
week. In this way they were able to put in place a mechanism of constant 
monitoring and intervention, and established themselves as the third major 
party to the interaction between Palestinians and Israeli security forces at 
these checkpoints.
Machsom Watch’s primary focus on checkpoints and their unmediated 
contact in “the field” allowed them to gain a great deal of perspective, infor-
mation, and know- how regarding these checkpoints, their effects on the 
Palestinians, the military rules that are supposed to govern them, and the de 
facto arbitrariness that actually governs them most of the time (Braverman 
2012). Although the Watch members mostly lacked any identifying features, 
their constant presence was hard to miss, and it seems most checkpoint 
operators recognized them and saw them as something between a burden and 
a full- fledged enemy (Bar 2017; Kutz- Flamenbaum 2016). Machsom Watch’s 
huge database of checkpoint reports is full of descriptions of confrontational 
encounters with checkpoint operators. The database is also indicative of 
the intensive contact such monitoring entails between the activists and the 
higher- ranking officers, who were routinely asked to intervene in either struc-
tural/ procedural issues, or in individual cases, when common ground with the 
checkpoint soldier/ officer could not be reached.
It is thus of no surprise that those operating the checkpoints tried to under-
mine the activists’ monitoring in a variety of ways. For instance, they often 
told the activists to move to another spot, away from where the soldier/ officer 
stood (Bar 2017; Kutz- Flamenbaum 2016). In extreme cases, they tried to 
declare the checkpoint and its surroundings “a closed military area” which, 
if  accepted, would have required the activists to vacate the area and cease the 
monitoring. However, Machsom Watch activists fiercely resisted these latter 
practices by being well informed about what is required by law to declare 
a closed military zone, and by refusing to give merit to any verbal declar-
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attempts to stop the monitoring of checkpoint operators most probably 
only increased the frustration of the soldiers/ officers, whose transgressions 
continued to be monitored by a group of civilians and were sometimes 
reported to their superiors.
Third move: new hi- tech indoor checkpoints
The next move was made by the Israeli government, and specifically by the 
Israeli agencies managing and running the checkpoints, and it marked a 
radical change to a portion of the checkpoints— those that were in proximity 
to either the pre- 1967 border or to the borders of Larger Jerusalem. These 
checkpoints were to become “terminals” resembling airports or “normal” 
land border crossings. Among other things, this shift would entail making 
these checkpoints more permanent structures, shifting their operation from 
being run by soldiers/ officers to specialized civilian personnel, and replacing 
much of the close- proximity personal monitoring functions of the checkpoint 
with less- conspicuous surveillance technologies.
The new indoor checkpoints were part of a greater scheme that also 
included the construction of the Separation Wall, which circles the West 
Bank. This project, devised by the Israeli government around 2002– 2003, 
would create a situation in which all Palestinian movement into pre- 1967 
Israel can only be done via the new indoor checkpoints (State Comptroller of 
Israel 2011). While in line with contemporary world trends to reduce uncon-
trolled movement of “undesirables” to a minimum and to privatize border 
work (Bigo 2006; Walsh 2010), Israel’s approach also diverges from this trend 
in that this border work has not been made more mobile, more ad hoc, or 
less formalized like in other places (e.g. Andreas and Snyder 2000; Bigo and 
Guild 2005), but quite the reverse; it is much more permanent and formal 
than before (Braverman 2011).
The shift to indoor checkpoints took a long time to realize, was implemented 
unevenly among the different “terminals,” and was riddled with errors. In 
some ways, this project is still ongoing since the full hi- tech vision of a ship-
shape terminal was realized only in two “model” crossings (Qalandiya and 
Checkpoint 300), while the remaining crossings still have a way to go. What 
became common to all the terminals was the much greater transparency they 
enforced on Palestinians passing through them. The gradual introduction of 
database links, magnetic ID cards, and biometrics (e.g. fingerprint reading) 
allows for much closer monitoring of each Palestinian passing through (Kotef 
and Amir 2007). Of course, greater transparency spells out greater and more 
sophisticated movement restrictions.
With regard to the issue of checkpoint operation transparency, what was 
most critical in this transformation was the shift indoors (Braverman 2012; 
Mansbach 2009). This meant that the checkpoint would no longer be open 
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Konforty 2017; Kotef and Amir 2007). While at the open- air checkpoints 
activists could stand outside the fences and still monitor and intervene, the 
walls of the indoor checkpoints prevent such monitoring. In addition, in the 
new terminals Palestinians passing through the checkpoint would no longer 
be able to plea with the checkpoint operators, to reason with them, or to alert 
them of any problem they encountered, because the operators are mostly 
hidden behind walls, heavy- duty glass windows, and CCTV (Braverman 2012; 
Kotef and Amir 2007; Mansbach 2009; Rijke and Minca 2019). In this new 
system, the limited transparency that was previously forced on the operators 
of the checkpoint is now largely lost.
Was this an intended consequence or maybe a coincidence or an oversight 
on the part of the decision makers? There are several indications that this was 
a sought- after consequence, even if  not an explicit one. First, these terminals 
were developed from scratch. They were not just another patch on the existing 
structures, such as the many upgrades that open- air checkpoints underwent, 
but an entirely new structure designed purposely several years after the 
checkpoint regime was put in place. Thus, these structures were deliberately 
designed to lack any outward- facing windows and avoided any inclusion of 
a physical or virtual viewing gallery, which would have allowed human rights 
activists and reporters to view the checkpoint processes. Similarly, the lack of 
any opportunity for feedback from the Palestinians crossing the checkpoint 
was a desired consequence. While the operators use the specially installed 
loudspeakers to communicate with the Palestinians, there is “no technology 
installed to hear possible responses, which explains why Palestinians have to 
shout or communicate via signs” (Rijke and Minca 2019).
This intentional lack of transparency and one- sidedness of interaction is 
further reinforced by the reasons given for this transition to indoor terminals. 
While there are several motivations for this transformation, what consist-
ently appeared at the top of the list of explicit goals was “reducing friction” 
(Davidov 2014; State Comptroller of Israel 2011). That is, reducing instances 
in which the operators come into direct contact with the Palestinian popu-
lation and, I would add, with the human rights activists who monitor and 
intervene on their behalf. Indeed, as discussed above, both types of inter-
action tend to produce conflicts and are perceived as a burden by the check-
point operators and to some extent by the higher army ranks. Therefore, 
the new type of checkpoint tries to achieve architecturally what in the past 
soldiers and field commanders tried to achieve unlawfully— to close off  the 
checkpoints to any form of outside monitoring.
This closing off  also suited the interests of those higher up the pecking 
order. Both the security forces’ top ranks and the Israeli political leadership 
of the last decade and a half  seem to be invested in upholding the checkpoint 
regime, as it is highly consensual among the Jewish population. Naturally, 
bad press, locally and internationally, runs the risk of putting pressure on 
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checkpoint regime (Davidov 2014). Hiding what is taking place in these 
checkpoints from sight and oversight thus serves to avoid negative reactions 
(Barag 2019; Handel and Dayan 2017). A good indication that this is in fact 
the thinking is that the two model terminals— the ones that actually resemble 
an airport— are the ones most exposed to the international community 
(Hass 2019).
Did this shift to terminals achieve the goals of reducing the operators’ trans-
parency? It seems it mostly did. To this day, in all but the two model indoor 
checkpoints Machsom Watch activists are not allowed to monitor, not even 
by passing through them as a Palestinian crosser does, while the two terminals 
that do allow activists to enter are limited to this single crossing- through pro-
cedure. Sporadic supervised visits to the checkpoints were organized following 
requests from activists/ reporters, but it seems each time they occurred, the 
checkpoint was closed off  for crossing (Afek 2019; Maor 2019), which meant 
the visitors did not witness real- world conditions. Machsom Watch activists 
did not cease their monitoring activities because of this shift, but have had 
to rely on the feedback of Palestinians exiting the checkpoints in order to 
understand what is going on within them. They still inspect each checkpoint’s 
facilities and surroundings (Afek 2019; Bar 2019; Barag 2019), yet the bulk of 
their monitoring and their intervention disappeared with the move indoors.
Case study B: the dynamics around Palestinian human 
rights NGOs2
First move: monitoring human rights violations
As mentioned above, Israeli NGOs have been monitoring Israeli agencies and 
settler actions for human rights violations for almost three decades. There are 
currently at least three dozen of these monitoring bodies that engage in some 
sort of empowering surveillance (Aggestam and Strömbom 2013; Avni 2006; 
Duke 2019; Fleischmann 2016; Helman 2015; Miretski and Bachmann 2014). 
That is, they are imposing transparency on government agencies in the name 
of universal human rights norms. The monitoring is done by a variety of 
methods such as direct observation, testimony collection, evidence collection, 
taking affidavits, gathering pictures and video data, making judicial inquiries, 
making formal and informal information requests, and more.
The collected data is used to monitor violations of human rights by a variety 
of government agencies and by right- wing social groups that either operate 
in the OPT or have a role in perpetuating the occupation. NGO proficiency 
in collecting data, processing it, and disseminating information arising from 
it has rendered them the primary source of information regarding the OPT 
for international forums, journalists, scholars, foreign government agencies, 
and even Israeli government agencies (Barag 2017; Braverman 2012; Kutz- 
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government agencies on the information these NGOs gather and analyze is a 
testament to the quality of work that they do.
These organizations are thus committed both to stopping human rights 
violations in the short run and to ending the decades- long Israeli occupa-
tion of the Palestinian territories. Yet, what these NGOs have found over 
the course of their activity is that merely putting the information on the 
web, available for all the world to see, is not enough. They have also learned 
that a large majority of the Israeli public does not want to hear about these 
violations or the occupation in general (Aggestam and Strömbom 2013; Avni 
2006; Desai 2015; Fleischmann 2016; Helman 2015), and that in the inter-
national arena Palestinian suffering “competes” for attention with many other 
types of suffering by different groups. This has pushed the organizations to be 
much more active in their dissemination of information and to dynamically 
seek an audience. Thus, beyond responding to queries that seek information, 
some of these NGOs often approach relevant forums that might see value in 
such information, produce pressure on the Israeli government, and eventually 
affect decision- making processes.
Nevertheless, despite all the dedication and creativity that Israeli human 
rights NGOs invest in their endeavor, their overall success is limited (Aggestam 
and Strömbom 2013; Fleischmann 2016; Kutz- Flamenbaum 2016; Miretski 
and Bachmann 2014). The occupation in general seems to be deepening 
with time, and the goal of either nullifying or eroding it has clearly not been 
realized. Moreover, the much more modest aspiration to put an end to sys-
tematic violations of human rights has had a very limited effect.
Second move: attack from the right- wing
It is precisely the role Israeli NGOs play in disseminating information about 
human rights violations perpetuated against Palestinians that causes a huge 
backlash against them within Israeli society (Avni 2006; Handel and Dayan 
2017). The Israeli right- wing, which enjoys widespread support among 
Jews in Israel, has recognized that by imposing transparency upon govern-
ment agencies, and by communicating the mass violation of human rights to 
publics and organizations abroad, these NGOs are exposing Israel to pressure 
to change its policies and end the occupation. The right- wing has recognized 
that this type of transparency jeopardizes the constant gains it enjoys in terms 
of solidifying and normalizing the occupation and that it should enlist its 
political power and its control of the Israeli government in order to terminate 
this transparency.
The method the Israeli right- wing has chosen involves a combination of 
direct attacks by individuals, groups, and organizations, and indirect attacks 
using legislative and administrative power (Handel and Dayan 2017). Israel’s 
right- wing control over state power has been used in several ways in order to 
weaken these NGOs. For instance, taxation policies were altered in order to 
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make donations to human rights NGOs less attractive and ultimately diminish 
their funding (Aggestam and Strömbom 2013; Policy Working Group 2018; 
Sucharov 2016). Legislative steps have also been taken, allegedly in the name 
of greater transparency, to force these specific NGOs to disclose the sources of 
their funding (Gild- Hayo 2018) in order to reveal that a significant portion 
of donations to Israeli human rights NGOs originates from foreign entities.
Complementing these legislative transparency steps were the steps taken by 
private right- wing individuals, groups, and organizations aimed at delegitim-
izing NGOs. Such steps included several media campaigns that focused on the 
fact that much of their funding comes from abroad, and thus painted them as 
traitors. Among them was a propaganda video titled “The Moles,” produced 
by Im Tirzu (a far- right Israeli organization), which suggests a link between 
terrorist attacks against Israelis and four figures from four Israeli human 
rights NGOs. The video claims that these activists and the organizations they 
are affiliated with work for foreign interests opposing Israel.3 Tapping into a 
well- known distrust of Israeli Jews toward foreign governments/ bodies, this 
video attempts to enrage the public against these organizations and provoke 
retaliation against them.
Another use of transparency by the Israeli right- wing is evident in the 
heavily funded project “NGO Monitor.” This website holds a detailed data-
base of all the human rights- related NGOs that operate in Israel/ Palestine. 
On its homepage, the organization describes its mission as follows: “we work 
to ensure that decision makers and civil society operate in accordance with the 
principles of accountability, transparency, and universal human rights” (NGO 
Monitor 2019). Although not unprecedented (e.g. Kutz- Flamenbaum 2016; 
Perugini and Gordon 2015), this is in fact one of the most blatant attempts to 
use Israeli human rights NGOs’ rhetoric and methods against them.
Third move: minimal transparency
The effects of the sophisticated right- wing moves against the Israeli human 
rights NGOs have been nontrivial but still limited. The ultimate goal of dis-
abling these organizations or intimidating them into docility has not been 
attained. Indeed, the top management of these organizations explicitly says 
that these campaigns have not changed their work procedure in any signifi-
cant way (Gvaryahu 2019; Montell 2019).
That said, it is evident that these attacks have posed a challenge to these 
organizations and hijacked some of their time, attention, and energy. Repeated 
threats of physical assault against activists, sometimes with indications that 
these activists were being followed/ surveilled, and a handful of actual assaults 
that took place, have rattled NGO activists (Gvaryahu 2019). Activists from 
the more well- known human rights NGOs, for instance, try to keep their affili-
ation somewhat secret (Doe 2017; Smith 2017). The NGOs themselves have 
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2019; Montell 2019). Beyond the threat of vigilantism from militant right- 
wing activists, there is a threat of verbal attacks, refusal of service, or work- 
related reprisals that seems to come from the general Jewish public, which 
shows strong and sometimes active support for the fight against internal and 
external “enemies” (Dishy 2017; Kuntsman and Stein 2015). Another type of 
attack that these organizations, especially the most visible, face is cyberattacks, 
requiring some NGOs to defend themselves accordingly (Yellin 2017).
These NGOs have needed to adapt institutionally, since they are now 
legally required to disclose certain facts regarding their funding. Yet these 
legal obligations have not pushed them to more substantial transparency, but 
rather to adhere to the letter of the law. Among other things, they are now 
required to publish a quarterly list of foreign donors, to specify on their web-
site and in mail correspondence if  they are mostly funded by foreign entities, 
and when appearing before the Israeli Parliament, to inform the committee 
chair of the same. An examination of these NGOs’ websites shows that they 
adhere to these provisions, and sometimes do so under a “Transparency” 
section. However, that same examination (conducted twice in 2018 and 
2019) showed that they did not go beyond what is required by law in any sig-
nificant measure, although hypothetically this opportunity could have been 
used to disclose further information. In fact, there are good indications that 
the combined attacks have shifted these organizations slightly away from 
transparency and toward opaqueness in their dealings with elements outside 
the organization. This was alluded to by several activists whom I interviewed 
(e.g. Doe 2017), and also experienced by me directly when trying to secure 
interviews. I often found myself  denied access and asked to provide ample 
assurances regarding my aims before and during interviews.
It is precisely the sophisticated use of imposed transparency on the part 
of the right- wing that has provoked this modest but apparent retreat from 
transparency by such organizations. Among the tactics that were used at least 
in one conspicuous case— that of the NGO Breaking the Silence— was the 
organization’s infiltration by several right- wing activists in order to gather 
information that would present the organization in a negative light and expose 
it to the public (Gvaryahu 2019). Fears of such forms of information- seeking 
have provoked heightened suspicion toward unknown outsiders and a much 
more robust vetting process of would- be activists.
When asked to explain what makes both the governmental and non-
governmental efforts to impose transparency on Israeli human rights NGOs 
instances of “bad faith,” interviewees point to their one- sided applicability. 
NGO Monitor only directs its probes to left- wing organizations, is itself  not 
transparent, and heavily decontextualizes the information it gathers (Policy 
Working Group 2018; Sfard 2017). The legislation that was passed forcing 
transparency on these NGOs was carefully worded in order to apply mainly 
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did apply, right- wing NGOs were de facto exempt from it (Bendet 2015; 
Gvaryahu 2019; Montell 2019). Thus, since these attempts of forced trans-
parency are not universal, they are perceived as illegitimate and disingenuous.
Conclusion
After analyzing the two OPT case studies, what becomes obvious is that 
imposed transparency is amply used to achieve strategic political goals. New 
forms of disclosure are constantly being invented and imposed on a targeted 
party in order to achieve “security,” restriction of movement, protection 
of human rights, the end of the occupation, and other goals. None of the 
described transparency moves were universally applied. The checkpoints only 
target Palestinians with their imposed transparency. Jewish settlers, although 
implicated in a variety of crimes against Palestinians, are not inspected. 
Similarly, Machsom Watch activists target the checkpoints of the West Bank 
for monitoring. They do not monitor what other security personnel do in the 
OPT, nor the occasional crimes carried out against soldiers/ police officers. 
None of the parties asked for consent, and no consent has been given by 
the targets of imposed transparency. Moreover, most of the transparency is 
achieved by monitoring/ surveillance, and there is very little self- disclosure in 
the process. Hence, the presented cases lie almost squarely within the imposed 
transparency archetype (see Table 4.1) and are a good representation of its 
dynamics.
As the empirical analysis shows, imposed transparency is not some-
thing that targeted organizations and individuals seem to come to terms 
with. Resistance/ evasion is strong and both individuals (e.g. soldiers) and 
organizations (e.g. NGOs) are constantly seeking ways to shake off  the 
monitoring that is imposed on them. Translated into the study of surveil-
lance, the above observed dynamics have pessimistic prospects for the via-
bility of Bentham’s and Foucault’s idea of internalization of the watching eye 
in situations of constant imposed monitoring. In fact, the end result is the 
Foucauldian panopticon effect in reverse— instead of self- regulation, these 
organizations and individuals opt for regression to opaqueness. This insight 
may serve as a warning sign for those who overestimate the power of sur-
veillance and of imposed transparency— these tools may achieve an imme-
diate desired goal, but in cases when they truly expose the targets to negative 
effects, they will probably be neither internalized nor accepted.
Cycles of imposed and counter- imposed transparency seem to come with 
negative side effects. Among them are the personalization of animosity and 
the erosion of the concept of transparency. Imposed transparency appears 
to personalize animosity by connecting what targets perceive as a negative 
outcome with the entity that initiated it. The term transparency, for its part, 
sheds all of its positive connotations in this process and becomes hollow and 
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strictly utilitarian. Most importantly, imposed transparency does not serve as 
a gateway to voluntary transparency, instead breeding even greater opacity.
That said, we have to acknowledge the sharp asymmetry in power between 
the different parties in these cycles of imposed transparency. As the empirical 
examination shows, this asymmetry means that both applying imposed trans-
parency and coping with its imposition as a target are much more effective 
for the powerful side than for the weaker side. Powerful organizations, such 
as the army, can establish massive operations of imposed transparency and 
can rely on their heavy state support to avoid being the target of imposed 
transparency. Weak groups/ organizations can apply imposed transparency, 
but with great investment of effort and at significant personal cost. Their 
ability to avoid being targeted also requires a disproportionate investment 
of energy and has limited results. That said, although imposed transparency 
favors the strong, it is often the only recourse of the weak. In our case, this 
asymmetry, which is part of the colonial settings in the Middle East, means 
that the NGOs’ imposed transparency only succeeds in stopping the most 
egregious violations of Palestinian human rights, and that the occupation is 
neither eliminated nor curbed.
Notes
 1 It is of course paradoxical that the process of demanding transparency from 
Palestinians is itself  starkly untransparent.
 2 This section refers to all Israeli NGOs dealing with Palestinian human rights, not 
just those dealing with checkpoints.
 3 The video is available here: https://youtu.be/02u_J2C-Lso.
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Classifying and dividing labor




According to Andrea Smith (2015, 23), “Surveillance studies’s focus on the 
modern state similarly hides an analysis of the settler colonialist and white 
supremacist logics of surveillance that precede the ascendancy of the modern 
state.” Indeed, surveillance studies has not yet fully explored the colonial 
genealogies of surveillance. In the United States, both the modern adminis-
trative state itself  and the surveillance practices that have helped and continue 
to help produce and reproduce it have both a settler colonialist and white 
supremacist genealogy. In this chapter, I will not only draw out the colonial 
genealogy of racializing surveillance but also show that contemporary sur-
veillance ultimately serves to secure a neocolonial political economy based on 
racial divisions within the working class.
Simone Browne (2015, 16) defines racializing surveillance as a “technology 
of social control where surveillance practices, policies and performances con-
cern the production of norms pertaining to race and exercise a ‘power to 
define what is in or out of place.’ ” David Lyon suggests that we ought to 
understand “surveillance as social sorting” in order to tease out the “clas-
sifying drive of contemporary surveillance” (Lyon 2003, 13). Surveillance 
undoubtedly serves the purpose of social sorting, and this holds particularly 
true for racializing surveillance. Yet, this leaves open the question as to what 
the purpose of social sorting is. In capitalist social formations a key function 
of social sorting, although not the only one, is to secure the conditions for 
capitalist accumulation. In this chapter, I will argue that racializing surveil-
lance is, above all, a colonial technology for (re)producing racial divisions 
within the US working class while also drawing out the dialectical relations 
between transparency and opacity in contemporary US racializing surveil-
lance. For, ultimately, contemporary racializing surveillance obscures not only 
its settler colonial and colonial genealogy but also its contemporary neoco-
lonial ontology. Drawing on (neo- )Marxian theory, I will first map how cap-
italist accumulation was not only historically enabled by settler colonialism 








that combines “ordinary” exploitation with racialized expropriation and dis-
posability. Second, I will show how capitalist expropriation and disposability 
in the United States have been and continue to be facilitated by practices 
of racializing surveillance. Lastly, I will argue that as a key manifestation of 
racializing surveillance in the contemporary United States, welfare surveil-
lance reproduces neocolonial racial divisions under the conditions of formal 
legal equality and professed colorblindness.
Race and the exploitation, expropriation, and 
disposability of labor
In the first volume of Capital, Marx begins his critique of political economy 
with an analysis of the commodity. Marx makes a distinction between the 
concrete qualitative uses to which commodities can be put— their use value— 
and their quantitative relation to all other commodities— their exchange 
value. Nonetheless, despite their material differences and their fundamentally 
different use values, all commodities are products of labor (Marx 1976). The 
amount of labor that goes into the production of commodities makes for 
their commensurability. This is expressed by the concept of value, which Marx 
(1976, 129) defines as “socially necessary labour time”— the average amount 
of labor time that goes into the production of a particular commodity at a 
given place, at a given time. Socially necessary labor time thus determines a 
commodity’s value, which is, in turn, represented by exchange value in rela-
tion to other commodities and which is ultimately expressed in terms of a 
price. Marx goes on to examine the process of commodity exchange and finds 
that under the conditions of a competitive market for commodities, sustained 
profits cannot arise from exchange. All market participants try to buy cheaply 
and sell dearly, and some of them may indeed obtain some profit because, due 
to the ebb and flow of supply and demand, prices do not always correspond 
to a commodity’s value. But as each seller is also a buyer, profits are fleeting; 
if  one market participant is able to sell particularly dearly today, she may have 
to buy more expensively tomorrow. In short, because of market competition 
the price of each commodity will ultimately even out around a commodity’s 
actual value so that profits are ephemeral (Marx 1976).
Yet, capitalists do find one commodity on the market that can create more 
than its original value. This is the peculiar commodity of labor power. Labor 
power also has a value, namely the socially necessary labor time for producing 
the commodities needed to sustain a laborer at a historically and geograph-
ically specific standard of living (Marx 1976). The value of labor power is 
reproduced after a certain time, but if  laborers are made to work longer and/ 
or more intensively than required to reproduce the value of their labor power, 
the capitalist has obtained surplus value. This is the Marxian definition of 
exploitation: the contractual obligation of laborers to work longer and/ or 
more intensively than necessary to produce the value of the commodities 
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workers need to sustain themselves at a given standard of living, at a given 
place, at a given time (Marx 1976). Exploitation is the source of surplus value, 
which capitalists can consume away and/ or reinvest. However, the continuous 
productive reinvestment of at least some portion of surplus value is what 
ultimately defines the capitalist. This is what capitalist accumulation is all 
about: the constant reinvestment of past profits to generate even more profits 
in the future (Marx 1976).
Marx thus shows that capitalist accumulation ultimately hinges on the com-
modification of labor power and the concomitant exploitation of the laborer. 
The commodification of labor power in turn centers on two conditions: (1) 
generalized commodity exchange based on the large- scale monetization of 
economic relations; and (2) processes of proletarianization. Yet, whereas the 
imperative of capital accumulation has become an almost universal social 
force, processes of proletarianization have unfolded unevenly and continue to 
be highly particularistic. According to Étienne Balibar (1991b, 161– 2), pro-
letarianization entails three separate social processes that cannot be solely 
derived from the purely economic contradictions inherent in the capitalist 
mode of production. First, exploitation, as outlined above, consists of the 
extraction of surplus labor (and hence also surplus value) by having laborers 
work above and beyond the actual value of their labor power. Second, 
through mechanization, automation, and the rationalization of the labor 
process laborers come under the ever more direct control and surveillance of 
the capitalist or her representatives for the duration of their labor time. This 
is what Marx (1976) called the shift from the formal to the real subsump-
tion of labor under capital. Thus, the commodification of labor power also 
entails the domination of  labor by capital at the workplace. Both exploitation 
and domination are conditioned by locally specific forms of contract law and 
local variations in how the formal freedom and equality of the public sphere 
(including the market) is demarcated from the private sphere of production 
(Marx 1976). Thirdly, laborers also bear the economic risks and associated 
insecurity of having to sell their labor power. They are exposed to market 
fluctuations, crises, and a trend toward rendering labor power superfluous 
through increasing investment in labor- saving machinery. Laborers thus also 
compete against one another in the labor market. Divisions and hierarchies 
within the working class both exacerbate competition between workers and 
are also compounded by it, as workers mobilize these divisions and hier-
archies not only in making their economic claims but also in expressing their 
opposition to their own oppression (Balibar 1991a, 214). This spatially and 
temporally uneven development of proletarianization is, on the one hand, the 
result of the historical processes that prompted proletarianization in the first 
place and, on the other, due to the fact that labor power is what Karl Polanyi 
called a fictitious commodity (Polanyi 1957, 75).
Firstly, proletarianization came about through a set of brutal historical 





violently divested numerous people from their means of production and/ or 
subsistence— primarily land— and also provided a large influx of precious 
metals into Europe, which led to increasing monetization, which in turn 
helped generalize commodity exchange (Marx 1976). Primitive accumulation 
occurred both in the colonial periphery and the metropolitan core, but with 
a key difference: whereas in Europe the large- scale dispossession of people 
mostly drove them into wage labor, the colonized were frequently forced into 
forms of unpaid labor. The imposition of various coercive colonial labor 
regimes was, moreover, entangled with the development of racial ideologies. 
Racial ideologies developed in the context of and as a direct consequence 
of the colonial conquest of the Americas, where, as the Peruvian sociolo-
gist Aníbal Quijano (2000, 533) puts it, “[t] he conquistadors assumed this 
idea [of race] as the constitutive, founding element of the relations of domin-
ation that the conquest imposed.” In the United States, the ideology of “race” 
developed through the codification of differences between free and enslaved 
people in order to justify and reproduce slavery “in a republic founded on 
radical doctrines of liberty and natural rights, and, more important a republic 
in which those doctrines seemed to represent accurately the world in which 
all but a minority lived” (Fields and Fields 2014, 141). From the foundation 
of the American republic, racism and class oppression have thus been inex-
tricably intertwined. African Americans became a “race” because of the vio-
lent expropriation of their labor power— in short, because of their violently 
imposed class position as enslaved people (Fields and Fields 2014, 266– 7). 
The ideology of “race” persisted even after the class position from which it 
originally derived was abolished. The ideology of “race” has undoubtedly 
undergone profound historical changes, but it still serves to justify various 
forms of racism— that is to say, forms of differential treatment alleged to 
result from ultimately fictitious innate differences of the individuals and/ or 
groups who are the victims of discrimination. This is what Fields and Fields 
(2014, 261 and 97) call “the social alchemy of racecraft [which] transforms 
racism into race” so that “[d]isguised as race, racism becomes something Afro- 
Americans are, rather than something racists do.” Particular populations are 
thus “racialized” because they are the targets of racism and not the other 
way around. Even though racism is no longer directly tied to the class pos-
ition of enslaved people, in capitalist social formations in general, and in the 
United States in particular, racism still serves to reproduce labor power below 
its value and “to exclude populations from the labor market” (Grosfoguel 
2003, 210). As Immanuel Wallerstein puts it:
A capitalist system that is expanding (which is half  the time) needs all the 
labour- power it can find, since this labour is producing the goods through 
which more capital is produced, realized and accumulated. Ejection out 
of the system is pointless. But if  one wants to maximize the accumula-
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production (hence the costs of labour- power) and minimize the costs of 
political disruption (hence minimize – not eliminate, because one cannot 
eliminate – the protests of the labour force). Racism is the magic formula 
that reconciles these objectives.
(Wallerstein 1991b, 33)
Indeed, capitalism has never been colorblind, and racism continues to play a 
significant role in facilitating capitalist accumulation.
Colonial violence, racism, and expropriation were, indeed, pivotal for the 
eventual expansion of the capitalist mode of production. Colonialism is 
widely held to have ended with the independence of most former colonies. 
Yet, a number of scholars argue that coloniality persists despite the abolition 
of colonial forms of labor control and the independence of former colonies 
(Grosfoguel 2003; Pinderhughes 2011; Quijano 2000). A hierarchical division 
of labor along the lines of race and ethnicity “continues to be an integral 
part of the contemporary global division of labor even after independence 
and the global expansion of the capitalist wage- labor relation” (Grosfoguel 
2003, 146). In fact, “the entanglement of capitalist accumulation processes 
with a racial/ ethnic hierarchy and its derivative classifications of superior/ 
inferior, developed/ undeveloped, and civilized/ barbarian people” constitutes 
a global coloniality even in the absence of any formal colonial system of rule 
(Grosfoguel 2003, 17; see also Quijano 2000). This situation should be termed 
neocolonial in order to highlight both the ruptures (abolition of colonial 
labor control, granting of formally equal rights, some forms of self- rule, etc.) 
and the continuities (racial/ ethnic division of labor, persistence of racism) 
between classical colonialism and contemporary neocoloniality. Primitive 
accumulation articulated a division between “free” and “unfree” labor upon a 
division between superior and inferior humans. In fact, unfree laborers in the 
colonies were not exploited in the strict Marxian sense, but their labor power 
was violently expropriated. The analytical distinction between exploitation 
and expropriation is a crucial one, and I will discuss its historical and contem-
porary significance in greater detail below.
Secondly, the uneven processes of  proletarianization are also due to the 
peculiar nature of  the commodity of  labor power. The economic value of 
labor power— the socially necessary labor time that goes into the production 
of  the commodities needed to sustain a laborer— only accounts for the bare 
life of  the laborer. Yet, all sorts of  immaterial and unquantifiable factors 
are required for the production and reproduction of  the human bearers of 
labor power: love, care, education, meaningful social relations in general, 
etc. Indeed, labor power has come to be exchanged as a commodity, but it is 
hardly if  ever produced as a commodity. This has led Karl Polanyi to treat 
labor power as a fictitious commodity— alongside land and money (Polanyi 
1957, 71– 80). The very fiction that labor, land, and money are commod-




as commodities is, in turn, a basic condition for capitalist accumulation. 
Polanyi further argues that extending markets to labor, land, and money not 
only required a separation between economy and society but also reshaped 
society into a market society. The colonization of  social relations by labor 
markets, in particular, led to major social dislocations. For, “[t] o allow the 
market mechanism to be the sole director of  the fate of  human beings and 
their natural environment indeed, even of  the amount and use of  purchasing 
power, would result in the demolition of  society” (Polanyi 1957, 76). Society 
had to respond to these dislocations, giving rise to what Polanyi calls a 
“double movement”:
Social history in the nineteenth century was thus the result of a double 
movement: the extension of the market organization in respect to genuine 
commodities was accompanied by its restriction in respect to fictitious 
ones.
(Polanyi 1957, 79)
In order to ensure the continuous availability of these fictitious commodities 
as crucial factors for the capitalist mode of production, to maintain the fiction 
of their status as commodities, and to secure social stability and hence also 
the capitalist mode of production itself  from the social dislocations caused 
by processes of fictitious commodification, capitalism requires what Nancy 
Fraser calls “background conditions of possibility” (Fraser 2014). The afore-
mentioned processes of proletarianization— exploitation, domination, and 
competition— already indicate that the commodification of labor power is at 
once an economic and a political phenomenon. Marx himself  went beyond 
exchange into the hidden abode of production to show that the expansion 
of value does not arise out of exchange but from the exploitation of labor. 
Moreover, Marx showed how the concentration of private property in the 
means of production and the commodification of labor power was ultimately 
brought about by primitive accumulation, that is to say, by state- sanctioned 
force, theft, and plunder. Throughout Capital, Marx also hints at the neces-
sity of state power to prop up an already established capitalist mode of pro-
duction. However, the main thrust of his argument— except for the section on 
primitive accumulation— tends to unfold within the parameters of bourgeois 
political economy: perfectly functioning competitive markets and minimal 
state interference. Marx’s critique of bourgeois political economy is, for the 
most part, a critique of the capitalist mode of production in the abstract and 
not of concrete capitalist social formations.
Nancy Fraser, however, argues that capitalism ought to be understood as 
an institutionalized social order that demarcates and depends on external 
spheres that not only provide labor power and means of production below 
value but also ultimately help secure capitalism from its own crisis tendencies 
as well as from working- class opposition. She suggests that we shift the focus 
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“from the front- story of exploitation to the back- story of expropriation” 
(Fraser 2014, 60). From this perspective, the exploitation of laborers and thus 
the expansion of capital centers on the continuing expropriation of nature, 
the unremunerated work of women, and the deployment of state power to 
secure the conditions for capitalist accumulation. Consequently, primitive 
accumulation does not just constitute “the pre- history of capital, and of the 
mode of production corresponding to capital” but ought to be seen as an 
ongoing process (Marx 1976, 875). The violent expropriation of labor and 
means of production from spheres outside the capitalist mode of production 
is a structural necessity, especially in response to periodic crises. What is more, 
primitive accumulation entailed and continues to entail the accumulation of 
divisions and hierarchies within the working class— divisions and hierarchies 
that became codified and naturalized in terms of race and gender (Federici 
2004, 63– 4).
If  all commodities, including labor power, are sold and bought at their 
value, the exploitation of labor is the only source of surplus value. Yet, even 
though the capitalist mode of production relies on commodity circulation for 
realizing the value (and surplus value) of its outputs, capitalists still scramble 
to get their inputs (labor power and means of production) from outside of 
commodity circulation proper, that is to say, below value or even for free. 
This has considerable consequences for how we conceive of the working class, 
because not all members of the working class are wage laborers. What defines 
the working class is that it creates (surplus) value for capitalists (Wallerstein 
1991a, 120).
Workers may get to keep some of the value they create (e.g., in the form of 
a wage) but never all of it. If  a worker gets to keep that portion of the overall 
value of her product that corresponds to the value of the commodities needed 
to reproduce herself  at a given standard of living at a given place at a given 
time, she is “merely” being exploited. If  she gets less than the value of her 
labor power, her labor power is being expropriated. What is more, workers 
worldwide tend to live in households where they pool a variety of different 
income streams: wage income, subsistence production, petty commodity pro-
duction, rent, and transfer payments (Wallerstein 2004, 32– 4). The degree of 
proletarianization is thus the proportion of household income derived from 
wage labor as opposed to other sources of household income. Indeed, the 
proportion of household income derived from wage income in relation to 
a household’s participation in capitalist surplus production thus ultimately 
determines the degree of exploitation/ expropriation of both the overall house-
hold and its individual members. In short, expropriation has not only histor-
ically enabled exploitation but also continues to complement it, especially in 
response to crisis. Expropriation and exploitation are therefore two funda-
mental logics of oppression inherent in capitalist accumulation. However, we 
should note that exploitation and expropriation are mere approximations. 





expropriation, although chattel slavery is a clear case of expropriation in its 
purest and most brutal sense.
Capitalist accumulation also gives rise to a third mode of oppression: the logic 
of disposability. Marx argued that continuous changes in the organic compos-
ition of capital, that is to say, changes in the relation between constant capital 
(especially technology and machinery) and variable capital (labor power), tend 
toward the creation of a surplus population whose labor power is no longer 
needed (Marx 1976, 782– 98). A racialized population who was subject to vio-
lent expropriation in the past and whose subsequent exploitation has always 
contained elements of expropriation through labor market segmentation and 
discrimination is also more likely to become disproportionately superfluous as 
a result of technological and organizational changes in production.
Capitalists’ scramble for cheap labor power and the concomitant expro-
priation, exploitation, and disposability of the working class not only allows 
for the continuing accumulation of capital but also for the accumulation of 
local, regional, national, and global divisions within the working class. These 
divisions feed competition between members of the working class, which may 
in turn further entrench these divisions. In short, divisions within the working 
class are both a condition for and a consequence of capitalist accumulation 
while also playing a key role in pacifying working- class struggles. Yet, capit-
alism cannot secure these divisions by purely economic means. State power in 
general and state surveillance in particular provide the very infrastructure for 
maintaining and calibrating divisions within the working class to the degree 
best suited to continuing capitalist accumulation. State power is thus not only a 
tool for securing the conditions for continuous expropriation and exploitation 
but also for managing a disposable, economically superfluous population.
Racializing surveillance in the United States (settler) 
colonial past and present
The contemporary US capitalist social order has been shaped and continues 
to be shaped by both the settler colonial expropriation of land and the colo-
nial expropriation of labor power. According to Lorenzo Veracini, settler 
colonialism and colonialism are two distinct relations:
On the one hand, the colonial “encounter” is mirrored by what I have 
theorized as a settler colonial “non- encounter,” a circumstance funda-
mentally shaped by a recurring need to disavow the presence of indi-
genous “others.” On the other hand, in the case of colonial systems, a 
determination to exploit sustains a drive to sustain the permanent subor-
dination of the colonized (Veracini 2011, 2).
Although, I am in broad agreement with Veracini’s argument that 
“[c] olonialism reproduces itself” and “settler colonialism, by contrast, 
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extinguishes, itself,” I do not think that colonialism can be associated with 
exploitation (Veracini 2011, 3). Both settler colonialism and colonialism are 
forms of primitive accumulation expressed by different modalities of expro-
priation. Settler colonialism expropriates indigenous lands, which frequently 
entails efforts to make indigenous populations invisible. This is why settler 
colonialism is marked by a logic of elimination (Wolfe 2006). On the other 
hand, colonialism’s expropriation of labor power requires the presence and, 
at least partial, visibility of the expropriated workers. Their presence cannot 
be disavowed, and their continuing expropriation needs to be justified. This 
is why colonial relations are much more likely to give rise to explicit racial 
ideologies. I am far from saying that racial ideologies are absent from settler 
colonial relations, but in the United States, at least, it was the colonial regime 
of slavery that prompted the development of a racial black– white binary and 
the associated practices of racializing surveillance. In the case of the United 
States, the visibility of racialized others brought about by the racializing 
expropriation of labor power perhaps also obscures the settler colonial expro-
priation of land that provided the conditions of possibility for the subsequent 
importation of enslaved people.
Chattel slavery constituted a form of colonial labor control defined by 
the brutal subordination and oppression of enslaved people for the pur-
pose of coercively expropriating their labor power. Slavery was, moreover, 
entangled with international systems of banking, insurance, and credit, and 
it also contributed to the rise of industrialization, first in Britain and later in 
the American north (see Baptist 2014; Johnson 2013; Oakes 2016). Simone 
Browne suggests that
slavery must be engaged if  we are to create a surveillance studies that 
grapple with its constitutive genealogies, where the archive of slavery is 
taken up in a way that does not replicate the racial schema that spawned 
it and that it reproduced, but at the same time does not erase its violence.
(Browne 2015, 13)
Indeed, as the Southern slave plantation system became ever more closely 
entwined with global capitalist commodity circulation— through its main cash 
crop cotton— plantation owners developed increasingly sophisticated strat-
egies of surveillance and control in order to extract ever more labor and hence 
also value from their slaves. Caitlin Rosenthal (2018) shows that Southern 
cotton planters combined sophisticated management techniques with violence 
to improve the productivity of slave labor. In fact, slave owners’ techniques 
for monitoring and measuring productivity foreshadowed Fredrick Winslow 
Taylor’s tools of scientific management. The fact that enslaved people were 
subject to much more intensive and extensive domination than “free” wage 
laborers meant that slave owners could and did exercise much more control 





measured and classified enslaved people not only as a captive input to pro-
duction but also as a form of alienable commodity capital whose value could 
either appreciate or depreciate over time (Rosenthal 2018).
Wage labor centers on the commodification of labor power. The bearers 
of this peculiar commodity remain its owners and can sell it as they see fit, 
although often under highly unfavorable conditions. Yet, once sold, laborers 
no longer fully control their labor power and have no legal rights to the 
products of their labor apart from their wages. The contractual exchange 
of labor power for a money wage is what ultimately allows for exploitation. 
Slavery, on the other hand, entailed the (almost) total commodification of 
people themselves. Slaves had neither legal ownership of their labor power, 
nor could they exert much (if  any) control over it. They did not work over 
and above the value of their labor power to produce surplus value, because 
the value of their labor power did no longer belong to them. Their labor 
power had been violently expropriated through their enslavement and was 
now completely owned by their master. Thus, the surplus value produced 
by slaves— that is to say, the value they produced over and above their own 
exchange value as slaves and the value of the commodities needed to keep 
them alive— is not a product of exploitation in the Marxian sense but of vio-
lent expropriation.
The commodification of humans ultimately depended on the definition and 
enforcement of property rights as well as on the classifications— to be found 
in ledgers, bills of sale, etc.— that marked people as commodities. Enslaved 
people were ripped out of their communities and stripped of all the customs, 
hierarchies, social distinctions, and identities that characterized their previous 
way of life in order to become subject to the commodifying classifications 
around productivity and value imposed by the slave trade and the planta-
tion system. However, precisely because enslaved people were humans and 
not commodities, efforts to commodify them required such horrific forms of 
violence. Enslaved people did not voluntarily submit to their commodifica-
tion. In order to become commodities, they constantly needed to be violently 
subjected to a process of commodification by means of surveillance and vio-
lence. And even then, they retained and struggled to assert their humanity 
(Rinehart 2016; Rosenthal 2018). As Rosenthal demonstrates, the written 
records of the surveillance and management practices used in and for the 
profitable commodification of enslaved people both obscure the violence 
inherent to slavery and also highlight the necessary brutality of a mode of 
production that feeds on humans as commodities (Rosenthal 2018, 187– 205).
The growing size of the slave population was, moreover, considered a 
massive social control problem. The threat of slave insurrection and the 
constant risk of slave flight led to the emergence of increasingly formalized 
slave patrols. The first slave patrols were formed in the seventeenth century 
and were informal bands of volunteers tasked with recapturing runaway 
slaves. In the course of the eighteenth century, slave patrols became more 
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organized and were also charged with preventing insurrection. The Fugitive 
Slave Act of 1850 gave state governments wide- ranging authority to recruit 
individuals— especially poor whites— into slave patrols that now had almost 
unlimited coercive powers over the slave population. Slave patrols were tasked 
with the routine surveillance of the slave population in order to regulate and 
manage their movement according to the politico- economic imperatives of 
chattel slavery (Bass 2001, 159; Brucato 2014, 38– 9). In fact, slave patrols are 
a significant strand in the genealogy of US police (Bass 2001; Brucato 2014; 
Hadden 2001).
Brutal efforts to control the movement, and hence also the labor, of the 
black population continued after the abolition of slavery. Immediately after 
the end of the Civil War, most Southern states replaced their Slave Codes with 
the so- called Black Codes, which were aimed at severely restricting the freedom 
of former slaves and maintaining them in a state of quasi- slavery through 
extremely low wages, debt peonage, as well as numerous sweeping vagrancy 
statutes. Mounting criticism from the Northern States led to a brief  interlude 
during which the federal government tried to turn freed people into citizens and 
“free” wage laborers with the help of the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and 
Abandoned Lands, better known as the Freedmen’s Bureau. The Freedmen’s 
Bureau was set up toward the end of the Civil War in March 1865 to provide 
immediate relief  to freed people as well as to poor whites uprooted by the 
war, but its mission expanded to a large- scale and often contradictory effort 
to protect freed people’s civil and political rights, to revive agricultural pro-
duction in the South, and to turn former slaves into free wage laborers (often 
on the same plantations they used to work on as slaves) (Goldberg 2007). 
The Freedmen’s Bureau can be understood as an early, although ultimately 
failed, attempt to (unevenly) integrate African Americans into a Northern 
capitalist order as both citizens and self- dependent but docile wage laborers. 
Despite its checkered track record, the Freedmen’s Bureau started from the 
assumption that African Americans could be turned into self- dependent citi-
zens and workers. This is perhaps why Du Bois (2007, 179) praised the Bureau 
as “the most extraordinary and far- reaching institution of social uplift that 
America has ever attempted,” despite the fact that it also frequently served as 
an instrument for disciplining black labor (Goldberg 2007, 40– 2). The simple 
fact that freed people could now enter labor contracts, even if  they were 
extremely harsh and, more often than not, entered into under highly coercive 
conditions, was a first step toward less expropriatory and more exploitative 
labor relations. In 1872, Southern white supremacists ultimately succeeded 
in swaying Congress to terminate the Freedmen’s Bureau. The Black Codes 
were replaced by the Jim Crow laws in 1877. The Jim Crow laws contained 
many provisions that were frequently as, if  not more, oppressive than the ori-
ginal Black Codes. Besides mandating strict racial segregation and brutally 
punishing any infraction against whites, Jim Crow laws also ensured African 






through debt peonage and convict leasing. This brutal colonial regime of 
racist oppression and expropriation was ultimately backed by both legal and 
extra- legal violence in the form of lynching (Marable 1983).
A neocolonial “entanglement of capitalist accumulation processes with a 
racial/ ethnic hierarchy” persisted after the abolition of slavery and the end of 
Jim Crow (Grosfoguel 2003). Although African Americans (as well as other 
racialized groups who are considered citizens) have struggled for and ultim-
ately won formally equal rights, although there now is a sizable black profes-
sional class, and although the United States elected its first black president, 
racial divisions of labor are still firmly in place. Michael Dawson makes this 
point forcefully:
Whether as slaves during one epoch; as colonized workers, sharecroppers, 
workers within segregated/ segmented labor markets throughout the 
twentieth century; or, as disposable workers in this neoliberal era— those 
marked by race within the United States and elsewhere have been denied 
a basic feature of capitalism— access to labor markets or, if  granted 
access, the ability to sell their labor on an equal basis.
(Dawson 2016, 150)
Indeed, in socio- economic terms, particularly with regard to their unequal 
access to labor markets, the racialized poor in the United States still find 
themselves in a neocolonial situation.
Surveillance plays a key role in securing this neocolonial situation. Practices 
of surveillance not only grant or deny access to (segmented) labor markets 
but also facilitate exploitation if  access is granted (see Fuchs 2013 for a dis-
cussion of capitalist labor force and market surveillance). Even after the abo-
lition of colonial labor control and the extension of formal legal equality, 
surveillance continues to have a disproportionate impact on the racialized 
poor. Surely, in a context of formal legal equality, racial difference itself  can 
no longer legitimate the use of intrusive surveillance and authoritarian labor 
control. However, discourses of criminality and welfare dependence are now 
mobilized for legitimating the disproportionate surveillance of the racialized 
poor. In short, racializing surveillance continues to play a key role in repro-
ducing a racial division of labor by either excluding the racialized poor from 
the labor market through criminal justice sanctions or including them in the 
lowest rungs of the labor market through welfare- cum- workfare programs.
Neocolonial racialization through welfare surveillance
The rise of the modern administrative state is closely entwined with the devel-
opment of various techniques for gathering knowledge on “the processes of 
the population,” many of which were honed and developed in settler colo-
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1987). Hence, the rise and expansion of state- administered welfare also went 
hand- in- glove with an extension and intensification of surveillance. The 
moment the state took on the task of supporting those who were deemed 
unable to support themselves, people in need had to be identified, their level of 
need had to be assessed, and, above all, their eligibility had to be ascertained. 
From the inception of modern state welfare, surveillance served the primary 
purpose of making a distinction between those eligible for public support 
and those who must fend for themselves. In the United States, this distinction 
between the deserving and the undeserving poor has always been profoundly 
racialized. Indeed, welfare has been and continues to be “one of the most 
racialized of political domains” in the United States (Brown 2013, 395).
The history of modern poor relief  is closely tied to questions of social con-
trol, on the one hand, and the constitution and maintenance of labor markets, 
on the other (Polanyi 1957; Dean 1991; Piven Fox and Cloward 1993). In fact, 
through its emphasis on means- testing and the principle of less eligibility, the 
1834 Poor Law Amendment Act in Britain marked the constitution of the 
first national labor market and was thus key for the expansion of industrial 
capitalism (Polanyi 1957; Dean 1991). Both the means test and the principle 
of less eligibility are major drivers of welfare surveillance. The means test 
hinges on determining who actually needs and deserves poor relief. Today, 
means- tested welfare refers to programs that are only targeted at particular 
populations— mainly those whose income is below a certain threshold. There 
are other forms of welfare, such as insurance- based programs, that poten-
tially benefit a larger portion of the overall population. In the United States, 
in particular, the very term welfare now denotes primarily means- tested forms 
of poor relief. We should note that this is wildly inaccurate because the middle 
classes are still the prime beneficiaries of welfare spending (Ward 2005, 244– 7; 
see also Wacquant 2009). Means testing entails gathering vast amounts of 
information on those seeking public support in order to determine whether 
they are eligible. Application forms and interviews with case managers require 
very detailed information about applicants’ family situation, health, job his-
tory, and even sometimes sexual history.
The principle of less eligibility, first formulated by Jeremy Bentham, more-
over, stipulates that public relief  ought to be less attractive than the most 
onerous and most badly paid work (see Sieh 1989, 162). Less eligibility is 
the primary source of welfare stigma. Welfare applicants and recipients are 
subjected to various rituals of humiliation, which often take the form of 
intrusive surveillance, including home visits, mandatory drug testing, etc. The 
main justification for intrusive welfare surveillance is, however, the preven-
tion of welfare fraud. Ironically, welfare fraud is a structural necessity, while 
its prevalence is massively overstated. A number of studies found that levels 
of fraud are very similar across different government programs (see Gilliom 
2001). Welfare recipients are, thus, as likely— or as unlikely— to cheat as, let’s 








intrusive levels of surveillance than recipients of farm subsidies. It is thus 
probably fair to say that surveillance is largely used for making welfare less 
eligible. At the same time, welfare benefits alone are barely sufficient to allow 
a household to make ends meet. Most welfare recipients, therefore, rely on 
some sort of unreported income, which means that they are living in constant 
fear of being found out and of having their benefits cut or even terminated as 
a result (Gilliom 2001; Wacquant 2009).
Welfare surveillance has been expanded enormously in response to the 
growth of the welfare state and the extension of relief  to minorities, especially 
African Americans, in the wake of President Johnson’s Great Society programs 
and the successes of the civil rights and welfare rights movements (Gilliom 
2001, 26– 7; see also Piven Fox and Cloward 1993; Ward 2005). Welfare sur-
veillance is geared toward determining eligibility, preventing fraud, and deter-
ring people from applying. To illustrate some of the surveillance practices 
that welfare applicants and recipients are subject to, I will use the example 
of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), which replaced Aid 
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) as part of Clinton’s 1996 wel-
fare reform. TANF provides cash benefits and is primarily targeted at poor 
single mothers. The 1996 welfare reform pretty much abolished welfare as 
an entitlement. TANF comes with a five- year lifetime limit. Moreover, 
TANF recipients have to find work within two years of receiving benefits. 
Thus, TANF is a form of workfare pushing the poor— in this case primarily 
single mothers— into the lowest rungs of the labor market. At the same time, 
states and even counties can set even more stringent eligibility criteria and 
conditionalities than the ones stipulated by the federal government. As a 
consequence, surveillance practices vary enormously between jurisdictions. 
TANF consists of a multistage and multiday application process, including 
interviews, group sessions, and assessments of employability. During this pro-
cess, applicants have to answer questions regarding needs, psychological well-
being, resources, paternity information about children, etc. Moreover, they 
have to back up their answers with a lot of additional third- party informa-
tion. All information is electronically stored and compared with federal, state, 
and commercial databases in order to determine eligibility and identify both 
fraudulent information and duplicate applications. Some jurisdictions even 
obtain debit card information to track their recipients’ spending habits. Many 
jurisdictions require fingerprints and photographs. TANF also enforces child 
support. Thus, if  the paternity of children is contested, TANF recipients have 
to agree to DNA testing. A number of jurisdictions also conduct home visits. 
And some jurisdictions also mandate drug testing (Gilman 2008). If  benefits 
are awarded, recipients are responsible for keeping their information up to 
date. Failure to do so may result in sanctions such as cuts to or even cancella-
tion of their benefits.
Welfare surveillance does not affect only people of color, but the massive 
expansion of welfare surveillance coincided with the extension of poor relief  
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to people of color. In addition, in public discourse, welfare— often narrowly 
viewed as encompassing only means- tested programs benefitting the poor— is 
often closely associated with blackness (Wacquant 2009; Roberts 2014a; see 
also Roberts 2014b). The replacement of AFDC by TANF is a case in point. 
As Deborah Ward puts it:
Race and racial distinctions had become so embedded in our welfare 
state that changes in recipient demographics— perceived or real, justified 
or not— led to the dismantling of a long- standing system, and this dis-
mantling both reflected and reaffirmed the racial division between the 
worthy and the unworthy poor.
(Ward 2005, 31)
The abolishment of poverty relief  as an entitlement through Clinton’s 1996 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (PRWOA) marked the 
culmination of a racial backlash to the expansion of relief  to poor African 
Americans. But there could only be a racial backlash because poor relief  had 
always been racialized.
Virginia Eubanks suggests that welfare surveillance constitutes a form of 
poverty profiling: “Like racial profiling, poverty profiling targets individuals 
for extra scrutiny based not on their behavior but rather on a personal char-
acteristic: living in poverty” (Eubanks 2018, 158). Yet, in my view, welfare 
surveillance must be viewed rather as racialized class profiling, whereby class- 
specific behaviors are classified as deviant so that particular populations can 
be slated for extra scrutiny and punitiveness without violating the principle 
of legal formal equality. These behaviors are class specific because they are 
associated with extreme poverty, but because people of color are dispropor-
tionately affected by poverty— especially by its most extreme forms— welfare 
surveillance also disproportionately targets people of color and thus inevit-
ably intersects with racial profiling.
Eubanks also makes the compelling argument that “[r] elief  institutions are 
machines for undermining the collective power of poor and working- class 
people, and for producing indifference in everyone else” (Eubanks 2018, 
178). Relief  institutions indeed serve to pacify poor and working- class people 
while ensuring their continuing availability for exploitation and expropri-
ation. However, the pacification of the working class is also effected through 
divisions within the working class, and the very distinction between the 
poor and the working class is both product and producer of these divisions. 
Distinctions between the poor and the working class, and between the 
deserving and undeserving poor, moreover, reinforce racial divisions, because 
“[t]hroughout welfare state development, deserving is a code word for ‘white’ ” 
(Ward 2005, 241).
Welfare surveillance constitutes a political technology for punitively man-





eligibility through intrusive surveillance ultimately reinforces the stigma 
attached to means- tested welfare. In its efforts to sniff  out even the smallest 
infraction of the onerous rules of means- tested welfare programs and 
through its rituals of humiliation, welfare surveillance serves to push welfare 
applicants into the lowest rungs of the labor market, where their labor power 
is often not only exploited but also expropriated. The work requirements now 
attached to welfare programs, such as TANF, facilitate capitalist accumula-
tion through the provision of cheap labor, while the meager financial transfer 
payments serve to (partially) address some of the social dislocations caused 
by capitalist accumulation. As a consequence, welfare surveillance produces 
and reproduces racial divisions and hierarchies within the US working class. 
Welfare surveillance stigmatizes and ultimately racializes welfare recipients 
while obscuring the colonial genealogy of racializing state surveillance. 
Welfare surveillance brings about the hypervisibility of welfare applicants 
and recipients for the administrative state as well as in public discourse 
(through media representations), while the neocolonial racializing effects of 
these surveillance practices remain largely invisible. Furthermore, welfare 
surveillance renders the individual failings of its targets transparent while 
obscuring structural inequities that create the demand for public relief  in the 
first place. In short, welfare surveillance has emerged as a central neocolo-
nial technology of racialization in the context of formal legal equality and 
professed colorblindness.
Conclusion
In capitalist social formations a key function of  surveillance- as- social- 
sorting is to secure the conditions for capitalist accumulation. This occurs 
through the classifications and ultimate division of  those people who com-
prise the class that produces the value necessary for capitalist accumula-
tion: the working class. Making distinctions between those whose labor 
can be expropriated, those who are “merely” exploited, and those whose 
labor is viewed as disposable; more finely grained classifications around 
the productivity of  individual and/ or collective units of  labor within par-
ticular industries or places of  production; as well as distinctions between 
the worthy and the unworthy poor have divided and continue to divide the 
working class.
In a settler colonial and neocolonial context, such as the United States, 
these distinctions are also always both racialized and racializing. Rationalities 
and practices of racializing surveillance, from chattel slavery to contem-
porary poverty governance, have thus been central to the reproduction of 
divisions within the US working class. However, rationalities and practices 
of racializing surveillance have also changed, particularly in response to 
various forms of resistance by racialized populations. As a result of the 
struggles of racialized populations, particularly the civil rights movement, 
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racializing surveillance now operates in the context of formal legal equality 
and professed colorblindness, and thus has to obscure both its colonial 
genealogy and its racializing effects. But, in spite of these highly significant 
changes, surveillance- as- social- sorting continues to divide the working class 
in order to extract as much value out of labor as possible as well as to prevent, 
control, and pacify working- class resistance.
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In 2013, Edward Snowden, the former National Security Agency (NSA) con-
tractor, copied classified documents that revealed the scope of US govern-
ment surveillance. The leaked documents referred to secret programs that 
enabled the collection of metadata on foreign and American citizens, and to 
the interception of domestic internet communications leading to the creation 
of an enormous database by government surveillance agencies with access 
to personal communications, including emails, social network entries, audio 
and video chats, visited websites, and medical and financial records (Olmsted 
2018; Greenwald 2014; Gurnow 2014). Snowden’s revelations ignited social 
and political discussion concerning the scope of government surveillance 
powers, as well as the impact of the secret NSA programs on the privacy of 
American citizens and on various potential violations of the constitution by 
the authorities (Goldfarb 2015; Lyon 2015; Kitrosser 2015). The substance of 
the leaked documents ignited an academic debate on the functioning of the 
US foreign and domestic surveillance system and its impact on the state of 
democracy and the rule of law.
Research has been conducted with regard to both national security and 
domestic surveillance in the United States, with a focus on the powers of 
institutions responsible for conducting or controlling surveillance procedures, 
as well as on the conflict this has caused between freedom and security (Farrell 
and Newman  2019; Johnson 2018; Keller 2017;  Goldfarb 2015; Lester 2015; 
Angwin 2014) and between secrecy and transparency (Graham 2017; Frost 
2017; Kitrosser 2015; Arnold 2014). It is no surprise to learn that the NSA 
was the most studied institution (Hayden 2018; Edgar 2017), but important 
analysis has also been done with regard to the surveillance activities of the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (Johnson 2018; Prados 2014) and the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (McCabe 2019). Studies focusing on 
concrete surveillance institutions have had at least one thing in common: a 















preserving, and defending a complex system of secret surveillance aimed at 
providing national security.
Unlike the case of post- 9/ 11 legislation and executive action, when the 
main theme of the public debate focused on the clash between freedom and 
security (Herman 2011; Posner and Vermeule 2006; Davis and Silver 2003), 
the post- Snowden era has been marked by a more frequent reference to the 
clash between two other important features of a surveillance state: secrecy and 
transparency. The debate has raised questions concerning the excessiveness of 
the US secrecy regime with respect to surveillance policies, appealing to the 
necessity of imposing broader transparency measures which would restore 
democracy and enable a proper oversight of the government’s actions (Edgar 
2017). Transparency has become the most demanded value, treated by many 
as a remedy for the overwhelming system of excessive secrecy and over- 
classification (Goldfarb 2015; Kitrosser 2015).
The problem the chapter addresses concerns the struggle between secrecy 
and transparency rooted in the institutional and systemic mechanisms of the 
separation of powers and the checks and balances system in the United States. 
I argue that in the area of national security surveillance, the adherence of the 
executive toward secrecy outweighs transparency as promoted by Congress 
and defended by the judicial branch. It seems that— not despite but because 
of the separation of powers doctrine— there is more secrecy rather than trans-
parency in US national security surveillance, which may lead to an argument 
about the illusion of transparency within the national security framework. 
The illusion, understood as a difference between the reality and the perception 
of the reality, in this context means that although the government has under-
taken several legal and political measures to achieve the socially demanded 
level of transparency, the result has been more a matter of perceived than 
actual change, due to the engagement of all branches in the defense of secret 
surveillance. The chapter analyzes the policies of these branches toward the 
conflict between secrecy and transparency in the area of national security 
surveillance in the pre- and post- Snowden eras. Due to the fact that congres-
sional legislation, executive action, and judicial interpretation of surveillance 
measures are intertwined, the empirical analysis is conducted in chronological 
order, focusing on the most important issues occurring before and after 2013.
For the purpose of the study, surveillance is defined as “the collection of 
information in order to manage control” (Lyon 2015, 3) with “the intention to 
protect, understand … or influence groups or individuals” (Kuntze 2018, 45). 
Considering government surveillance, it seems obvious that in a democratic 
state there should be a mutual relationship based on control: the authorities 
control the society, and the society controls the authorities, although the 
character of the two types of control is quite different and is conducted with 
varying intensity. By managing control, the surveilling party influences the 
lives of surveilled subjects, often justifying it by the need to protect them; 
however, the scope of this protection is determined by means of surveillance 
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and its more (or less) secretive character. The biggest challenge concerns the 
level of understanding among the subjects of the surveillance relationship, as 
it often has an impact on the scope of the accountability of the surveillance 
programs. This can be seen especially in government surveillance, where the 
society, aware of the authorities’ need to impose certain measures of surveil-
lance, is reluctant to approve the culture of secrecy in which the surveillance 
state is shrouded (Arnold 2014). In what follows, government surveillance 
shall refer to national security surveillance, that is, US foreign intelligence sur-
veillance and other surveillance activities conducted by the intelligence com-
munity, as well as by the institutions involved in such activities (Friedman and 
Hansen 2012). Although the 2013 leaks revealed the scope of US surveillance 
of foreigners, including political leaders, and thus affecting transatlantic 
relations (Cole et al. 2017), the analysis focuses mainly on those aspects of 
national security surveillance which were directed toward American citizens, 
raising the problem of constitutionality and governmental accountability.
In discussions of national security surveillance, transparency should be 
understood as oversight and control of the activities of institutions involved 
in conducting government surveillance, rather than the full disclosure of 
information concerning surveillance programs and their outcomes. In order 
to pursue the politics of national security effectively, the government must 
be allowed to act in partial secrecy and to select the means necessary to pro-
vide the expected level of safety to its citizens (Cain 2015, 41). But the lack 
of control from oversight institutions may lead to the abuse of power and to 
violations of the rights and freedoms of individuals, who demand a certain 
level of transparency from their government. Such a level could be reached, 
for example, by legislation limiting the scope of national security surveillance, 
as well as by institutional solutions providing for a system of effective over-
sight imposed on different levels and in different relations (Eskens et al. 2015, 
8). From the perspective of the separation of powers, control over executive 
actions should be conducted by both Congress and the judiciary, despite the 
different character of their functioning. It seems that without the people’s 
knowledge of the scale and character of government surveillance, resulting 
from the effects of this congressional and judicial oversight, there is neither 
democratic accountability nor the proper functioning of the constitution as a 
fundamental guarantee of individuals’ rights.
The core question about the relation between secrecy and transparency 
is not new to surveillance studies and has been examined from various 
perspectives (Moses and de Koker 2017; Lyon 2014; Ball et al. 2012; Friedman 
and Hansen 2012; Theoharis 2011; Herman 2011). The methodology of pol-
itical and legal sciences applied here, based on historical institutionalism and 
systemic analysis, will focus on the character of the separation of powers doc-
trine, which evolved along with the growth of the secret surveillance state. 
The system revealed by Snowden, who uncovered a secret web of programs 








courts, affected the checks and balances system (Goldfarb 2015; Arnold 2014; 
Greenwald 2014). Some researchers placed the responsibility for the existence 
of the secret surveillance state on concrete examples in specific presidential 
administrations (Graham 2017; Glennon 2015; Theoharis 2011); some tried 
to find the explanation for the temporary violation of the rights and freedoms 
of individuals in a state of emergency (Edgar 2017); and others have explained 
that the executive acted in accordance with the Constitution (Calabresi and 
Yoo 2012). These research findings confirmed conflicting arguments raised 
by politicians, journalists, and American citizens, who presented different 
approaches toward the interpretation of the constitutional powers of the gov-
ernment with respect to its surveillance competences. My argument focuses 
mainly on the scope of the separation of powers doctrine, which is the key 
to understanding why the transparency of national security surveillance has 
been an illusion, rather than a reality.
National security surveillance pre- Snowden
The Cold War era
The national security paradigm has always been rooted in the American polit-
ical system, becoming an indispensable element of the policies of most presi-
dential administrations. It has been systematically used since the late 1940s, 
usually applied by the executive with regard to foreign policy (Theoharis 
2011, 133– 5). The separation of powers was not in the spotlight of early Cold 
War national security legislation, but Congress was aware that the expan-
sion of executive powers should be somehow controlled by other government 
branches. The National Security Act of 1947 placed theoretical limitations on 
the functioning of the intelligence community, by requiring the president to 
keep Congress “fully and currently informed of the intelligence activities of 
the United States, including any significant anticipated intelligence activity” 
(National Security Act 1947). The law confirmed congressional oversight over 
intelligence activities, but it was obvious that the scope of control and trans-
parency would depend on a president’s will.
Five years later, President Harry Truman issued a top- secret directive 
establishing the NSA, responsible for monitoring communications out of the 
United States (Glennon 2015, 12– 13). In order to achieve national security 
goals, the government operated several secret surveillance programs aimed at 
both foreign and national subjects. Institutionally, all three major agencies, 
the NSA, the CIA, and the FBI, were involved in the process of protecting 
national security during the Cold War era, and their activities were held far 
from public scrutiny due to the imposition of a broad secrecy system (Edgar 
2017). Surveillance measures quickly became an effective tool of govern-
ment agencies’ control of the communications and activities of US persons 






Secrecy versus transparency in the US 111
was involved not only in counterintelligence but strictly collaborated with 
both the CIA and the FBI in sharing information about foreign and domestic 
threats to national security (Keller 2017).
The truth about several secret surveillance programs was revealed 
during the investigations conducted by congressional oversight committees 
established in the mid- 1970s: the Pike Committee (House) and the Church 
Committee (Senate). The investigations focused on the secret and— in many 
respects— illegal programs conducted by the CIA and NSA, as well as on 
the FBI’s wiretapping of politicians and journalists (Prados 2014). The 
Church Committee’s investigation, followed by a series of reports, not only 
disclosed the scope of national security surveillance for domestic reasons but 
also raised concerns about the character of the separation of powers with 
regard to national security surveillance. The Committee found that “intelli-
gence activities were essentially exempted from the normal system of checks 
and balances,” decreasing the constitutional accountability of the executive, 
which had an exclusive role in conducting national security policies, including 
surveillance of US citizens. The report indicated that the executive agencies 
applied excessive secrecy in their conduct of surveillance programs in order 
to limit congressional oversight and the knowledge of the people targeted by 
government due to their political beliefs (Church Committee Report 1976).
As a result, Congress established two stable oversight bodies whose role was 
to control foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities and expanded 
the powers of the justice committees of both houses to oversee the actions of 
domestic surveillance agencies (Glennon 2015; Solove 2011). Furthermore, 
in 1978 Congress implemented the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
(FISA), introducing higher judicial scrutiny over national security surveil-
lance measures and establishing the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
(FISC) to grant warrants for the surveillance of those who were suspected of 
being foreign agents (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 1978). The means 
of appointment of FISC judges, as well as the length of their tenure and the 
necessity to close the court’s proceedings to the public, were aimed at produ-
cing a system of judicial check on the activities of institutions imposing sur-
veillance, without violating the sensitive character of the cases discussed. On 
the other hand, the special court had to operate on the basis of information 
and documents provided solely by the executive, which made its proceedings 
and decision- making process dependent on the value and relevance of the 
shared data (Glennon 2015, 45). Theoretically, transparency was weakened 
by institutional secrecy.
The analysis of the legislative and institutional effects of the committees’ 
investigations proves that Congress did not want to strip the executive of the 
power to exercise its constitutional goal of providing security to US citizens. 
The secrecy rule guiding the FISC procedures, and the discretionary power 
of the executive to control the content of shared information with the judges, 





institutional changes within the government significantly limited the scope of 
national security surveillance. Furthermore, the Supreme Court confirmed— 
or at least did not neglect— the leading role of the executive in implementing 
and operating national security policy, even if  it resulted in violations of the 
civil rights of Americans. The reference to the privilege of state secrets in the 
dispute over the crash of a military plane (United States v. Reynolds 1953), 
lack of ripeness in a case concerning US Army surveillance of American 
citizens (Laird v. Tatum 1972), or the limitation of First Amendment rights 
during the Red Scare era of the early 1950s (Dennis v. United States 1951) may 
serve as good examples of the strengthening of the government’s powers for 
national security reasons.
The post- 9/ 11 era
The secrecy of national security surveillance was again at the center of US 
political debate after the terrorist attack of 9/ 11, when Congress implemented 
antiterrorist legislation. The USA Patriot Act became the main source of 
power for the federal institutions responsible for law enforcement and intel-
ligence activities (Smith and Hung 2010). Among various provisions deter-
mining the relations between executive agencies, the Act introduced National 
Security Letters (NSL), issued without judicial control by the FBI, and roving 
wiretaps focusing on individual persons rather than the devices which they 
used (USA Patriot Act 2001). Generally, Congress agreed to expand execu-
tive powers by delegating vast competences to executive agencies, referring to 
the times of emergency (Akerman 2006), which allowed the George W. Bush 
administration to justify its national security policy.
Among several measures undertaken by the administration was a secret 
program, called Stellar Wind, which became public due to a press leak in 
2005 (Fisher 2013, 251– 2), as a part of a broader Terrorist Surveillance 
Program (TSP) implemented in 2002 (Kuntze 2018, 82). Its main purpose 
was to collect international phone calls and emails of targets suspected of 
organized terrorism, but in addition to data on foreign nationals the program 
allowed the NSA to intercept and store metadata from telephone and internet 
providers, including information about the private communications of US 
citizens (Edgar 2017, 40). Importantly, Stellar Wind not only lacked the 
approval of Congress and the judiciary, including the FISC, but it was also 
based on an internal memorandum created by the Office of Legal Counsel 
(OLC). The document assumed that presidents— based on unitary executive 
theory— had almost unlimited power in determining the scope of govern-
ment surveillance (Posner and Vermeule 2006). The theory claimed that the 
president, as commander- in- chief, had the power to initiate any surveillance 
program, because all executive power belonged to the president, especially in 
times of war and emergency (Goldfarb 2015). Apart from legitimizing Stellar 
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control by other branches of government was justified by the necessity to 
keep the programs secret (Lester 2015).
In 2007, the government decided to launch a new national security surveil-
lance program, called PRISM, to monitor the data of the users of the most 
important internet providers. As a result, in order to provide information 
necessary to limit the terrorist threat the NSA secretly collected, stored, and 
analyzed billions of items of data on US citizens (Edgar 2017, 5). In contrast 
to Stellar Wind, PRISM was based on congressional authorization, Section 
702 of the Protect America Act (2007), and the FISA Amendments Act 
(2008). The legislation permitted the government to intercept communications 
inside the country connected with foreign suspects of terrorism, but it had 
to be approved by the FISC, which applied minimization rules in order to 
protect the rights of American citizens. Still, the reasonable belief  standard 
substituted the former probable cause standard, thus making it easier for the 
government to obtain FISC approval.
According to Section 702 of the 2007 Act, the government also conducted so- 
called upstream collection, which focused only on domestic communications 
by intercepting information from major internet cables and switches in the 
flow of communications between communication service providers (Edelson 
2016, 120). The executive also used the amended Section 215 of the Patriot 
Act to intercept data from domestic bulk collection of international and 
domestic telephone records. It guaranteed thousands of numbers analyzed 
with regard to one seed number, providing for the almost infinite collection 
of data concerning US persons (USA Patriot Act Additional Reauthorizing 
Amendments of 2006).
All these programs introduced some level of control over the surveillance 
activities of the executive. After 2006 especially, Congress and the courts 
became more actively involved in the process of overseeing national security 
surveillance measures imposed by the NSA or FBI. Still, national security sur-
veillance, or rather dataveillance (Lyon 2014; van Dijck 2014), was imposed 
so broadly that there was no way for the oversight institutions to exercise their 
powers effectively. The collection of the electronic data of foreign and US 
citizens by government agencies was often conducted without the approval of 
FISC, or based on a general acceptance of the operation of certain surveil-
lance programs by the court (Glennon 2015). Despite theoretically broader 
congressional and judicial control of the surveillance measures, there was a 
lot of criticism that too much information was kept secret, thus leading to 
potential overuse of executive powers (Herman 2011; Romero and Temple- 
Raston 2007).
Barack Obama’s win in 2008 gave hope to his supporters of a change in the 
national security surveillance system, especially with regard to the scope of 
powers of the executive, and the level of transparency (Olmsted 2018, 220). 
As a Senator, Obama had criticized the administration’s accumulation of 







concrete NSA surveillance program (Edgar 2017, 51– 52). As a presidential 
candidate he referred to the greater transparency of the government’s sur-
veillance programs (Graham 2017, 180– 181). The fact is that as president, 
Obama modified, and even expanded, some of the surveillance programs 
initiated by the Bush administration. He decided to continue programs based 
on Section 215 of the Patriot Act, approved the continuation of PRISM 
based on Section 702 of FISA, actively used the NSL, and signed the exten-
sion of the FISA Amendments Act (Graham 2017; Glennon 2015). It seems 
as if  the main purpose of Obama’s administration was to adapt the law to 
serve the purposes of the politics of surveillance rather than impose a new 
system of transparency.
National security surveillance post- Snowden
Soon after the Snowden revelations, President Obama insisted on conducting 
a broad investigation of NSA surveillance, appointing a Review Group on 
Intelligence and Communications Technology. It recommended several 
reforms, from terminating the existing surveillance programs to preserving 
a limited impact of the NSA on the collection of the data necessary to con-
duct effective surveillance against potential terrorists (Kitrosser 2015, 338). 
In early 2014, the White House issued a directive that clearly stated that 
“the collection of signals intelligence [was] necessary for the United States 
to advance its national security and foreign policy interests and to protect its 
citizens and the citizens of its allies and partners from harm” (Presidential 
Policy Directive 2014, 28). As a confirmation of the differences between the 
rhetoric and activities of the presidential administration, Obama’s govern-
ment denied access to several requests for information about government 
actions (Keller 2017, 31).
At the same time, Congress initiated a discussion over legislative reform 
that would legalize the existing surveillance programs. The Privacy and Civil 
Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) produced a report that concluded that 
the NSA’s program of bulk collection of  phone data raised several consti-
tutional issues concerning both the scope of  executive powers and poten-
tial violations of  individuals’ freedoms. The report determined certain NSA 
surveillance programs as illegal and ineffective, thus raising several doubts 
concerning their continuation (The Report of the PCLOB). With regard 
to the bulk collection of  phone metadata, the Board suggested that the 
program should be terminated, determining also that the way to intercept 
the communications stored by telecommunications companies was to obtain 
the approval of  FISC for every individual case of  reasonable surveillance 
(Graham 2017, 197– 8).
Finally, in June 2015, the USA Freedom Act (2015) was enacted, thus 
ending the government surveillance program of bulk collection of metadata. 
The Act forced the government to obtain FISC warrants in order to conduct 
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the collection of data from telecommunications companies for foreign intel-
ligence reasons. For the purpose of preventing previous procedural flaws, 
judges received expert support from technical and privacy advisers, and their 
legal interpretations became public. Important change was made with respect 
to the records collected by telecommunications companies, which stored them 
instead of the NSA; however, the agency could gain access to these records 
given FISC approval. The Act also limited the NSA’s access to targeted indi-
viduals’ phone records and the records of the phone numbers associated with 
them (Graham 2017, 198; Olmsted 2018, 223).
Despite strengthening the checks and balances system with regard to judi-
cial control of government surveillance, and ending the bulk collection of 
metadata, no serious changes were introduced to the institutional and struc-
tural aspects of surveillance programs. Actually, the bulk collection of meta-
data ended six months after the implementation of the Freedom Act, as the 
presidential administration asked FISC for a transition period that would 
allow the analysts to end their work (Edelson 2016, 116). Still, the government 
did not suggest the creation of any new oversight system, but a strengthening 
of the existing one with effective control of congressional committees and 
FISC, and the support of such institutions as PCLOB. Analysis of the legal 
regulations governing the functioning of the oversight system proves, however, 
that the scope of control of the surveillance measures depended on the will 
of the executive, which could easily hide behind national security arguments. 
And even the publication of annual transparency reports by the NSA did not 
change the feeling that there was more of a rhetoric of openness rather than 
real transparency (Alloa and Thoma 2018).
Apart from legislative changes, Snowden’s actions also had an impact on 
decisions made by the judicial branch. Until 2013 the courts usually applied 
the state secrets privilege in lawsuits filed by US citizens who believed that 
government surveillance violated their constitutional rights. Both the Bush 
and Obama administrations defended the challenged programs, referring 
to the necessity to protect national security surveillance, and the courts 
repeatedly declared the lack of  standing of  the challengers. Even in 2013 
such verdicts were announced by the Supreme Court, where the claims 
were defined as based on “speculation and on a predicted chain of  events 
that might never occur” (Clapper v. Amnesty International 2013). However, 
Snowden’s revelation of  the scope and character of  the NSA’s surveillance 
legitimized the lawsuits filed by individuals and civil liberties organizations 
challenging the constitutionality of  national security surveillance. In late 
2013, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) challenged the NSA’s 
program of bulk collection of  phone metadata in the US District Court for 
the Southern District of  New York. The court ruled for the government, 
finding no violation of  the rights of  citizens who lacked a reasonable expect-
ation of  privacy while providing information to telecommunications com-
panies. However, the appeal of  the ACLU to the US Court of  Appeals for 
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the Second Circuit proved successful, leading to a decision on the illegal 
status of  the bulk telephone metadata program, as a violation of  Section 215 
of  the Patriot Act (ACLU v. Clapper 2013).
A similar decision was made by the US District Court for the District 
of  Columbia in December 2013, when judge Richard J. Leon called the 
NSA program an indiscriminate and arbitrary invasion of  the privacy rights 
protected by the Fourth Amendment (Klayman v. Obama 2013). Such an 
inconsistency as that between Klayman and Clapper proves the existence of 
conflicting approaches in the judicial branch toward national security sur-
veillance. Both decisions ignited the discussion in Congress about the future 
of  the bulk collection of  phone data, which resulted in the termination of 
the program by the provisions of  the Freedom Act (Edgar 2017, 4). Judicial 
control over the legality of  national security surveillance affected the legis-
lative process, but it would be too far reaching a conclusion to say that the 
legislative and judicial branches became united against the secret surveil-
lance system imposed by the executive, as the Court of  Appeals’ decision 
was the only serious limitation of  national security surveillance in the post- 
Snowden era.
There is no surprise that the next president, Donald Trump, became a 
strong supporter of national security surveillance. In 2015, during the debate 
concerning the future of bulk collection of phone metadata, he expressed his 
support for the program (Council on Foreign Relations 2015). But when he 
became the subject of a secret FBI investigation about possible connections 
between his campaign and Russian intelligence, Trump accused the Obama 
administration of illegal surveillance. Time showed that Trump’s negative 
attitude toward the leaders of intelligence and law enforcement agencies 
determined his personal decisions as president (Hayden 2018, 139– 41). 
Trump’s critical attitude toward the FBI, CIA, and NSA led to a decrease in 
trust among Republican voters toward the national security agencies, in con-
trast to some Democratic voters (Nelson 2018, 181). From an institutional 
perspective, the beginning of Trump’s presidency marked a politicization of 
national security surveillance, the source of which was the personal opinion 
of the President as an alleged subject of illegal wiretapping.
On the other hand, at the beginning of the second year of Trump’s tenure 
Congress passed the reauthorization of Section 702 of FISA. The legislation 
was preceded by a few months of public debate concerning the effectiveness 
of the transparency system under the existing regulations. Despite concerns 
of the Democrats that the intelligence community would be endangered by 
the President’s influence on surveillance programs, the law was presented 
as a safeguard for civil liberties and an assurance of greater transparency 
(Goldsmith and Hennessey 2018). Due to the lack of a serious national 
security surveillance scandal, the proponents of the new transparency system 
argued, as in 2007 and 2012, that it worked properly thanks to the broad over-
sight system imposed by the legislation. One should remember, however, that 
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the two earlier reauthorizations of the law had raised hopes for a diminishing 
of the level of secrecy of national security surveillance, which did not actually 
happen.
A culture of interbranch secrecy?
Secrecy had always played an important role in the American political 
system from the time of its establishment, becoming a valuable tool during 
the Revolutionary War, when it assured the effectiveness of the govern-
ment (Ginsberg 2016, 7), and during the Philadelphia Convention, when the 
Framers referred to the executive branch as the one possessing “the powers of 
secrecy, vigor, and dispatch” (Farrand 1966, 70). Thus the executive invoked 
the principle of secrecy as a guarantee of its proper functioning (Graham 
2017). The growing impact of secrecy on the operations of the US govern-
ment in the twentieth century led to the notion that there is a specific cul-
ture of secrecy (Moynihan 1997; Theoharis 1998), manifested not only in the 
amount of classified information kept far away from the public’s reach, but— 
above all— in the conviction that secrecy ensures effectiveness and account-
ability (Edgar 2017, 345; Ginsberg 2016, 7).
In the twenty- first century the US government agreed to conduct a 
similar politics of  surveillance, supporting the necessary secrecy of  govern-
ment activities relating to security issues, especially when they were under-
taken by the executive branch (Laidler 2019). The culture of  secrecy is 
obviously rooted in activities undertaken by presidential administrations, 
or is a “product of  the executive branch’s very nature” (Kitrosser 2015, 2). 
The executive, unlike the legislative and judicial branches, has more space to 
act in the shadows because both Congress and the courts operate through 
publicly recorded legislation and written public opinions. Furthermore, the 
executive branch also has access to human and technological resources, 
enabling it to act in broader secrecy than any other part of  the government 
(Kitrosser 2015, 2– 3).
There is surely a contradictory approach toward the scope of transparency 
and secrecy between the executive and legislative branches. While presidents 
have to keep some of their communications and actions secret, Congress’s 
main role is to control these actions either by implementing legislation or 
imposing oversight measures (Lester 2015, 5). Both branches are involved in 
a constitutional tug- of- war in the direction of broader secrecy versus more 
openness. Even the analysis of constitutional provisions concerning the sep-
aration of powers as articulated in Article Two leaves the impression that 
the executive was meant to be the most secret one. All this has led to the 
creation of various theories supporting the secretive powers of the execu-
tive, such as executive privilege, protecting the confidentiality of presidential 
communications from Congress (Frost 2017; Garvey 2014); unitary executive 







powers (Edelson 2016; Calabresi and Yoo 2012); and state secrets privilege, 
limiting public access to certain national security information (Arnold 2014; 
Herman 2011).
These theories are obviously in conflict with the traditional understanding 
of the checks and balances system, as they assume narrow congressional 
oversight and judicial control of the legality of the national security policies 
of the executive. In other words, they legitimized certain policies of presiden-
tial administrations in the pre- and post- Snowden eras, including the impos-
ition of often unlimited surveillance. The controversy is even greater when 
one realizes that the government has the discretionary power to decide which 
information should be kept secret without thoroughly explaining the reasons 
for its classification as such. However rational it would seem with regard to the 
intelligence community, which operates within the realm of secrecy ensuring 
efficacy (Edgar 2017, 76; Sagar 2015, 151), there is no doubt that the execu-
tive has overused the paradigm of national security. Furthermore, whenever 
presidents have announced “times of emergency” it has meant an automatic 
change in the scope of protection of constitutional rights, such as freedom 
of speech, freedom of assembly, due process of law, and the right to privacy 
(Farber 2008; Akerman 2006). Such an approach was usually supported by 
other branches of government, especially the courts, which followed the rule 
that in “times of emergency and peril” the scope of the constitutional pro-
tection of basic rights and freedoms may be limited (Korematsu v. United 
States 1944). There is no doubt that extended surveillance measures have 
played a significant role in the government’s use of emergency powers and 
that national security arguments have enabled the authorities to classify most 
of their operations in that respect.
Of course, stable and ad hoc congressional committees, inspectors general, 
courts, and special tribunals have played an important role in imposing con-
trol on US surveillance legislation and the executive actions of the national 
security state (Glennon 2015). Analysis of the character and results of that 
control proves that, except for the times of increased transparency stemming 
from press publications or leaks of information concerning surveillance 
programs (Keller 2017), there has been no clear indication from the controlling 
institutions about the possible unlawfulness of these programs. Transparency 
has usually resulted from ex post rather than ex ante congressional oversight 
(Lester 2015), which proves that the system governing national security sur-
veillance is more likely to promote secrecy than openness. The debates in 
Congress on the reauthorization or modification of surveillance legislation 
have ended, in most cases, by reaffirming or even expanding the powers of 
executive agencies. The only significant changes in preventing the further 
growth of surveillance powers of the government occurred in times of leaks 
about secret surveillance programs, such as in the 1970s, and after 2005 and 
2013. These were the only moments in which the investigative and oversight 
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powers of Congress proved effective, but the analysis of the legislative and 
institutional outcomes of the postcrisis reforms did not diminish the level of 
secrecy of national security surveillance.
Similarly, the Supreme Court has never ruled against secret surveillance 
conducted by the government, and neither has it limited the agencies’ sur-
veillance powers (Fisher 2017). Furthermore, the Court has never found any 
major national security legislation unconstitutional, especially if  it adjudicated 
in times of emergency (Laidler 2011; Akerman 2006). Despite public criticism 
of certain sections of the Patriot Act by civil rights advocates (Romero and 
Temple- Raston 2007), the Justices did not address the issue of the consti-
tutionality of these provisions, leaving their modification to Congress in a 
politically driven legislative process. Lower federal courts were more active 
in imposing judicial review of the surveillance programs, but when it comes 
down to the constitutionality of these programs the result is vague. The lack 
of a transparent and unified position of the federal judiciary on the scope 
of government surveillance programs strengthens the argument that these 
programs are legal.
Historically, the courts have hesitated to check the constitutionality of the 
actions undertaken by the executive, especially when the powers of intelli-
gence agencies, or foreign policy in general, were at stake (Fisher 2017). That 
leads to another observation, that the federal judiciary was constructed to 
serve mainly as a “national policy- maker” (Dahl 1957), thus supporting not 
only the direction of government policies but legitimizing concrete govern-
ment decisions and programs, provided they protected national security. Even 
if  one argues that such an approach was typical for the early stages of the 
Cold War, the announcement of the “war on terror” by the Bush administra-
tion created an emergency state with national security arguments closing the 
door to any debate on the constitutionality of secret surveillance programs 
(Akerman 2006). The problem clearly lies in the culture of secrecy, which 
may be especially observed with respect to the FISC procedures. If  a judge 
is forced to make a decision concerning the government’s request to impose 
surveillance measures without having access to the full information about the 
program or to the probable cause of the national security danger caused by 
the surveilled subject, it is impossible to obtain transparency. Secrecy forces 
the judicial branch to trust the government in determining the legality of its 
operations, which can be directly observed in the FISC decisions. According 
to existing reports, between 1979 and 2009 it approved more than 99% of gov-
ernment requests for surveillance from 28,000 applications overall (Herman 
2011, 112).
The abovementioned examples prove that the principle of separation 
of powers has been affected by the secrecy of executive actions relating to 
national security and that both Congress and the courts have agreed to play 





The illusion of transparency
The post- Snowden checks and balances system consists of the oversight of 
national security surveillance by the judges of the FISC and by members of 
Congress participating in the works of House and Senate intelligence over-
sight committees, as well as the members of PCLOB, seeking to ensure that 
surveillance programs do not violate the constitutional rights of Americans. 
From the structural perspective, each branch is represented in the system, 
checking whether the institutions responsible for conducting national security 
surveillance are acting in accordance with the constitution. The legislative 
branch has the power to reauthorize national security legislation or to adopt 
new regulations potentially limiting excessive surveillance measures. Congress 
also has control over the annual budget appropriation, which enables the 
operation of surveillance programs, and is thus able to determine the char-
acter of national security surveillance. At the same time, the federal judiciary 
has the potential to adjudicate in cases concerning the right of individuals by 
imposing statutory or constitutional interpretations of government surveil-
lance policies and programs. The power of the courts is not limited to solving 
disputes stemming from excessive surveillance measures imposed by execu-
tive agencies but often comes down to a determination of the parties’ legal 
standing. Additionally, the subjects conducting surveillance, such as the NSA, 
release several reports regarding the scope of their surveillance programs, 
thereby becoming the most transparent intelligence community in US history. 
At least in theory, the current oversight system of national security surveil-
lance should satisfy anyone concerned with the lack of transparency.
In practice, however, when one compares the post- Snowden system with the 
oversight measures established in the 1970s as a consequence of the Church 
and Pike Committees’ reports, there are no serious institutional differences. 
The House and Senate intelligence oversight committees have been monitoring 
national security surveillance since the late 1970s. The level of knowledge of 
committee members of how the national security surveillance system works 
may seem higher than 50 years ago, but real changes in that system resulted 
from uncontrolled leaks to the press rather than effective oversight conducted 
by these committees (Arnold 2014). Similarly, the lack of serious budget cuts 
to national surveillance programs (Goldfarb 2015) reveals the congressional 
attitude toward national security surveillance, not to mention the dramatic 
change in the character and amount of data intercepted by the government 
due to broad programs of electronic surveillance. The scope of national 
security surveillance has changed, but the oversight system does not keep up 
with these changes.
Congress, as the national legislative body, has always used its power to 
implement certain regulations aimed at conducting effective control over 
national security issues. None of the legislation was immune from execu-
tive action, which resulted in further expansion of surveillance powers, often 
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leading to limitations on the rights of individuals as the price for increased 
security. On the other hand, despite very active use of judicial review, the 
Supreme Court rarely entered into the world of national security politics, 
leaving it to presidential discretion and interpretation. Finally, the special 
court approving foreign surveillance requests did not play its role effectively 
for procedural reasons and because of the excessive secrecy around national 
security surveillance. Secrecy is, therefore, a natural element of foreign sur-
veillance, but it is also the main obstacle to conducting proper oversight of 
government surveillance. Excessive secrecy means that the system lacks trans-
parent control over executive actions or that the applied measures of control 
are ineffective and inefficient. In both perspectives, stable or ad hoc control 
is imposed marginally, as the information shared by the executive about the 
scope and character of the surveillance programs is limited by the principle 
of secrecy.
As David Lyon (1994, 24) observes, “surveillance is an institutionally 
central and pervasive feature of social life. Paradoxically, it expanded with 
democracy.” The expansion of national security surveillance became one 
of the key elements in the evolution of the checks and balances system in 
American democracy. That evolution was possible not only due to the role 
of the executive but because Congress and the judicial branch were reluc-
tant to limit presidential attempts to establish a secret national security state. 
Functioning in an almost never- ending state of emergency enabled those 
governing to legitimize the implementation of secret NSA programs aimed 
not only at foreign terrorist suspects but also at American citizens who often 
did not pose any threat to national security. These programs were and still are 
defended for their effectiveness, which may be legitimized only because the 
national security policies are generally kept secret. Whether the purpose of 
such surveillance measures is always achieved seems disputable, but as long 
as the system protects the government in the process of limiting the consti-
tutional rights of Americans there is no way to change it, considering that in 
the contemporary United States, at least in the area of national security sur-
veillance, the meaning of the constitution is determined by all three branches 
of government.
It seems obvious, then, that secrecy and transparency cannot fully coexist 
at the same time; therefore, the institutions responsible for interpretation of 
the law should pose a concrete limit to both values. Such a limit may depend 
on the state of mind of the society: in times of intensified press investigations, 
whistleblower leaks, active operation of oversight committees, and frequent 
judicial review, there is pressure for greater transparency. But in times of 
crisis, wars, or terrorist attacks, secrecy not only prevails but is treated as a 
value by both the authorities and the society (Fung et al. 2008, 106). Post- 9/ 
11 polls indicated that a lot of citizens were ready to give away their freedoms 
for stronger security and approved of the antiterrorist measures imposed by 





In contrast, just after Snowden, when civil liberties were threatened by exces-
sive government surveillance, distrust of the authorities expanded, with four 
out of five citizens negatively evaluating secret surveillance programs (Epstein 
2017, 303).
Analysis of pre- and post- Snowden national security surveillance leads to 
the impression that the demanded transparency has never been and will never 
be achieved, and the main reason for this is the way the separation of powers 
and checks and balances systems work. Although there is no reference in con-
stitutional documents to either secrecy or transparency, the analysis of early 
writings by the Framers proves that they valued the necessity of imposing 
a system of government transparency (Arnold 2014, 31), but, at the same 
time, they accepted a certain level of secrecy, especially of the executive (Frost 
2017, 146). The evolution of the national security state proved, however, that 
if  the government wanted to conduct successful foreign and security policy, 
it had to keep information about surveillance programs out of public reach. 
Furthermore, the government was able to select the means by which it would 
act internationally and domestically; therefore, it was just a matter of time 
until most of the surveillance measures would be cloaked in total secrecy. 
The adoption of several theories to legitimize and justify application of these 
measures was the last step on the way to establishing a secret surveillance 
state. Today, even if  presidents are critical about the level of secrecy of sur-
veillance programs, they prefer to legalize them, rather than withdraw from 
them (Olmsted 2018). Moreover, according to recent public opinion polls, 
such an approach is accepted by the majority of society, which wants to feel 
safe and secure, listing dealing with the terrorism threat as one of the three 
top public priorities (Pew Research Center 2019).
The rhetoric of safety or security has often served as the legitimiza-
tion of surveillance policies, and political leaders in democratic states have 
strongly supported the vision that full security can only be achieved with 
surveillance measures (Green and Zurawski 2015). In times of internal or 
external danger, usually referred to as times of emergency, governments have 
implemented broad surveillance programs that expanded their authority, 
thus potentially limiting the rights and freedoms of the people (Greenwald 
2014; Farber 2008; Akerman 2006). This does not mean that the authorities 
put aside the discussion of transparency, which could be observed in their 
rhetoric, and even in some institutional solutions (Fisher 2017, 280). Still, 
with regard to the national security state, the successful implementation of 
surveillance measures outweighed the possibility of providing information 
about their scope and character. In that perspective, the rhetoric of the execu-
tive, as well as the establishment of a more transparent oversight system, 
created an illusion that excessive secrecy has diminished. This means that 
all of the transparency policies implemented by US government as a result 
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monitoring, or the new rhetoric of openness— are just tools with which to 
convince society that the culture of secrecy has given place to transparency. 
In reality, however, little has changed: national surveillance is conducted in 
secret, both with regard to foreign intelligence collaboration and domestic 
surveillance of potential terrorist suspects. The separation of powers, which 
is an effective means of control among the branches in several constitu-
tional areas, is not effective with regard to national security. The powers of 
the executive, rooted in the principle of secrecy, limit congressional and judi-
cial checks and provide no balance; therefore, the illusion of transparency 
stems mainly from institutional rather than ideological or partisan factors. 
This all leads to a strengthening of the idea of the national surveillance state, 
which can be seen as a permanent feature of governance now substituting for 
the classical national security state (Balkin 2008, 4). If  the national surveil-
lance state becomes more powerful, the erosion of the system of checks and 
balances will continue, further deepening the illusion that Congress and the 
courts are controlling what the executive does in secret.
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Secret surveillance in Poland 
after Snowden
Between secrecy and transparency
Mateusz Kolaszyński
Introduction
Surveillance powers are typical in the work of law- enforcement agencies and 
intelligence services around the world. In democratic states, they make it 
possible to fight against such threats as terrorism, cyber- attacks, organized 
crime, etc. (Gill and Phythian 2018). To this end, state services use secret 
surveillance— covert techniques and practices of information gathering about 
people that occur without the monitored subjects’ knowledge or approval. 
These surveillance powers, typically carried out by law- enforcement and intel-
ligence services, are more sensitive politically, as well as closely related to core 
issues of power and security (Svenonius and Björklund 2018). However, these 
state activities may also seriously interfere with fundamental rights, in par-
ticular privacy and data protection. Nowadays, technological advancements 
have generated new threats and, at the same time, have provided means of 
fighting those threats, making such work increasingly complex. Technological 
progress means that intelligence services have tools for almost unlimited sur-
veillance. It is the obligation of the state to provide adequate safeguards for 
people and to enact clear laws in this area (FRA 2017a, 2017b).
This problem has often been described as a conflict between security and 
human rights (Bigo 2012). However, secret surveillance can also be used to 
protect human rights, e.g., potential victims of crime or terrorist attacks. 
Thus, this chapter recasts the conflict in surveillance policy as a dilemma 
between secrecy and transparency (Matei and Bruneau 2011). Secrecy ensures 
the effectiveness of security services, and thus agencies lobby for solutions 
that limit transparency. In turn, explicit provisions regarding surveillance, 
control mechanisms, and independent oversight can be considered aspects 
of transparency. Such guarantees can also contribute to increased protection 
of human rights. The goal of this chapter is to discuss the barriers against 
overcoming the culture of secrecy in the area of surveillance (Kovanic and 
Coufalova 2019) with particular focus on Poland, where debates about the 
Snowden revelations have not succeeded in making surveillance practices 












The obligation to provide security for citizens is one of the constitutional 
values in a democracy, and the effectiveness of security provision sometimes 
requires secrecy. However, the domination of secrecy over other constitutional 
values is a systemic and institutional problem. Since 1990, there has been no 
comprehensive move toward transparency. The construction of modern intel-
ligence services has not been completed in Poland. There is a lack of response 
to contemporary challenges, including the development of information tech-
nologies and international cooperation with the services of other countries, as 
well as regulatory challenges related to Snowden’s revelations.
On the contrary, even after Snowden’s revelations security services have 
increasingly extended surveillance powers (Kolaszyński 2019). Since 2016, 
the role of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal has been limited. Earlier, the 
rulings of the tribunal had a substantial impact on limiting surveillance. This 
makes Poland one of the countries that still has a broad surveillance man-
date (Svenonius et al. 2014). In general, successive Polish governments have 
supported reforms that tend to increase surveillance powers. This practice is 
mostly influenced by the politicization of law enforcement and, first and fore-
most, intelligence services. Security services can push for beneficial solutions 
for themselves, such as unlimited access to information. The success of 
these policies also derives from the weakness of institutional arrangements, 
including limited possibilities of the opposition, low public awareness, and a 
lack of real independent oversight. Overall, there is institutional support for 
broad surveillance powers and a lack of significant safeguards against such 
policies in Poland.
The article is structured as follows: the first part will present significant 
legislative changes in the area of surveillance after 2013; the second part 
will describe institutional and administrative arrangements that should 
ensure there is a balance between secrecy and transparency, and therefore 
the successful governance of surveillance; the third part will show the bal-
ancing role of the Constitutional Tribunal prior to 2016 and its limited role 
ever since.
Legal framework after 2013
Since Snowden’s warnings about the extent and dangers of secret surveil-
lance, Poland has had no radical rethinking with respect to secret surveillance 
practices. Since 1983, Polish law has used the term “preliminary investigation” 
(czynności operacyjno- rozpoznawcze) to refer to secret surveillance. This sig-
nificant change did not mean that before 1983 security services did not keep 
citizens under surveillance. Indeed, they frequently operated in such a way but 
did so without any statutory basis. The Act of 1983 thus did not regulate pre-
liminary investigation in a comprehensive way. The practices of the Security 
Service (Służba Bezpieczeństwa— SB) in the Polish People’s Republic (Polska 
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since under the communist system secrecy was the norm in the state’s surveil-
lance policies (Persak and Kamiński 2005).
In 1990, a new intelligence and police law led to changes in regulations 
concerning secret surveillance (preliminary investigations). The statutory 
regulation was expanded, and there were attempts to improve the rules in 
the ensuing years. The process of declassifying secret surveillance during the 
political transformation came down to the following key issues: changing the 
statutory basis for secret surveillance; new intelligence and police services 
structure that would formally separate preliminary investigations from pol-
itics; increasing governmental control and external oversight of secret surveil-
lance. But the reforms also raised doubts regarding the role of transparency in 
surveillance and did not strike a balance between security and human rights.
With regard to state surveillance, the culture of secrecy and the lack of 
citizen awareness still dominate, despite a few solutions aimed at enhancing 
transparency. Very often, extensive surveillance powers are granted without 
adequate procedural guarantees for the protection of human rights and 
without creating independent oversight mechanisms over security services. 
Increasingly, the capabilities of state institutions stem from adopting impre-
cise, laconic regulations (FRA 2017a). This problem of lack of balance has 
received attention from several institutions, even if  it remains unresolved. 
At the national level, these institutions are primarily the Constitutional 
Tribunal, the Commissioner for Human Rights (RPO), the Supreme Audit 
Office (NIK), NGOs, and some experts. At the international level, relevant 
institutions include the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the Venice Commission, 
and the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA).
This part of the chapter will present the most important legal changes 
regarding secret surveillance after 2013. Most of them were introduced in 
2016 after the election of the conservative Law and Justice party (PiS) in 
order to increase the scope of state secret surveillance. Earlier, the ruling 
liberal coalition of the Civic Platform (PO) and the Polish People’s Party 
(PSL) ignored changes in the area of secret surveillance, even though reforms 
became a necessity as a result of the Constitutional Tribunal’s ruling and 
alarming signals from other institutions, such as the RPO. Current solutions 
in Poland will be presented in the context of international standards set by the 
ECHR, the Venice Commission, and the FRA.
A key piece of legislation were the amendments referred to as the 
Surveillance Act of 2016,1 which implemented some recommendations 
included in the Constitutional Tribunal judgment of July 30, 2014 (No. K 
23/ 11), which demanded rigorous reform to surveillance. However, the Act 
only partially implements the judgment, and the most essential principles 
formulated in the judgment, which reflected the process of the revision of 
secret surveillance legislation, were not included. This issue will be discussed 




other legal solutions that the Constitutional Tribunal’s judgment did not 
require or refer to at all, in particular with reference to the scope of intelli-
gence services’ access to telecommunications and internet data, which have 
been significantly extended. This led to the creation of a mechanism for the ex 
post oversight of access to telecommunications and internet data conducted 
by the regional court based on a biannual statistical report prepared by law 
enforcement and intelligence services. However, the judicial oversight is illu-
sory due to the limited powers of the regional court, which will be further 
discussed in the second part of the chapter.
In 2016, the Sejm (lower house of the Polish Parliament) passed numerous 
other laws that extended the reach of surveillance powers. A notable event 
was the passage of the amendment to the Code of Criminal Proceedings, 
introduced in March 2016,2 enabling the broader use of surveillance in crim-
inal proceedings (Grabowska- Moroz 2016). The amendment introduced a 
provision (§168a), which states that evidence cannot be considered inadmis-
sible solely because it was obtained in violation of the rules of criminal pro-
cedure or by committing an offense. The only exception is when the evidence 
has been obtained as a result of murder and/ or willfully causing bodily injury 
or imprisonment in connection with the performance of an official public 
duty. Moreover, the amendment deleted the so- called “ex post consent pro-
cedure” conducted by the court. According to the previous law, if  operational 
surveillance— recording the contents of telephone conversations and corres-
pondence conducted via telecommunications networks— provided evidence 
of a different crime or one committed by a person other than the one under 
investigation, the decision of the court was required. The Act deleted this pro-
cedure and provided that only the consent of a prosecutor is required (§168b).
Another regulation that impacts the oversight system of intelligence services 
and law enforcement is the new Law on the Prosecutor’s Office.3 According to 
this new law, the office of the Prosecutor General is held by the Minister of 
Justice so that this function is fulfilled by a politician, a member of the gov-
ernment. This dual role is especially important because prosecutors are also 
entitled to permit the use of some secret surveillance. Their control covers 
access to classified files containing information gathered during surveillance. 
Moreover, the new law allows the Prosecutor General to order the competent 
authorities to conduct secret surveillance operations if  they are related to the 
ongoing investigation (Rzepliński 2003).
On June 10, 2016, the Sejm also adopted the Anti- terrorism Law.4 This 
regulation extends the powers of the Internal Security Agency (ABW) and, at 
the same time, relaxes oversight requirements, particularly toward foreigners. 
At least three controversial provisions of this Act are related to secret surveil-
lance and concern the following issues: the confidential register maintained 
by the ABW, wiretapping (in legal terminology: operational surveillance) 
of foreigners, and criminal proceedings based only on information from 
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register of persons who may be associated with terrorism.5 However, how 
this confidential register is maintained does not meet the standards set by the 
ECHR (Leander v. Sweden, No. 9248/ 81). The Anti- terrorism Law regulates 
the exception by way of a fundamental principle in the Polish legal system, 
according to which any application of operational surveillance by intelli-
gence services and law enforcement requires the consent of an independent 
authority (a regional court).6 The third significant change introduced by the 
Anti- terrorism Law “liberalizes” criminal trial procedures.7 A person can be 
charged in criminal proceedings based only on information obtained as a 
result of secret surveillance. Moreover, information from secret surveillance 
may be the basis for the prosecutor’s request for detention on remand. Thus, 
pretrial detention and prosecution may occur based on anonymous data, for 
example, an officer’s note from a meeting with an informant not disclosed in 
the case file (Bodnar et al. 2019).
Recently, three new institutions emerged which were granted consider-
able powers in terms of surveillance: the National Revenue Administration 
(KAS), the National Security Services (SOP), as well as the Internal Oversight 
Inspector (BNW), which is subject to the mandate of the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs. The KAS was created from the merging of two services that used 
surveillance. Due to the large number of institutions authorized to under-
take surveillance in Poland, this combination is generally favorable. The SOP, 
like the Government Protection Bureau (BOR), is responsible for providing 
VIP security services for the Polish government (security of incumbent and 
former Presidents of Poland, high- ranking state officials, etc.). However, the 
new service has garnered significantly more far- reaching powers. Controversy 
was aroused when surveillance powers were granted to the SOP, because the 
BOR did not have such powers. The surveillance powers of the SOP are exten-
sive and include operational surveillance and the collection of metadata. It 
is particularly worth noting that the new law copied the solutions of other 
police acts without any new proposals for better safeguards for human rights 
(Kolaszyński 2019).
The BNW is a part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and is supposed 
to keep under surveillance other security services upon the request of the 
Minister of Internal Affairs. The purpose of this service is to improve and 
unify ministerial control of other institutions, such as the police, the Polish 
Border Guard, and the SOP. One of the tasks of the new agency is to con-
trol the surveillance activities of the services mentioned above. Seconded 
police officers, border guards, and SOP officers work primarily in the BNW. 
Formally, this institution is a part of the internal organization of the Ministry 
of Interior (Kolaszyński 2019).
The extensive surveillance powers of the BNW are controversial. Since 
1990— when civilian control over security services was established— only 
security services (the police, the Polish Border Guard, and intelligence ser-






the right to intervene in the work of services only when entitled to do so 
by applicable acts. This solution was designed to separate civil and political 
management in the ministry from professional and apolitical law enforcement 
and intelligence services (Widacki 1999). After 1990, control over surveillance 
powers gradually became the domain of prosecutors and courts. The sur-
veillance powers of the new services under the full control of the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs work against the model mentioned above. On the one 
hand, the minister gets the opportunity to view the surveillance materials of 
the supervised services. On the other hand, the minister’s Internal Oversight 
Inspector— the BNW— also has extensive surveillance powers. For example, 
this institution can use operational surveillance or partake in collecting meta-
data (Kolaszyński 2019).
Surveillance methods form the core of the activity of each service. 
Problems arising from the monitoring of this activity, that is, controlling the 
controllers, are visible in many countries (FRA 2017a, 2017b). However, the 
common standard is oversight exercised by an independent, external body. 
The appointment of the BNW does not meet this standard. The Ministry 
of Internal Affairs is politically accountable for the activities of the services 
controlled by it (the police, the Polish Border Guard, the National Security 
Bureau). That is why a reliable explanation of violations may conflict with the 
minister’s potential accountability (Kolaszyński 2019).
The legislative changes presented above grant the security services exten-
sive opportunities to use secret surveillance. It is also necessary to indicate 
areas in which systemic reforms have not been undertaken for many years. 
Three such areas, where regulations are residual and loose, are essential for 
surveillance. More clarification of the law on these issues and proper devel-
opment of regulations would ensure an adequate balance between transpar-
ency and secrecy (FRA 2017a, 2017b). The first area is the system of control 
and oversight over intelligence and police services. More on this subject will 
be discussed in the second part of the chapter. The law also barely regulates 
the second area— international cooperation in the Polish security services. 
Additionally, there is no legal basis for intelligence actions taken abroad. 
Currently, the law does not control any surveillance methods that are used to 
collect data outside the country. It also does not require the officers to fulfill 
any particular responsibilities or comply with bans. Both legislative changes 
and a lack of initiative in other areas mean that the current legal system may 
be incompatible with the Polish constitution and international standards in 
many elements (Lefebvre 2016; Kolaszyński 2019).
Since Snowden, international standards have generally been ignored by the 
Polish authorities, despite the recommendations of the Polish Ombudsman, 
NGOs, and experts. A report prepared under the auspices of the ombudsman 
pointed to many deficiencies in the Polish legal system (Bodnar et al. 2019). 
Polish law does not conform to international standards relating to the use of 
wiretaps and operational surveillance (as well as the use of metadata) resulting 
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from the case law of the ECHR. Moreover, Polish law does not correspond to 
the standard for the use of metadata by the security services and the protec-
tion of information related to professional privilege (e.g., lawyers, journalists) 
set out in the judgment in the case of Big Brother Watch and Others v. the 
United Kingdom (European Court of Human Rights 2018, application Nos. 
25198/ 0258170/ 13, 62322/ 14, and 24960/ 15). Polish authorities do not imple-
ment standards related to the jurisprudence of the CJEU, especially in the 
field of standards related to telecommunications data based on the so- called 
retention directive (Court of Justice of the European Union 2014, Digital 
Rights Ireland, Nos. C- 293/ 12 and C- 594/ 12; Court of Justice of the European 
Union 2016, Tele2, Nos. C- 203/ 15 and C- 698/ 15) and procedural protection 
for persons at risk of expulsion (Court of Justice of the European Union 
2013, ZZ v. Secretary of State, No. C- 300/ 11). The problems identified by 
international organizations are also not the subject of reflection. A number 
of recommendations from the Venice Commission have not been introduced 
into Polish law. According to the Opinion of 2016 (Venice Commission 2016), 
procedural safeguards and material conditions established in the police acts 
on implementing secret surveillance are still insufficient because they do not 
prevent excessive use of powers and unjustified interference that conflict with 
the privacy of individuals.
In Poland, there is a visible departure from European standards regarding 
secret surveillance (Wetzling and Vieth 2018). The lack of balance between 
secrecy and transparency is a systemic problem that has been known for years. 
Intelligence services and law enforcement are increasingly able to use secret 
surveillance. Additionally, more and more institutions are entitled to under-
take such activity. The problem is also that politicians have an increasing 
impact on the use of surveillance. Moreover, rather than the development of 
adequate control and oversight mechanisms, there has instead been a deteri-
oration in standards (Bodnar et al. 2019). The second part of this chapter will 
show how this process is supported by institutional solutions or, oftentimes, 
a lack of them.
Institutional and systemic challenges
According to Richard J. Aldrich and Daniela Richterova, Snowden’s 
disclosures have not changed the state’s interference in personal privacy but 
have rather exposed the crisis of state secrecy. In their view, “the key issue 
is not government looking at us, but our increasing ability to look at gov-
ernment, and especially new ways of calling the secret state to account” 
(Aldrich and Richterova 2018, 1003). A similar opinion can be found in the 
Guardian article about the situation in Poland that was published shortly 
after Snowden’s revelations: “The Prism affair questions the very essence 
of the contract between societies and their governments: accountability” 











of creating an oversight system of state surveillance became the primary issue. 
The way these mechanisms function is a practical reflection of how the state 
confronts the dilemma between transparency and secrecy.
The problem of the lack of balance between secrecy and transparency can 
be seen from the perspective of the separation of powers. Each branch has 
a different role in secret surveillance. Together, the executive, legislative, and 
judicial branches can provide guarantees against the use of secret surveil-
lance. In turn, possible shortcomings of this system have allowed laws to be 
passed without a balance between transparency and secrecy (Wegge 2017).
In Poland, there is a serious problem with the politicization of the services. 
Until 1990, security services were part of ministries and were fully politicized 
(Gruszczak 2009; Caparini 2014). Formal regulation in 1990 was designed 
to separate civil and political management in the ministry from professional 
and apolitical services. This solution was to guarantee that secret surveillance 
would not be used for current policy (Widacki 1999). This was necessary 
because of the use of surveillance against the opposition in the communist 
system (Persak and Kamiński 2005). However, separating politics from intel-
ligence services turned out to be very difficult in practice.
In 1990, the principle was introduced according to which politicians would 
no longer have complete control over the surveillance of citizens, and it was 
no longer to be used as a tool in dealing with legitimate political opposition 
(Widacki 1999). However, some chosen members of the government were 
given control over surveillance powers, in particular, the Prosecutor General 
as the Minister of Justice (1990– 2010, and since 2016) and the Minister of 
Internal Affairs (1990– 1996, and since 2018). After winning the 2015 election, 
the PiS government not only reverted to the previous influence of politicians 
on the secret surveillance apparatus but significantly expanded this influence. 
The new Law on the Prosecutor’s Office discussed above and the establish-
ment of the BNW allow for more far- reaching secret surveillance than before.
Politicians can be influenced by those who decide on secret surveillance 
in Poland, that is, the heads of the special services. These heads have enor-
mous power over their services as they primarily decide on the scope of the 
surveillance activity. At the same time, they are not clearly separated from 
the current policy because there are no significant restrictions on who should 
be appointed head of a service. A candidate for the position does not have 
to be an officer of any service, nor demonstrate specific experience, know-
ledge, etc. It is also quite common that many functions are performed by 
politicians or other people not directly involved with intelligence services and 
more connected with current politics.
In Poland, there is a lack of governmental control over secret surveillance. 
According to Hans Born and Gabriel Geisler Mesevage (2012, 6– 7) “over-
sight” should be distinguished from “control” because “the latter term implies 
the power to direct an organization’s policies and activities. Thus, control is 
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with the senior management of intelligence services.” There are practic-
ally no permanent, institutionalized forms of control over services respon-
sible for secret surveillance. Since there are so few institutional limitations, 
different governments enjoy considerable independence in exercising control. 
As a result, since 1990, law enforcement and intelligence services have been 
supervised by a number of bodies of various structural and political statuses 
with unsuitable experience and backgrounds. This means no officials have 
specialized in control over these institutions.8 For example, in the government 
of Jerzy Buzek (1997– 2001), the Board for Special Services (KSS) never met 
at all (Zybertowicz 2007). The creation of effective control mechanisms is 
hampered by the lack of political responsibility for special services. In Poland, 
there have been many scandals related to the impact of special services on 
political and economic life. However, political responsibility for these events 
is not typical for politicians who control the services. Andrzej Zybertowicz 
(2007) calls this phenomenon “the institutionalization of non- accountability” 
and “self- tasking of the services.”
In this situation, with a lack of permanent control over security services 
and a lack of political responsibility, the special services gain a considerable 
advantage over politicians. First of all, they are the only ones who have expert 
knowledge about intelligence activities, including secret surveillance (Łoś 
1995). In Poland, there are still not enough civilian experts and supervisory 
institutions. The small number of private experts has historical reasons, since 
before the political transformation security research was dominated by the 
communist party structures (Matei and Bruneau 2011). At the same time, the 
security services have centralized and hierarchical structures that minimize 
access from the outside. In the face of any reform attempts, state security 
experts present a reliable and determined group of influencers with a high 
degree of knowledge and power. Mixing these two spheres— politics and spe-
cial services— can give rise to support for broad surveillance powers. In this 
tandem, intelligence services enjoy expert knowledge and access to secrets. 
The government lacks permanent structures, and knowledge about special 
services is almost impossible to verify. These circumstances make politics vul-
nerable to manipulation. This situation is further exacerbated by the system 
of informal relations between these spheres (Zybertowicz 2007).
Such relationships within the executive branch have an impact on parlia-
mentary oversight. In 1995, the Sejm Committee for Special Services (SKSS) 
was appointed, made up of members of the parliament.9 The parliamentary 
majority has a decisive influence on the work of the committee. Recently, 
several practices meant to increase the power of the opposition to the work 
of this body have been abandoned. With the original establishment of the 
committee, the practice of a six- month rotating chairmanship was introduced. 
During the fourth term of the Sejm (2001– 2005), the additional practice 






(Kolaszyński 2018). In 2015, however, the parliamentary custom of a rotating 
chairmanship of the committee was abandoned.
The SKSS formally has a broad mandate regarding oversight of the spe-
cial services. However, the importance of the committee is not demonstrated 
by the full range of its work since its powers are limited in practice. The 
committee’s members are formally allowed to demand any information about 
secret surveillance from the government, the heads of special services, and 
officers subject to them, but the real power to request this information is 
limited. In order to disclose any information related to secret surveillance, 
the head of a given institution has to give their consent. The regulations do 
specify any particular grounds for either approval or rejection of consent, so 
the committee might be denied access to information without detailed justifi-
cation (Sarnecki 2010). Polish parliamentary oversight is very often reduced 
to trying (and failing) to access the “secrets” of special services. At the same 
time, the committee has not contributed to initiating a policy debate on gov-
ernment control of secret services. Since 1995, the SKSS has not prepared any 
public report on the situation of special services and their government control 
that could initiate a debate on this issue.
The lack of real oversight and parliamentary debate is also evident in the 
legislative process. Laws on secret surveillance have passed without serious 
discussion about the balance between secrecy and transparency. Opposition 
MPs and NGOs are often concerned about the encroachment on human 
rights associated with excessive secret surveillance. However, their impact 
on the final form of the law is minimal. The majority of the Sejm supports 
unequivocally government projects that give broad powers to security ser-
vices. The ultimate argument for supporters of governmental projects is often 
populist rhetoric, i.e., if  someone disagrees with the broad powers of a par-
ticular service, then he or she is a supporter of criminals. This approach was 
evident during the legislative work on the Central Anti- Corruption Bureau 
(CBA) Act in 2006. Criticism of the extensive powers of this institution was 
often rejected with arguments such as “honest people have nothing to fear” or 
“only a supporter of corruption may have doubts about the broad powers of 
the CBA.” Eventually, despite its unprecedented broad powers in Poland, the 
CBA Act was passed with the support of a significant part of the opposition.
Populist rhetoric is effective due to public opinion. Knowledge about the 
activities of intelligence services is not common. In general, citizens do not 
know what functions the security services other than the police perform, 
nor is there widespread knowledge of the umbrella mechanisms of control 
and oversight. This problem is characteristic of many Central and Eastern 
European countries (Matei and Bruneau 2011). One of the main reasons for 
this is the government and intelligence services’ information policy, which 
leaves a lot to be desired. There is a culture of secrecy in this area because even 
the necessary information on the activities of special services is not provided. 
The need for confidentiality often masks incompetence. This also applies to 
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proactive information policy, which is, to some extent, carried out by only two 
services, the ABW and the CBA (Matei and Bruneau 2011).
The secret surveillance issue is not popular with the public. This factor 
reduces the pressure on the government to seek a balance between broad 
powers and human rights. According to the Public Opinion Research Center 
(CBOS), the majority of voters support broad surveillance powers. In the 
opinion of Poles, there is no need to change surveillance capabilities, and 
security services should have wide surveillance powers. This is particularly 
apparent with regard to internet surveillance. According to CBOS, when 
faced with a choice between, on the one hand, increased possibilities for 
internet surveillance for the police and other services in order to combat 
crime and, on the other hand, decreased control of online communication to 
protect users’ privacy, Poles usually choose the first option (46% vs. 30%).10 
Moreover, half  of the respondents think that the current powers of police 
services and intelligence agencies to gather information about internet users 
are acceptable. It is important to note that this CBOS research was carried 
out in April 2016 after the reform that introduced the so- called Surveillance 
Act. In general, surveillance is not an issue that is particularly important for 
Poles. Shortly after the introduction of the Surveillance Act, 54% of Poles 
didn’t know anything about this law (27% of Poles had heard of it but did 
not know what the changes were; only 19% of Poles had heard of it and had 
some idea of the changes introduced) (CBOS 2016, 5). A large group of Poles 
are not interested in the issue of surveillance whatsoever. It seems that lack 
of awareness is a crucial factor in assessing the attitude of Poles toward this 
problem (Svenonius and Björklund 2018).
This indifference can be gradually reduced by the activities of NGOs and 
media pluralism. More and more NGOs are comprehensively monitoring the 
issue of surveillance. The largest of them include the Panoptykon Foundation, 
the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, and Amnesty International. 
They use the Act on access to public information.11 As a result, the media has 
often proved a more effective oversight tool than the overall formal control 
and oversight mechanisms (Matei and Bruneau 2011). Most of the evidence 
of irregularities associated with security services originated in media reports 
(Hillebrand 2012).
The balance between secrecy and transparency is also distorted due to 
the weakness of independent oversight. In 2001– 2002 some responsibilities 
related to secret surveillance— operational surveillance— were transferred 
from the Prosecutor General to the courts. The Prosecutor General was no 
longer supposed to authorize this power but merely provided an opinion on 
the motions submitted to the court by the various services. This method offi-
cially guaranteed external, independent oversight over this area of secret sur-
veillance, which impinges upon human rights to the greatest extent. However, 
there is a lack of actual judiciary oversight in practice. Judiciary oversight 






criminal cases. There are no other specially designed departments or other 
structures that would be responsible for giving consent to operational sur-
veillance. For this reason, such duties are treated as peripheral and secondary 
tasks. Moreover, the courts are not able to review all materials regarding a par-
ticular case. They can only examine what the services show them. Ultimately, 
this oversight is illusory. Publicly available statistics confirm this thesis— the 
courts accept about 99% of the requests from the heads of secret services for 
the application of operational surveillance (Rojszczak 2021).
In Poland, no independent body has yet been established to examine citi-
zens’ complaints about the surveillance activities of security services. There 
is still no effective external oversight of access to telecommunications, posts, 
and internet data, as that guaranteed by law since 2016 is mostly illusory. 
This monitoring is exercised only ex post and randomly; the lack of prior and 
individual oversight is not the only deficiency with regard to current solutions 
(Bodnar et al. 2019). Both types of judicial oversight— that established 
in 2001 over operational surveillance and the one established in 2016 over 
telecommunications, internet, and postal data— share the same limitations. 
In both cases, permanent organizational structures that would deal with this 
type of activity were not guaranteed in the acts. Moreover, no additional 
financial and human resources were provided for this purpose. Ensuring 
adequate organizational structures to enable permanent oversight is justified 
by the scale of the security services’ activities: in 2017, special and police ser-
vices acquired over 1.2 million pieces of data. As for operational surveillance, 
the police alone filed nearly 10,000 wiretapping applications in 2017 (Bodnar 
et al. 2019; Kolaszyński 2019).
In Poland, there is no specialized, independent institution that would deal 
only with the oversight of secret surveillance. In many countries, such external 
bodies have been created. Currently, one or more such institutions dedicated 
to security services operate in 16 EU countries. Only some aspects of secret 
surveillance work also used to be monitored by an independent constitutional 
body— the NIK and the RPO. Their role is essential, but neither is authorized 
to carry out any regular oversight of the services (Kolaszyński 2018).
The role of the Constitutional Tribunal
According to some researchers, breaking the secrecy culture exceeds the cap-
abilities of any institution in Poland (Zybertowicz 2007). However, it is worth 
noting the role of the Constitutional Tribunal in regulating surveillance. This 
institution has played one of the most significant functions in developing the 
statutory basis for secret surveillance over the last 30 years. The tribunal has 
often contributed to the introduction of changes in the regulations and, con-
sequently, the move toward more of a focus on the protection of human rights 
(judgments No. W 12/ 94, No. K 45/ 02, and No. W 54/ 07). The tribunal’s case 
law has significantly reduced surveillance powers and was of fundamental 
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importance for statutory changes in the matter of surveillance. However, in 
2016 the function of the tribunal in this field was actually suspended. The 
paralysis of the constitutional court is the most severe change in surveillance 
policy since Snowden and can explain the expansion of surveillance powers 
in recent years.
Before 2016, the tribunal decided to limit surveillance powers on several 
occasions. Two representative cases will be presented below. In both cases, 
these were sentences issued shortly after the establishment of new special 
services: the Internal Security Agency (ABW) and the Foreign Intelligence 
Agency (AW) (2002) and the Central Anti- Corruption Bureau (CBA) (2006). 
The judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of April 20, 2004 (No. K 45/ 
02) considered the appointment of political heads to security agencies as 
nonconstitutional. According to the tribunal, assigning the heads the role of 
secretaries of state was a sign of circumventing the constitutional ban on 
joining the parliamentary mandate with employment in a government agency, 
and the post of head of special services had not been prepared for politicians. 
This also applies to the use by politicians of intelligence services and their sur-
veillance powers. This ruling was welcomed by constitutionalists (Radziewicz 
2004), and since then, the heads of the ABW and AW have not been secre-
taries of state with political functions.
As with the establishment of the ABW and AW, the Constitutional Tribunal 
examined the constitutionality of the Act on the CBA. In a judgment on June 
23, 2009 (No. K 54/ 07), the Constitutional Tribunal ruled that the definition 
of corruption in the CBA Act was unconstitutional because the definition 
was unclear and ambiguous, resulting in CBA’s broad scope of competence. 
This legal definition played a fundamental role in determining the scope of 
the CBA’s tasks. In this context, the court also ruled on surveillance powers. 
It considered the use of sensitive data and information obtained as a result 
of performing surveillance activities without instruments for controlling 
how these data are stored and verified unconstitutional. This problem also 
concerned the method of deleting unnecessary data due to the statutory tasks 
of the CBA. Based on this judgment, the CBA Act was thoroughly amended. 
This amendment introduced to the CBA somewhat independent, internal 
control of the rights related to the collection and processing of personal data.
The Constitutional Tribunal judgment of July 30, 2014 (No. K 23/ 11), which 
was issued after the Snowden revelations, could have had a similar impact. In 
this case, the tribunal ruled at the request of the Polish Ombudsman com-
prehensively concerning surveillance powers. In this judgment, the tribunal 
specified essential principles that must be jointly met by provisions that regu-
late acquiring information on individuals in secrecy by public authorities in 
a democratic state ruled by law. The judgment required the introduction of 
changes in the law, which concerned the introduction of a mechanism of inde-
pendent oversight over access to telecommunications data by police and spe-
cial services officers; clarification in the law of the types of crimes detrimental 
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to the economic foundations of the state, in respect of which the ABW may 
conduct surveillance control; introduction of a mechanism guaranteeing the 
protection of attorney– client privilege; and introduction of a procedure for 
the destruction of redundant telecommunications data. Furthermore, the 
tribunal’s judgment contained many recommendations regarding limitations 
on the use of operational surveillance.
As noted above, the 2016 Surveillance Act implemented some 
recommendations included in this judgment. The difference from previous 
rulings of the Constitutional Tribunal lies in the fact that this judgment was 
only partially implemented— the Polish legislature did not include the essen-
tial principles of secret surveillance. Moreover, the Surveillance Act introduces 
other legal specifications that the Constitutional Tribunal’s judgment did not 
require or refer to at all (Bodnar et al. 2019). In February 2016, the Polish 
Ombudsman referred the most important provisions of the Surveillance Act 
to the Constitutional Tribunal. In his words, the reform not only fails to exe-
cute the judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 2014, but also “seriously 
violates the constitutional rights and freedoms and the standards set out in 
international law.”12 According to the ombudsman, in the Polish legal system 
there is still a shortage of legal safeguards that would ensure that surveillance 
measures do not violate fundamental rights. However, in March 2018, the 
ombudsman withdrew his application from the Constitutional Tribunal. He 
stated there was no chance of an independent and substantive judgment of the 
Constitutional Tribunal. This decision is related to the dispute surrounding 
the Constitutional Tribunal in Poland. The withdrawal of the application is 
significant if  we take into account the role of the Constitutional Tribunal 
in limiting the powers of surveillance. Until now, it has been one of the key 
institutions that make up the oversight system of police and intelligence ser-
vices. In the same year, the ombudsman withdrew the motions for all legal 
changes discussed in part one of the work: the Code of Criminal Procedure 
(April 2018– Article 168a and May 2018– Article 168b); the Anti- terrorism 
Act (April 2018); and the Act on the Prosecutor’s Office (October 2018). The 
reason for all these decisions was changes in the composition of the previ-
ously appointed Constitutional Tribunal and the fact that unauthorized per-
sons were appointed on political grounds.
Conclusion
A culture of secrecy still dominates Polish surveillance policy. This is 
connected with the still- dominant logic and interests of the security services, 
as secret surveillance is primarily used to combat crime and other threats to 
national security in an effective way. Such an approach is supported by the 
government, which has limited the influence of alternative expert knowledge. 
Ultimately, this leads to the adoption of laws that provide extensive surveil-
lance powers without sufficient institutional or administrative mechanisms to 
govern surveillance practices and prevent abuse.
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The pressure toward a more transparent approach to surveillance is still 
weak due to many factors. The political opposition still has a limited influence 
on the shape of surveillance law. Public opinion has little interest in this issue, 
which weakens potential pressure on the government. Also, independent over-
sight, which only exists formally, does not play any substantial role; it does 
not allow reliable conclusions based on verifiable facts, and it falls short of 
professional control mechanisms with appropriate substantive facilities and 
proper procedures. In addition to all this, the activities of the Constitutional 
Tribunal— which has in the past played an important role in limiting sur-
veillance and protecting rights— have recently been paralyzed, resulting in a 
continued imbalance between transparency and secrecy in surveillance.
Notes
 1 The Act of 15 January 2016 Amending the Police Act and certain other acts (the 
so- called Surveillance Act).
 2 Act of 11 March 2016 amending Code of Criminal Procedure and other acts, 
Journal of Laws, item 437.
 3 Act of 28 January 2016 Law on Prosecutor Office, Journal of Laws of 2017, item 
1767 as amended.
 4 Act of 10 June 2016 on antiterrorist action, Journal of Laws of 2018, item 452 as 
amended.
 5 Act of 6 June 2016 on antiterrorist action, Journal of Laws of 2018, item 452 as 
amended.
 6 Article 9 of Act of 10 June 2016 on antiterrorist action, Journal of Laws of 2018, 
item 452 as amended.
 7 Article 26 of Act of 10 June 2016 on antiterrorist action, Journal of Laws of 2018, 
item 452 as amended.
 8 In 2014, the NIK ran an oversight of control regarding special services (ABW, 
AW, CBA, and others). Due to classified data protection, the results were never 
disclosed. They only issued one public statement, which claims that rules in force 
limit the Prime Minister’s power to control special services effectively.
 9 Article 95, second paragraph of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 
April 2, 1997 (Journal of Laws, no. 78, item 483 as amended) states that the Sejm 
is responsible for government oversight.
 10 Fieldwork for national sample: April 2016, N = 1104. The random address sample 
is representative of the adult population of Poland. For more information see 
CBOS 2016.
 11 The Act of September 6, 2001 on Access to Public Information, Journal of Laws 
of 2019, item 1429.
 12 The Commissioner for Human Rights application, No K 9/ 16, p. 6.
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Legal safeguards and oversight 
innovations for bulk surveillance
An international comparative analysis
Thorsten Wetzling and Kilian Vieth
Introduction
All democratic countries rely on intelligence agencies to keep their open soci-
eties safe. These agencies provide actionable intelligence to decision- makers 
on a wide range of security and foreign policy matters. Regardless of whether 
this concerns terrorism, arms proliferation, or organized crime, information is 
required beyond that which is publicly available. Intelligence services master a 
range of clandestine methods to acquire such information. Some methods— 
including the electronic surveillance of communications data— are difficult to 
reconcile with the fundamental principles of democratic governance, such as 
the rule of law, transparency, and accountability. They may also infringe on 
fundamental human rights and civil liberties, such as the right to privacy as 
well as the rights to freedom of opinion, of expression, of association, and 
of assembly. In order to ensure public trust and the legitimacy of intelligence 
governance, democracies need to place all intelligence activities on a solid 
legal footing and subject them to rigorous and effective oversight.
The democratization of intelligence and the professionalization of oversight 
have made significant advances over the last few decades in many established 
democracies. Parliaments in Europe, North America, and Australasia, for 
example, have frequently reformed national intelligence laws and extended 
the remit and the resources of independent oversight bodies over time. In 
addition, countries such as the United States have introduced transparency 
principles that commit the intelligence community to providing more informa-
tion to the public than at any previous time in history (Office of the Director 
of National Intelligence 2015). Still, as the failures of effective oversight 
of electronic surveillance prior to the revelations of Snowden have shown, 
democratic intelligence governance cannot be taken for granted. The stakes 
are high, and the temptations to abuse privileges such as government secrecy 
are omnipresent. Effective governance and democratic control of intelligence 
is the result of a complex, multifaceted effort that cannot be left to a small 
group of technocrats. Put simply, when democracies allow their intelligence 
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they have to do this within the rubric of the rule of law and checks and 
balances. And while cultural, political, and constitutional differences across 
nations render it futile to establish a one- size- fits- all intelligence governance 
blueprint, it is certainly worthwhile to study how common challenges are met 
across different systems and to identify and promote innovative solutions so 
that they may traverse national jurisdictions.
In this chapter, we focus on the bulk surveillance of foreign communications. 
By this we mean the interception, collection, management, and transfer of 
enormous troves of communications data that is transmitted via different 
telecommunications networks (fixed telephone lines, mobile networks, the 
internet, and satellite networks). Foreign communications are intercepted 
as electronic signals, comprising various types of metadata as well as con-
tent. Bulk surveillance is controversial because it is “non- targeted” or 
“unselected” or “general”— in other words, not directed at a particular indi-
vidual. David Anderson, the former UK Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, 
warned that the use of bulk powers may have serious adverse human rights 
implications: such powers
involve potential access by the state to the data of large numbers of people 
whom there is not the slightest reason to suspect of threatening national 
security or engaging in serious crime […] any abuse of those powers could 
thus have particularly wide ranging effects on the innocent […] even the 
perception that abuse is possible, and that it could go undetected, can 
generate corrosive mistrust.
(Anderson 2016, 120)
Bulk surveillance of (foreign) communication has been a standard intelli-
gence practice for decades. Greater public interest in the wake of the Snowden 
revelations, and the fact that many countries lacked a robust legal framework 
for it, let alone effective oversight thereof, have led many parliaments to adopt 
new laws or to amend existing legislation since then. Now that a sweep of 
new laws, oversight institutions, and control practices are in place it is time to 
take the national governance regimes at face value. While pending litigation 
at both national and European courts may still prompt a redesign of some 
intelligence laws, the very practice of bulk surveillance of communications is 
unlikely to be abandoned. Quite the contrary, it is here to stay and will remain 
a key practice of modern intelligence.
This makes it even more important to identify good solutions to the many 
thorny governance challenges entailed. This is what we aim to provide with 
our compendium, which we outline here. The full compendium, published by 
the Heinrich Böll Foundation and available online (Wetzling and Vieth 2018; 
Wetzling et al. 2020), identifies and contextualizes legal provisions and over-
sight practices from different democracies on bulk foreign communications 




Legal safeguards and oversight innovations 147
with democratic governance, the rule of law, or the protection of human 
rights. They are also seen as good practices when they embody an innovative 
attempt to improve the effectiveness of oversight.
We believe that all countries stand to benefit from a thorough discussion 
of the growing acquis of good practices regarding the governance and over-
sight of bulk surveillance of (foreign) communications. Despite the relevant 
and legitimate criticisms that can be directed at recent intelligence reforms 
(Lubin 2018), most of them also brought about individual changes that 
embody significant improvements in governance. When taken together, these 
promising practices paint a unique picture, which, in turn, can help identify 
opportunities for progress in national frameworks. Obviously, it takes know-
ledge to develop a reform agenda and political will to overcome national 
shortcomings. Yet, if  other countries successfully demonstrate that the sky 
did not fall when they implemented more ambitious solutions to particular 
governance challenges, then this can be used as a powerful argument to per-
suade others to follow suit.
Methods
When democracies allow their intelligence services to conduct large- scale elec-
tronic surveillance of foreign communications data, they must do so within 
the limits of the law. They must also ensure that this practice is subject to 
effective and independent oversight. Yet, what does that mean in practice, and 
how can one best distinguish between good and poor legal safeguards and 
efficient and inefficient oversight dynamics?
To find out, we studied a wide range of different public resources, such 
as commentary on intelligence laws, oversight body reports, strategic litiga-
tion materials, as well as commentary on intelligence policy. We developed 
a scheme of analysis and conducted a series of interviews with a range of 
different experts (legal scholars, computer scientists, public servants and 
oversight professionals, industry representatives, etc.) to obtain further infor-
mation on current practices (see the methodology section in Wetzling et al. 
2020). Once we collected enough information, we wrote a draft compendium 
and organized two expert focus groups to further test and refine our findings. 
Based on this work, we produced a compendium of good practices on bulk 
surveillance of (foreign) communications from different national intelligence 
laws and oversight systems across Europe, North America, and Australasia, 
upon which this chapter is based.
Our focal points were the legal frameworks and oversight regimes regarding 
nontargeted signals intelligence (SIGINT), with a special emphasis on foreign 
communications data. This provides intelligence services “mass access […] to 
data from a population not itself  suspected of threat- related activity” (Forcese 
2018, 3). Unsurprisingly, then, nontargeted (or “bulk”) SIGINT capabil-
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community. It is a technically sophisticated and highly complex intelligence- 
gathering discipline that involves a lot of international cooperation and grew 
in the shadows of many democracies for quite some time.
What are the relevant aspects that one needs to consider when it comes 
to creating a legal basis for— and the democratic control of— bulk surveil-
lance? According to what standards and criteria can we assess the quality 
of either a legal provision or an oversight practice? We consider a practice 
to be good when, by comparison, it provides an improved safeguard against 
potential violations of rights, or because it stands out in the way that it 
solves a common governance challenge, or because it may make innovative 
use of technology for the benefit of greater oversight effectiveness. Whether 
or not these standards are then observed in actual practice is another story. 
This needs to be independently and effectively reviewed based on the actual 
dynamics of judicial oversight as well as its resources, legal mandate, and 
technological tools.
Building blocks of the good practice compendium
This chapter devotes a section to each of the eight phases of bulk surveil-
lance governance: (1) strategic planning, (2) application process, (3) author-
ization, (4) collection and filtering, (5) data processing, (6) analysis, (7) review 
and evaluation, and (8) reporting. For each phase we discuss good practice 
recommendations based on actual empirical examples adopted in particular 
countries; the full compendium available online includes references to specific 
examples of existing legal safeguards and concrete oversight practices from 
different systems up to the year 2019.1
Phase 1: strategic planning
The first phase of the SIGINT process involves the identification and formu-
lation of certain intelligence needs. Ideally, strategic planning will also draw 
on insights from previous assessments of collected intelligence and their value 
after analysis. A clear and specific legal mandate is the precondition for the 
transparency and accountability of foreign intelligence gathering. The man-
date should describe specific legal grounds, against which the permissibility 
and proportionality of a particular measure can be assessed. It should also 
stipulate what data sources or types of communications may and may not be 
included in SIGINT collection.
According to jurisprudence by the European Court of Human Rights and 
the Court of Justice of the European Union, bulk surveillance is only per-
missible when it is strictly necessary to protect the democratic institutions of 
society (European Court of Human Rights 2015, 2016, 2018a, 2018b; Court 
of Justice of the European Union 2016). This indicates that intelligence ser-
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and the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights may only engage in 
bulk collection techniques in relation to clearly confined categories of serious 
threats to a democratic society. These categories ought to go beyond a general 
understanding of what constitutes a serious threat.
The actors involved in setting intelligence priorities play a significant 
role here. There may be both external planning and tasking by government 
officials or ministers outside the service, and internal planning and tasking by 
the services. External planning and tasking traditionally focus more on a stra-
tegic/ political level, whereas internal planning typically includes a stipulation 
of data sources or types of communications.
Good practices provide answers to questions such as: who can influence 
and challenge the tasking process? Does an evaluation of previous intelli-
gence cycles feed into the planning of future intelligence collection? If  so, 
how? When it comes to the formulation of concrete intelligence needs, does 
the process allow those with adversarial positions to challenge what may be 
taken for granted? Matters concerning cooperation with foreign intelligence 
agencies must also be addressed at this stage: will the need for cooperation 
with foreign services be weighed against other factors, such as human rights 
obligations and other national security interests? If  so, how?
The compendium identifies four good practices from existing legal 
safeguards across a number of different countries. These include: laws ending 
discrimination based on citizenship; clear rules for setting intelligence prior-
ities; regulating international cooperation; and prohibition of objectives that 
may not be advanced through bulk collection.2
Setting strategic goals and formulating operational priorities is a core compe-
tence of the executive. Consequently, we found only very limited involvement of 
oversight bodies in the tasking and planning phases. Privacy International also 
found recently that no intelligence oversight body currently possesses the power 
to authorize decisions to share intelligence (Privacy International 2018). Clearly, 
this invokes not just legal and operational questions but also political ones. Can 
a government sufficiently trust a foreign service to engage in new cooperations? 
Nonetheless, some oversight bodies have recently taken an interest in reviewing 
the tasking of and cooperation between intelligence services.
Phase 2: application process (“warrantry”)
With a warrant, the intelligence service (or, as the case may be, the ministry 
performing executive control over a particular intelligence service) submits an 
application for authorization to collect data in bulk. Warrants need to describe 
and delimit bulk SIGINT measures based on specific criteria regarding both 
the form and content of the warrant that are set out in law. Warrants are a 
core element of accountability in intelligence governance, although they have 
to provide detail and particularity in order to constitute an effective safeguard 
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In the SIGINT world, warrants might therefore be tied to classes of indi-
viduals or activities rather than specific persons. Some jurisdictions apply 
much stricter limits to the legal concept of a warrant. In the United States and 
Canada, for instance, warrants always refer to targeted surveillance operations 
that involve a judge, who has to authorize them. A range of countries in 
Europe only apply the concept of warrants to criminal investigations and not 
to intelligence collection. In this conventional understanding, “bulk powers 
are irreconcilable with the requirements of classic warrants. There is no spe-
cificity. By definition, bulk powers are not targeted; they are indiscriminate” 
(Forcese 2018, 3). Under the United Kingdom’s Investigatory Powers Act, on 
the other hand, the term “warrant” is used for different types of applications 
for bulk interception or acquisition of data. This, then, implies a class- based 
warranty system, in which large categories of data can be collected.
Although the terminology is tricky and warrants for untargeted collection 
or bulk surveillance are not a feature of some legal systems, they are included 
here as a useful comparative category. Warrants can be a powerful tool to spe-
cify the minimization rules, the authorization requirements, and the purpose 
limitations of a measure. The more specificity a bulk warrant can provide, 
the better its protective function. Warrants may also be used to exclude cer-
tain data categories from collection and limit the use of the data collected. 
It is important to note that many such limits and conditions could appear in 
a law governing intelligence surveillance. The major advantage of warrants, 
though, is the active involvement of an independent judicial authorization 
body before the collection begins (see phase 3), which allows for case- by- case 
controls. Ideally, a clear legal mandate is combined with obligatory, inde-
pendent, ex ante controls of all applications for bulk data collection.
Warrants also often define the duration of an operation for a specific 
collection method. This, in turn, triggers a mandatory reassessment of the 
measure, and potentially the subsequent reapplication and reauthorization. 
Setting an expiration date is, hence, an accountability mechanism as well as a 
regular efficacy test that helps to ensure the efficient allocation of resources 
by the agencies.
Naturally, the more targeted an envisaged surveillance operation, the more 
specific the warrant can be formulated. Given the focus of this chapter, that is, 
safeguards and oversight innovation regarding nontargeted communications 
surveillance, we mostly reviewed types of “bulk” warrants. That said, 
interesting features in targeted surveillance warrants might be discussed when 
applicable to the sphere of untargeted collection.
It is common for various intelligence laws to include a list of criteria that 
each application for a SIGINT measure needs to address. Ideally, these 
include:
 • Purpose(s) of the requested activity;
 • Alternative means available;
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 • Private companies that may be compelled to cooperate;
 • Service or services that will be instructed to perform the activity;
 • Time frame for assessment and authorization of the warrant, including 
for emergency situations;
 • Geographical zones or organizations or groups of people that a par-
ticular measure is directed at;
 • Technical device or facility to be tapped;
 • Exploratory monitoring or preliminary aptitude tests that have been 
conducted in preparation;
 • Type(s) of data to be retrieved;
 • Search terms or selectors used (i.e., a range of IP addresses);
 • Types of data use and forms of data exploitation to be performed on 
the data;
 • Duration of the warrant and rules for renewal; and
 • Additional background materials to be submitted with the warrant.
The various forms of bulk warrants that now exist in many countries high-
light the potential for even broader applications of this accountability mech-
anism in the field of foreign communications surveillance. There is a need to 
think more creatively about further relevant criteria and additional aspects 
that add more precision to bulk warrants. For example, lawmakers could ask 
the executive to specify the actual use of minimization procedures and how 
the intelligence services intend to honor data- use limitations.
Phase 3: authorization/ approval
After a warrant has been issued, the requested bulk SIGINT measure must 
be authorized or— as the case may be in different jurisdictions— approved 
by a review body that assesses the necessity and proportionality. Differences 
exist across nations as regards the moment when the independent judicial 
review process comes into play. In some countries, the competent minister or 
other members of the executive authorize warrants. In the United Kingdom, 
for example, the authorization of  warrants is the privilege of the executive. 
Ministerial authorization, then, has to be approved by independent Judicial 
Commissioners. By contrast, in the German legal framework, warrants 
are authorized by bodies such as the G10 Commission or the Independent 
Committee.
The independent ex ante authorization/ approval of data collection is a cru-
cial safeguard against the misuse and abuse of bulk surveillance powers. The 
legitimacy of surveillance practice depends on the control of executive con-
duct from the outside. Enacting the control mechanism prior to implementa-
tion is crucial, because this can both deter and prevent certain actions from 
being taken. Independent authorization/ approval also contains an important 
learning element, because the competent bodies can improve their controls, 
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draw lessons from past mistakes, and then declare more assertively that cer-
tain measures are not required, or that no sufficient proof was presented.
Across many democracies, a dual system of authorization/ approval has 
emerged that combines a judicial and an executive control function. A judi-
cial oversight body— ideally a court— is best suited to administer a compe-
tent legal review of a bulk surveillance application. But, as several discussions 
with intelligence oversight practitioners have shown, the involvement of the 
political leadership level, for example, the responsible minister or secretary of 
state, may also present a relevant safeguard, especially in the realm of foreign 
intelligence. The acceptance of a surveillance operation may go beyond legal 
criteria of necessity and proportionality and move into the political domain. 
Including political considerations, such as possible damage to diplomatic 
relations with a foreign country, may add an important perspective to the 
authorization process.
The complexity and confidentiality of the subject matter require that 
the authorization body be sufficiently qualified (e.g., a specialized court for 
SIGINT operations) and have the necessary powers and resources to conduct 
the authorization (e.g., access to all relevant information) (European Court 
of Human Rights 2015, 275). A fundamental requirement for an authoriza-
tion/ approval body is its independence. Further relevant aspects include:
 • Who is involved in the authorization process?
• How is the independence of the authorization/ approval ensured? For 
example, unified, fully resourced authorization bodies with full access 
rights are far better equipped to conduct comprehensive reviews.
 • When does the review take place? Prior to, or after the implementation of 
bulk surveillance measures?
 • How does the authorization take place?
• Are all warrants independently authorized, or does the law account 
for exceptions? For example, are there any exceptions for emergency 
procedures? If  so, are they designed so that they do not unduly open 
up loopholes for unauthorized operations?
• What assessment criteria are being used?
• How explicit are the oversight bodies as regards the use of criteria to 
assess the legality, necessity, and proportionality in concrete practice?
• How much time does the oversight body have to assess a warrant?
 • Does the law foresee an appeal procedure?
• Are the authorization decisions legally binding?
• Is technical and adversarial advice incorporated into the authoriza-
tion process? If  so, how?
 • Do the warrants also account for metadata and “secondary data” 
(Smith 2018)?
 • Does the authorization take other (ongoing) surveillance measures into 
account when assessing a new warrant?
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 • How is the authorization decision documented? Are there publicly 
available statistics on the number of rejections and the total number of 
applications reviewed?
Current good practices in existing legal safeguards include laws that provide 
a margin of discretion for authorization bodies; mandatory public reporting 
on individual authorization decisions; adversarial proceedings that provide 
additional input legitimacy to the authorization/ approval decision process; 
quotas for maximum permissible number of certain surveillance instruments. 
Good oversight practices include explicit standards for proportionality 
assessments when approving bulk SIGINT warrants in actual practice. For a 
detailed discussion of the relevant legislation supporting these practices, see 
the full compendium (Wetzling and Vieth 2018; Wetzling et al. 2020).
Phase 4: collection and filtering
Once a warrant has been authorized or approved, an intelligence agency can 
proceed with the implementation of a particular surveillance measure. For 
this, it intercepts the relevant signals, for example, by tapping an internet ser-
vice provider’s (ISP) fiber optic backbone cable or diverting data at an internet 
exchange point. Afterward, the collected data has to be filtered for two 
reasons: first, because of the huge volumes passing through— which would 
be far too much to be stored long term— gratuitous data that is extremely 
unlikely to yield any intelligence value is filtered out (e.g., all data from public 
video feeds); second, the collected data stream has to be filtered so as to abide 
by legal requirements. Certain data— for example, domestic communications 
or communications involving lawyers, priests, or other professions relying on 
the confidentiality of correspondence— may be offered higher levels of pro-
tection in national surveillance laws.4
Collection
At the collection point, it is critical to clearly define who is in charge of extracting 
the data and where and how the extraction devices may be installed. Is the 
collection administered by the intelligence service, or do private entities (e.g., 
ISPs) do this on behalf of the intelligence services? This distinction is relevant, as 
provider intermediation can be an important safeguard against overcollection. 
In principle, intelligence agencies should not have direct access to the facil-
ities of telecommunications providers. Cases have surfaced, however, in which 
internet companies agreed to search the data they administer on behalf of an 
agency. Yahoo, for example, secretly scanned all email accounts for information 
provided by US intelligence agencies (Menn 2016). A legal framework, therefore, 
has to define how (private) intermediaries may be compelled to cooperate and 
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A number of European countries have installed electronic interfaces that 
give oversight bodies direct access to operational systems and collected data. 
Such direct access can be an important innovation for oversight, but it also 
entails risks that have to be addressed. The advantage of direct access to 
databases is that the oversight body can conduct random checks, unannounced 
inspections, and potentially also automated controls on the data handling 
by the intelligence agencies. This has the potential to level the playing field 
between the controller and the controlled. Traditionally, oversight bodies 
depend, to a large extent, on the information provided by the intelligence ser-
vices. If  overseers gain direct access, the incentive to comply increases because 
intelligence officials cannot know whether an incident will be reviewed or not. 
Technical interfaces might also empower review bodies to monitor statistical 
anomalies in the databases. This opens a new field of (automated) oversight 
applications that will support overseers in effectively diverting their limited 
resources for in- depth compliance auditing. Such an approach— using analyt-
ical techniques to identify potential noncompliance— amounts to “predictive 
oversight” and is already being practiced by institutions entrusted with finan-
cial audits in the banking sector.5
Granting direct, unfettered access for oversight bodies to the intelligence 
databases may, however, turn them into attractive targets for foreign espi-
onage and hacking attacks. It is important, therefore, to only grant such 
access to properly trained oversight personnel and to provide the highest level 
of cybersecurity to oversight bodies.
Making sense of raw intelligence data and log files is hard. It is not enough 
for oversight bodies to merely have access. The information advantage that 
direct access may bring comes from data analytics. In other words, oversight 
bodies need to engage with the data that they now have access to. In order to 
learn how much more rigorous their controlling could become, overseers may 
want to learn from financial audit bodies and will need special training.
Filtering
Once data has been acquired by means of untargeted electronic surveil-
lance, it may be subject to additional filtering, depending on the national 
surveillance regulations. The specifics of the data minimization and filtering 
processes should be subject to critical review, for they may reveal the extent 
to which intelligence agencies abide by constitutional and human rights 
standards. For example, some intelligence laws grant enhanced privacy pro-
tection to professions that depend on the confidentiality of information. This 
may pertain to communications involving priests, lawyers, journalists, and 
physicians. Whether and how data minimization and filter tools are capable 
of accommodating such communications in practice should be of interest to 
oversight bodies. This may also extend to the review of protected health data 
and DNA- related information.
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In addition, there are technical questions that come to mind, as they, too, 
reveal interesting information about the independence of oversight bodies and 
the extent to which data minimization is an actual priority (or not) within the 
intelligence community. For instance, how is “surplus information” treated in 
the collection and filtering process? When data minimization systems, such 
as the Massive Volume Reduction (MVR) systems of the United Kingdom’s 
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), are being used, are 
they subject to independent oversight? More specifically, are the technical 
equipment and filter programs regularly subject to independent verification, 
or do the oversight bodies merely rely on the assurances of the intelligence 
agencies that the data minimization and filtering processes are fit for purpose?
The independent verification of data minimization techniques deserves 
greater attention from oversight bodies (Vieth and Wetzling 2019, 18ff). They 
ought to investigate the technical implementation of the filtering process 
and the independent auditing of filter effectiveness. Similarly, the deletion of 
data is an ongoing oversight challenge that many review bodies are gradually 
waking up to. Here, we find that mutual learning from regular exchanges with 
other oversight bodies in other countries and the promotion of systematic 
dialogues with external experts should be intensified.
Phase 5: data processing
Once data has been collected and filtered, it must be stored, tagged, and later 
removed or destroyed. This phase of the SIGINT process is particularly rele-
vant for oversight and the services because lawful and efficient data manage-
ment is the basis for relevant data analysis. For the sake of clarity, this phase 
is divided into four subcategories reflecting the different facets of data pro-
cessing: storage, maintenance, sharing, and deletion.
Data storage
Due to different retention periods, it may become necessary to keep separate 
databases, for example, for encrypted data, metadata, and content data, or 
in order to distinguish data pools according to their legal basis or warranted 
purposes. It can therefore be relevant whether there are isolated data storage 
locations. Increasingly, bulk surveillance governance relies on the verifiable 
technical or institutional separation between the authority to intercept and the 
authority to analyze the data. In order to honor data protection obligations, a 
surveillance law should further restrict the extent to which databases may be 
linked or accumulated.
Transnational threats prompt closer transborder cooperation among intel-
ligence services, not least for neighboring countries. Intelligence data— both 
unevaluated and evaluated— is therefore not just shared bilaterally but also 
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When we speak of  joint databases, we refer to a multilateral exchange of 
data that can be hosted either on national territory or abroad. Typically, 
joint databases are run multilaterally, with all participating services adding 
and accessing data.
The European Counter Terrorism Group (CTG), for example, runs a data-
base that facilitates the multilateral exchange of evaluated data on individuals 
who have traveled to and returned from certain conflict areas (CTIVD 2018, 
10; see also van Eijk and Ryngaert 2017). This database became operational 
in July 2016, is administered on servers in the Netherlands, and makes infor-
mation available in (near- ) real time to the 30 participating services of the 
CTG. Interestingly, unevaluated data may also be exchanged within the CTG, 
although not via the database. It may be jointly stored and processed within 
standard SIGINT cooperations (CTIVD 2018, 9).
Existing good practices in legal safeguards include laws that protect all 
data categories and, in particular, that allow for no distinction between rules 
regulating metadata and content data retention since both are worthy of 
protection; explicit obligations regarding joint databases with foreign intel-
ligence services, including obligations to keep a file classification scheme, 
appropriations clauses for joint databases, and equalized retention rules for 
citizens and noncitizens.6
Data maintenance
This comprises all practices that concern the labeling and registration of 
intelligence databases. Data upkeep is not only required by data protection 
regulations but also serves a practical end: it ensures that the services keep 
only relevant and accurate data.
Relevant aspects for good practices include: how is bulk data tagged? And 
what authority do data protection agencies have to investigate the sound 
implementation of databases? For auditing purposes, data must be traceable 
throughout the entire lifecycle. It is also important to anonymize data to the 
greatest extent possible. The security and quality of the databases must be 
ensured to protect sensitive information from being stolen or compromised. 
Adequate data maintenance also builds on clear restrictions of data access. Is 
the access to the stored data regulated by law and restricted to specialized per-
sonnel only? Or is data access for operational teams limited by data exploit-
ation warrants (see phase 2)?
Existing good practices in legal safeguards include legally imposed duty of 
care with regard to data processing, including the use of algorithms, avoiding 
data breaches, and insuring the validity and integrity of processed data; the 
mandatory tagging of all bulk SIGINT data as a precondition for meaningful 
data protection controls. In terms of oversight, good practices include the 
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Data sharing
Sharing data with foreign services entails a responsibility to assess and miti-
gate the risk of misuse of the shared data. Although SIGINT burden- sharing 
among partner services is a common practice, what rules and procedures are 
in place to evaluate partner services’ data quality and data veracity? Oversight 
of— and accountability for— data- sharing agreements and joint databases 
must be ensured. Finally, in times of advanced joint intelligence databases, 
how do oversight bodies cooperate internationally to control the permissible 
use of international data pools? Current good practices include rules for over-
sight body access to shared data and random sample checks on automatic 
transfers of personal data to foreign intelligence services.
Data deletion
The proper deletion of data is an enormous challenge. Technically, it is not as 
easy as one may think to securely “get rid” of data. This is because “deleting” 
a file typically only marks the space it occupies as usable. Until the disk space 
is overwritten, the data is still there and can be retrieved. To ensure that the 
deleted data cannot be retrieved any longer, the physical records on a storage 
medium must be overwritten with other data several times (minimum of 
seven times as per the US Federal government’s guidelines) (Dorion 2008). 
But simply overwriting the storage space on a physical medium with new data 
does not necessarily guarantee that none of the old data is gone for good. 
Although there are technical means to ensure that deleted data is actually 
unretrievable, it seems necessary to develop more detailed standards for what 
constitutes the proper deletion of data. Errors in this process could result in 
millions of datasets being falsely stored for years.
Moreover, it is now also “more costly to delete data, than retain it” (OECD 
2013, 100). Therefore, legislators have found it difficult to insert the proper 
legal definitions or public standards for what “deletion” or “destruction” of 
data means into intelligence laws.7 By extension, then, the deletion problem 
also becomes a veritable oversight challenge. This is because review bodies 
need accurate audit trails to be able to check services’ compliance with data 
deletion requirements. This may include the automated destruction of data 
after legal retention periods have lapsed or if  the relevant authorization for 
collecting data has ended.
There is also a need for better guidelines on what data should be deleted at 
what point in time. Storage periods (see part one of phase 5 above), for that 
matter, define maximum times for which data may be retained. With adequate 
normative criteria at hand, the services or the competent oversight bodies 
could, theoretically, also decide to apply a shorter storage period. For example, 
if  a system flags data that has not been used for a certain time period, this 
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Intelligence law should outline specific and short retention periods, after 
which the data must be permanently and unmistakably destroyed. There 
might be special requirements for the deletion of  large amounts of  data. 
For example, the NSA’s XKeyscore system may have a rolling buffer so that 
new incoming data automatically overwrites the old data. It is also rele-
vant how data destruction is documented and controlled by the competent 
oversight body. For example, is stored data linked to specific warrants, and 
does it have traceable time stamps for full and proper deletion? Adequate 
records of  the data destruction are also important for possible notification 
purposes.
Relevant aspects for good practices include: how are storage and deletion 
implemented in practice? Should intelligence data be stored in “clouds”? Even 
in the sphere of national security, we witness close cooperation with commer-
cial third parties, such as private cloud storage services (Konkel 2014). How 
can it be ensured that such outsourcing— entailing the risk of shifting respon-
sibility for a crucial phase of data processing to private companies— does not 
undermine democratic accountability and oversight?
Existing legal safeguards include legal obligations to immediately delete 
data tied to rejected applications; obligations to destroy data from bulk 
collection that is deemed irrelevant; and obligations to delete health data in 
foreign datasets. Good existing oversight practices include running statistical 
pattern analysis on the amount of deleted material and independent review of 
compliance with deletion obligations.
Phase 6: analysis
A wide range of data use is relevant for this phase. There are, of course, 
overlaps between data processing and data analysis. Whereas data processing 
refers to data registration and other formal or technical data management 
practices, in this phase data becomes information that is relevant for political 
decision- making. Different automated data analysis methods serve different 
purposes and are governed by their own specific rules. Bulk datasets are used 
both to “establish links between known subjects of interest” as well as to 
“search for traces of activity by individuals who may not yet be known but 
who surface in the course of an investigation, or to identify patterns of activity 
that might indicate a threat” (UK Home Office 2017, 52). For example, con-
tact chaining is one common method used for target discovery:
Starting from a seed selector (perhaps obtained from HUMINT), by 
looking at the people whom the seed communicates with, and the people 
they in turn communicate with (the 2- out neighbourhood from the seed), 
the analyst begins a painstaking process of assembling information about 
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Automated pattern analysis and anomaly detection increasingly rely on 
artificial intelligence (AI) methods such as machine learning and predictive 
analytics. “AI is expected to be particularly useful in intelligence due to the 
large datasets available for analysis” (Hoadley and Lucas 2018, 13). The risks 
and benefits generally associated with AI also challenge existing oversight 
methods and push legislators as well as oversight practitioners to creatively 
engage with AI as a dual- use technology. In intelligence, AI “is intended to 
automate the work of human analysts who currently spend hours sifting 
through data for actionable information. It may free them to make more effi-
cient and timely decisions based on the data” (Hoadley and Lucas 2018, 9). 
Conversely, malicious use of AI creates new security threats that have to be 
mitigated (Brundage et al. 2018).
Good practices need to consider the following questions: what types of 
data use are permissible in a given legal framework, and are there specific 
rules for different forms of data use? For example, there should be procedures 
for each type of use, specifying the circumstances under which that specific 
use is permitted. There should also be independent oversight (internal and 
external) over bulk data analysis techniques, including rules and safeguards 
as concerns the use of AI. How is the level of privacy intrusion of specific 
data- analysis tools measured? And what kind of material is fed into query- 
focused databases? How is the convergence of different databases/ data sources 
regulated? For example, may bulk communications data be matched with 
other stored data (such as data gathered via sensors or in hacking operations) 
or publicly available data? If  so, does such enrichment of material happen 
automatically?
Current good legal safeguards include human- in- the- loop safeguards for 
automated data analysis that prohibit action on the basis of automated results 
alone, as well as legally required specialized training for analysts. Good over-
sight practices include automated internal compliance systems for data ana-
lysis and ex ante review of AI experiments and novel data analysis techniques.
Phase 7: review and evaluation
Compliance with legal safeguards must be ensured through comprehensive 
and regular judicial oversight. Examining the effectiveness of data collection 
measures is equally important. Overseers need to know about this to assess 
the political value, the cost efficiency, and the need for the reauthorization of 
warrants. Identifying suitable metrics and methods for this remains a consid-
erable challenge. For example, if  data from a certain program or collection 
stream never feeds into the production of intelligence reports, does this mean 
that the particular data collection is superfluous and a strain on the limited 
resources of the intelligence community? Or, in contrast, would this be tanta-
mount to someone canceling a fire insurance policy simply because, thus far, 
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The scope of the review mandate of the oversight body is a core factor. 
Effective review presupposes that there are no gaps in the control mandate. 
Control remits should be defined functionally, covering all aspects of intel-
ligence collection, as recommended by the Council of Europe (Council 
of Europe 2015). Does the competent oversight body have the sufficient 
resources (staff, time, money, technical expertise) to conduct meaningful 
reviews? Intelligence law should also define the role for oversight in assessing 
the political relevance of finished intelligence operations and assign the duty 
to the executive branch to demonstrate the efficiency of its bulk surveillance 
measures, despite the ubiquitous presence of open- source information.
Existing good legal safeguards include laws that expand the scope of over-
sight and put in place a holistic review of SIGINT practices across different 
agencies; mandatory reauthorization of legislation and verification of effect-
iveness before renewal of authorization; and criminal liability for non-
compliance with oversight requests. Good oversight practices include early 
and systematic oversight involvement; obligatory quarterly self- reporting of 
incidents to the Inspector General; and international cooperation of over-
sight bodies, including joint review and mutual learning sessions.
Phase 8: reporting
After a SIGINT collection cycle has been completed, both government 
and oversight bodies need to be transparent and provide adequate infor-
mation about both the surveillance activities undertaken by the state and 
their specific oversight activities thereon. To enhance public trust, the intel-
ligence services should proactively declassify key legal documents of  public 
interest.8 Such releases have, for example, allowed the creation of  rare public 
and quite comprehensive accounts of  different types and patterns of  com-
pliance violations over the duration of  the Section 702 program.9 Although 
full transparency of  oversight activities may not be possible due to secrecy 
requirements, the regular reporting by oversight bodies is a crucial means for 
public trust and accountability. For this, it ought to be as comprehensive and 
timely as possible.
Relevant considerations include: what rules are in place regarding manda-
tory, periodical public reporting on surveillance measures and their demo-
cratic control? Information on oversight methods and capacities, especially 
with a view to bulk surveillance, should be provided to the greatest extent pos-
sible. Reports should draw a holistic picture of all intelligence activities. What 
contextual material and statistical information is provided to the public? 
What outreach activities are pursued, and how does the oversight body com-
municate with the public?
Existing good practices in legal safeguards include allowances for deviations 
from the norm of classification and options for declassification, and legal 
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reporting on nonconformities with selectors; oversight bodies pushing for 
declassification; and institutional support and protection for whistleblowers.
Conclusion
Our initial review of legal safeguards and oversight innovations in different 
stages of the bulk surveillance governance process features 64 good practices. 
These range from ending discrimination based on citizenship to more specific 
authorization regimes and additional safeguards for international intelligence 
cooperation. Each pertains to different aspects of surveillance governance. 
More specifically, this includes:
 • Restriction of bulk surveillance powers;
 • Transparency;
 • Access;
 • Oversight professionalism;
 • International cooperation;
 • Direct government responsibility;
 • Sanctions; and
 • Private- sector involvement.
Reforms of bulk surveillance post- Snowden have been limited and 
underwhelming in the eyes of many observers. Yet, the debate about rights- 
based and democratically controlled surveillance governance is far from over. 
Although courts such as the European Court of Human Rights tend to grant 
a broad leeway to national governments to implement bulk surveillance, they 
also insist on adequate safeguards. What this means in practice, however, will 
not be decided by the courts. Rather, it involves the hard work of taking the 
lessons about ineffective oversight and applying better practices through the 
slow and steady channels of democratic institutions. In this spirit, we con-
tinue to collect and compare international good legal safeguards and prom-
ising oversight practices (Wetzling et al. 2020). This may not be the Snowden 
legacy that some expected. Yet, it is the difficult and necessary work of demo-
cratic governance.
Notes
 1 An up- to- date collection of international good practices is available at: www.
intelligence- oversight.org.
 2 References to empirical examples in phase 1 can be found here: www.intelligence- 
oversight.org/ phases/ strategic- planning/ .
 3 Laura Donohue interviewed by Henry Farrell in Farrell (2016).
 4 As established earlier, it is not always technically possible to filter out the 
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 5 For a detailed analysis of potential applications for direct oversight access to oper-
ational surveillance systems, see Vieth and Wetzling (2019).
 6 References to the individual good practices in the data processing phase are avail-
able at: www.intelligence- oversight.org/ phases/ data- processing/ .
 7 We are grateful to Professor Nico van Eijk, who presented valuable information on 
the legal and technical challenges of data deletion during our workshop on May 
14, 2018.
 8 The US intelligence community, for example, has released official documenta-
tion of intelligence activities and procedures, such as declassified FISC opinions, 
quarterly reports, and semiannual assessments. Many of these documents can be 
found at www.icontherecord.tumblr.com. A guide to released documents is avail-
able here: www.dni.gov/ files/ CLPT/ documents/ Guide_ to_ Posted_ Documents.
pdf. A searchable database of all documents is available at: www.intel.gov/ 
ic- on- the- record- database.
 9 Robyn Greene has compiled highly informative documentation that informs the 
public about how unintentional violations may threaten the privacy of protected 
communications over a longer period of time “with significant and prolonged 
impact” (Greene 2017). For a summary of compliance reports under Section 702 
of FISA, see Greene (2017).
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Transparency and surveillance 
of end users on social media 
platforms
A view of structural economic factors
Abel Reiberg
Introduction
Over the past two decades users of social media platforms have been sub-
ject to intensive surveillance by various actors. Surveillance has been used 
by, for example, end users in cases of digital stalking, private companies pro-
viding third- party apps in cases like the Cambridge Analytica scandal, and 
government agencies, as in the case of the National Security Agency’s sur-
veillance programs. These actors, however, were able to engage in surveillance 
only because platform providers have designed platforms to accumulate vast 
amounts of personal data. In this sense, it is the providers of the platform 
who enable surveillance. It is first and foremost they who initiate, oversee, and 
steer the flows of information on the platform. In order to explain the inter-
action of transparency and surveillance on social media platforms, therefore, 
the interests of platform providers need to be studied. This chapter addresses 
the question of why platform providers have furthered transparency and sur-
veillance of end users by investigating the providers’ economic interests.
The structure of this chapter is as follows: the second section of this chapter 
discusses the relationship between transparency and surveillance. It is argued 
that transparency allows actors to carry out the monitoring that is an essential 
part of surveillance and that transparency can therefore be understood as a 
precondition to surveillance. The third section then addresses the question of 
why providers of social media platforms have both the ability and the interest 
in furthering transparency and surveillance of end users on their platforms. 
Here it is argued that the ability to further the transparency of end users relies 
on the centralization in markets for social media and that this centralization, 
in turn, is due to economies of scale, particularly those on the demand side. 
Furthermore, it is argued that the underlying interest in furthering transpar-
ency and surveillance relies on the particular multisided market strategies 
of the platform providers. In order to illustrate the argument, the strategies 
applied by Facebook, the provider of the largest social media platform, 





A summary of this chapter’s results and limitations is provided in the con-
cluding section.
On the relationship between transparency and 
surveillance
References to transparency in political discourse usually have a positive con-
notation; there are, however, telling exceptions. On December 14, 1996, the 
German newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung1 published a commentary titled “the 
transparent citizen.” With surprising foresight, the data protection officer of 
the state of Bavaria criticized policies providing the German foreign intelli-
gence agency with competences which, as the leaks of Edward Snowden would 
later reveal, were then used for the illegal surveillance of German citizens. In 
the commentary, as in similar contributions to the discourse on security sur-
veillance, the metaphor of the “transparent citizen” stands for the transpar-
ency of a citizen’s personal traits, preferences, or behavior to the “eye” of  a 
surveilling other— in this case the intelligence agencies.
The metaphor illustrates a specific perspective on the relationship between 
transparency and surveillance: one in which transparency, understood as the 
absence of an obstacle in the process of observation, is a precondition for sur-
veillance, as it allows actors “to oversee”— from the French sur [over] + veiller 
[watch]— others. Surveillance, in turn, entails observation or the gathering 
of information, not as passive monitoring but for the purpose of “discip-
line” (Foucault 1995), “behavioral modification” (Zuboff 2015), or “influence, 
management [or] protection” (Lyon 2007); that is, forms of social control. 
Thus transparency empowers surveillance and therefore might not be seen as 
a solely positive but as an ambivalent condition— depending on who it is that 
is empowered in relation to whom.
The commonplace positive connotation of transparency seems to rely on 
the equally common assumption that an increase in transparency usually 
benefits the weaker actors in asymmetric power relations, for example, the 
citizens in their relations to elected officials. However, it may more often be 
the case that it is the stronger actors who are able to define the terms of trans-
parency and who can use the possibilities transparency offers.
In order to determine whether an increase in transparency in a specific situ-
ation is desirable or not, it is (among other things) important to clarify which 
actors the increase in transparency might enable to carry out surveillance and 
which actors might be subjected to that surveillance— although this analyt-
ical task has generally not become easier in the past decades. With the rise of 
new information and communication technologies, the practice of surveil-
lance has disseminated throughout society. An increasing number of actors 
are involved in acts of surveillance, often simultaneously playing both the 
role of the surveillant and the role of the surveilled. This is particularly the 
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of social media platforms is utilized by actors such as the end users, third- 
party developers, advertising clients, government agencies, and the platform 
providers themselves. Furthermore, these actors often switch between roles in 
acts of surveillance. End users may, for example surveil other end users while 
at the same time being themselves surveilled by platform providers.
These diverse actors, however, vary in their degree of agency. As Trottier 
puts it, “On first pass it seems that all social media users have the potential to 
watch over each other. But those who manage [the platform] have a privileged 
view of its contents” (Trottier 2011). Because providers are developing and 
deploying the software at the heart of platforms and are defining their terms of 
use, they have more control over the platforms than any other group of actors. 
It is the providers that first and foremost decide who will be transparent for 
whom. Therefore, it is the providers and their interaction with other relevant 
actors that is the focus of this article. The question addressed in the following 
is why and how providers are furthering transparency and surveillance of the 
largest and most exposed group of actors, the platform’s end users.
As authors like Fuchs (2012, 2014) and Zuboff (2015, 2019) have shown, 
answers to this question can be found by analyzing the economic function of 
surveillance in platform economies. From a Marxist perspective, they have 
argued that surveillance has become the key component of a new mode of 
production that constitutes a new variant of the capitalist economic order, 
which Zuboff (2015, 2019) calls “surveillance capitalism.” This chapter 
follows Fuchs and Zuboff insofar as it highlights the economic function of 
surveillance on platforms. However, it does so not from a Marxist macroeco-
nomic perspective but by relying on concepts of microeconomic literature on 
platform economics, which help to further the understanding of why and how 
specific firms (namely, the most successful firms) in specific markets (namely, 
markets for social media) are deciding to make surveillance an integral part 
of their business. Particularly useful are the concepts of “network effects” and 
“multi- sided markets,” which have been advanced in the last two decades by 
works of authors such as Rochet and Tirole (2003), Weyl (2010), and others. 
In the next section, the concept of network effects will be touched upon in 
order to explain why concentration in markets for social media occurs and 
how this affects user privacy. The section thereafter will explain how the 
multisided market strategy of a social media platform provider may create 
interest in surveillance. The discussion will be illustrated with examples from 
Facebook, Inc., which, based on the number of end users, is the provider of 
the largest social media platform.
Economic underpinnings of surveillance and 
transparency on social media platforms
Today, providers of social media platforms belong to the most successful com-






valuable corporations (Wikipedia 2020; Handelsblatt 2018). An important 
reason for the high market capitalization of the platform providers (676 billion 
US dollars in the case of Facebook) is the degree of concentration in the 
respective markets. Most of the platforms dominate specific markets, which 
becomes visible when looking at the number of end users of these platforms, 
which in some cases is not only high in relative but also in absolute numbers. 
The platforms run by Facebook are a good example, among which are the 
platforms Facebook, Instagram and WhatsApp with 2.76 billion daily active 
users in total (Facebook 2021). For comparison, in the relatively competi-
tive sector of instant messaging the closest competitor to Facebook, Inc.—
Snap— has around 293 million daily active users on its platform Snapchat 
(Snap 2021). As interactions are increasingly concentrated on individual 
platforms, it is not surprising that the monetization of these interactions has 
led to a strong concentration of capital at the platform providers. However, 
the market concentration has not only economic or financial consequences 
but also consequences for the privacy of the platforms’ end users.
Concentration in markets for social media and its  
implications for mass surveillance
As authors like Helen Nissenbaum (2004) have argued, privacy is highly 
context- specific as people usually do not object to sharing information per 
se, but to sharing specific information depending on the social context. They 
may, for example, want to share personal health information with their phys-
ician but oppose sharing the very same information with their neighbors. 
Thus, in order to safeguard privacy, it is necessary to ensure that informa-
tion shared is appropriate to and contained within the social context it was 
meant to be shared. Hypothetically, a decentralized ecosystem of platforms, 
in which a multitude of platforms exists, would be able to cater to different 
social contexts— such as specific platforms for communication with family 
members and other platforms for communication with friends or colleagues, 
and so on. In a fully centralized ecosystem, in contrast, interactions relating 
to various social contexts take place on a single individual platform, which 
has several consequences for user privacy.
One of the consequences of centralization is that end users can be monitored 
in a wider range of contexts. This is not only a difference in quantity. As 
has been acknowledged, for example, in court rulings regarding violations of 
privacy,2 the combining of apparently insignificant bits of information can 
enable the creation of significant data profiles of the persons in question.
A telling example is Facebook’s patent on methods that allow the com-
pany to use the “staggering” amount of information shared by users— “by 
sharing photos, real- time status updates, and playing social games” including 
“information describing recent moves to a new city, graduations, births, 
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create a profile that provides inferential information regarding other key 
aspects, such as household income. In short, it is possible to create much 
more detailed “data doubles” (Ericson and Haggerty 2000) of end users in a 
centralized ecosystem than in a decentralized one.
Furthermore, the data obtained from users can be distributed more widely 
in a centralized ecosystem. Users are therefore much more likely to experience 
what Trottier (2011) with reference to Facebook described as the “leaking” of  
information from one context to another. They may, for example, share cer-
tain information assuming that this information is relevant for their friends, 
while not realizing that the same information will be disseminated among 
their family members or colleagues who are present on the same platform. 
With the very design of the platform, providers like Facebook, Inc. are facili-
tating the leakage of information, as will be argued below with reference to 
the examples of the Facebook Beacon and Facebook Timeline.
Finally, in a centralized ecosystem the end users have fewer options to react 
to unwanted behavior of the platform provider. While they might still be able 
to voice concerns, their options to exit the relationship to the platform are 
reduced. Therefore, it is less likely that end users will have leverage to keep 
the platform provider from introducing problematic practices such as sur-
veillance practices. As authors like Srinivasan (2019) have argued, users on 
Facebook are unable to react to breaches of their privacy due to Facebook’s 
monopoly status.
To summarize, factors that are conducive for centralization in markets 
for social media are also conducive for transparency and surveillance of end 
users on social media platforms. Therefore, it is important to understand the 
working of such factors. While many different factors may be furthering the 
concentration of markets, one set of factors that is of particular relevance 
(and specifically in markets for social media) is economies of scale. Economies 
of scale may exist both on the supply and the demand side.
On the supply side, economies of scale exist when the average costs of pro-
duction decrease as outputs increase. Typical examples can often be found 
in markets for infrastructure. In the case of railways, for example, offering a 
customer the service in question (transportation by train) incurs almost the 
same cost in the case of one customer as compared to the case of a thou-
sand customers. There are high fixed costs for the construction of the railway 
system and relatively low variable costs, such as personnel costs, for its oper-
ation. In other words, once the infrastructure is in place, the costs per cus-
tomer fall rapidly so that a large provider can operate more cost- efficiently 
than a small provider.
The same logic applies to a different degree to social media. Offering the 
communication services of a social media platform to a single customer is 
almost as expensive as offering the same service to a thousand customers. 
In both cases, the key component of the platform, its software, has to be 




and small numbers of users. These include costs of research and develop-
ment, which in the case of Facebook, Inc. amounted to over 10 billion dollars 
in 2018. Additionally, there are relatively low variable costs to bear, such as 
costs for the operation of the hardware of the platform.3
As a result, providers that can rely on a large customer base have a cost 
advantage and can offer their services at lower prices than providers with 
a small customer base. Therefore, once a provider has established a large 
customer base, it is unlikely that a newly entering provider with an initially 
small customer base can compete. The respective market therefore tends to a 
monopoly.
While economies of scale on the supply side promote centralization in the 
context of social media, centralization is further strengthened by economies of 
scale on the demand side. Varian, Farrell, and Shapiro (2004, 33) use the term 
“demand side economies of scale” interchangeably with the more widespread 
term “network effects.” The terms refer to a situation in which the marginal 
utility of a product increases with the number of its users. In such a situation, 
the service in question provides only minimal utility for an individual user, 
but a larger group of users increases the utility for each user. Good examples 
are again the classic and the new markets for infrastructure. Writing about 
the infrastructure for telephony, for example, Theodore Vail, the President of 
AT&T, noted in the company’s 1908 annual report to shareholders:
A telephone— without a connection at the other end of the line— is not 
even a toy or a scientific instrument. It is one of the most useless things 
in the world. Its value depends on the connection with the other tele-
phone— and increases with the number of connections.
(AT&T 1908)
This is also the case with social media platforms. If  the platform were used 
by only one individual, it would be absolutely useless. If, however, the number 
of users increases, the utility of the platform for each user also increases.
Fortunately, today’s telephone customers can contact any other telephone 
customer regardless of which specific telecommunications provider they use. 
This is not the case for social media users. A Facebook customer, for instance, 
is not able to contact a customer on another platform, such as Diaspora. In 
this situation, customers have strong incentives to select the provider catering 
to the larger number of end users. Therefore, once a provider has established 
a large user base it is likely to dominate the market.
This may even lead to a lock- in situation (Varian, Farrell, and Shapiro 
2004, 21). In such a case, even if  a majority of users would prefer to switch 
providers, they are unable to do so collectively and therefore remain. In this 
case, users are de facto missing one of the fundamental options for reacting 
to a decrease in service quality, namely the option to exit the relationship with 
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Facebook is one example of such a lock- in. Srinivasan considers Facebook’s 
extensive use of user data as a decrease in the quality of Facebook’s service, 
yet end users are unable to react against it by exiting, due to Facebook’s mon-
opoly position.
To summarize, economies of  scale contribute to the competitive 
advantages of  large platforms and therefore allow providers like Facebook, 
Inc. to acquire a dominant position in the market for social media. This 
results in a situation in which the communicative processes of  large parts of 
society are concentrated on individual platforms. In this situation a single 
platform provider has the ability to oversee a large variety of  interactions 
of  users and to expose users to a large variety of  settings. Furthermore, it 
limits the users’ ability to react to that oversight and exposure. While there-
fore the tendency for concentration in markets of  social media explains 
why platform providers acquire a position that is particularly suited for 
surveillance of  end users, it does not explain why the providers are actu-
ally interested in using this position. In order to understand the providers’ 
interests, it is necessary to consider their best options for beneficial eco-
nomic exchanges with their counterparts. Here it is necessary to consider 
that, in contrast to more traditional companies, platform providers do not 
have only one key market in which they are active but rather face so- called 
multisided markets.
A multisided market strategy and its implications for mass 
surveillance
By definition platform providers3 mediate between different groups of market 
participants (Evans and Schmalensee 2016). The main function of a platform 
is to enable interaction among these groups. In order to understand not only 
how a provider of a specific platform is generating revenue but also whether 
and how the provider relies on transparency and surveillance to do so, it is 
necessary to look at how the different groups of actors are being integrated 
and how externalities among them are managed.
Which groups of actors are integrated into a platform and in what way 
depends mainly on the strategy chosen by the individual platform provider. 
According to the definition of social media, end users always take part in the 
interactions on a platform. However, depending on the particular strategy 
applied by the provider in question and the resulting design of the platform, 
additional groups often also take part. In the case of Facebook, for example, 
there are arguably three main groups of actors, which are the end users, third- 
party developers, and advertising clients. The following will describe the strat-
egies that Facebook applies toward the three main groups of actors on its 
platform, in order to elaborate the nature of its business model, which seems 
to have become the dominant model for providers of platforms not only but 




Strategy toward end users
It is a constitutive aspect of social media that end users are able not only to 
consume but also to produce content. Therefore, end users take two different 
roles on social media platforms: on the one hand, they create a supply of data, 
and on the other hand, they also create a demand for that data. Platform 
providers like Facebook, Inc. enable supply and demand to meet. In this 
constellation the providers (and also the end users) benefit from such net-
work effects. Among the end users, these network effects are bilateral.4 The 
more supply- generating end users the platform has, the more relevant it is for 
demand- generating end users; and the more demand- generating end users a 
platform has, the more supply- generating end users it will attract. As argued 
above, these network effects enable rapid growth of platforms.
For this reason, platform providers try to strengthen the network effects 
with both their pricing as well as the design of their platform. With their pri-
cing, providers often lower the barriers to entry of end users by setting prices 
extremely low— often at zero. In this way the providers try to ensure that they 
succeed in the competition for end users, which— due to the network effects— 
has a winner- takes- all characteristic. On the other hand, this means that no 
revenue is provided from the end users directly and that the revenue necessary 
to sustain the platform has to be derived from other groups of actors. As will 
be discussed below, in the case of Facebook, these are mainly the advertising 
clients.
Regarding the platform design, the platform providers have to ensure that 
it serves the function of matching demand and supply for data as effectively 
as possible, since only then can network effects reach their maximum inten-
sity. In the case of social media, this may already have implications for the 
transparency of end users, as it encourages users to seek information about 
others, even if  this imposes costs on those users who experience a breach of 
their privacy. Indeed, it seems that some platform providers, in their goal to 
maximize interaction among end users on the platform, have come to the 
conclusion that a “forced matching”— a matching that lies beyond the supply/ 
demand of information that would occur if  end users had full control— may 
result in more interaction. Such a forced matching implies either extracting 
more data from existing end users (in their role as suppliers) than intended 
by them, or forcing more data on end users (in their role as customers) than 
actively demanded by them, or both.
Looking at the case of Facebook, Inc. there are several major design 
decisions that seem to be a result of both strategies. Arguably the most 
striking examples are the introduction of Facebook’s News Feed and 
Facebook Beacon. Facebook’s Newsfeed was introduced in 2006. According 
to Wikipedia, News Feed is “the primary system through which users are 
exposed to content posted on the network” (Wikipedia 2019). With the intro-
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of end users from the specific context it was placed in (their profile page) and 
placed in a much wider context (the News Feed) of— at least potentially— the 
landing page shown to each of the contacts of the end user. Unsurprisingly, 
at least when considering Nissenbaum’s contextual understanding of privacy 
mentioned above, many users saw the introduction of the News Feed as a vio-
lation of their privacy (Zuckerberg 2006a; Bunz 2006). These users were com-
fortable with sharing information on their profile page; however, they were 
uncomfortable with the broadcasting of this information over the landing 
pages of their contacts. Only after massive protests by users did Facebook 
introduce options for users to better control the flow of their personal infor-
mation to the News Feed (Zuckerberg 2006b). However, it did not make the 
News Feed an optional feature.
Facebook Beacon, introduced in 2007, allowed participating third parties 
to send information about Facebook users’ activities on their websites to 
Facebook. Online shops, for example, were sending data about the purchases 
of users to the platform. This data was then placed on the News Feed. In the 
case of Beacon, users were given little option to control the flow of personal 
information. The option to opt- out of the service was made available only 
after user protests, and it prevented only the publishing of the data, not its 
collection (Zuckerberg 2007). Several protests and a class- action lawsuit were 
initiated as a response by users. In the course of the lawsuit Beacon was finally 
terminated (Perez 2009).
As these two examples show, the platform providers’ aim of maximizing 
interaction among users in the case of Facebook already implies a furthering 
of transparency and surveillance of users. In order to gain a more complete 
understanding of the providers’ interests it is necessary to also consider the 
providers’ strategy toward the other groups of actors integrated into the plat-
form, among them the developers of third- party apps and the advertising 
clients.
Strategy toward developers
The developers can be considered as another side in the multisided market that 
providers like Facebook cater to. In the case of Facebook, developers turn to 
the platform in order to find consumers for their games and applications. For 
users, in turn, the games and applications are products to consume. Facebook 
enables the exchange between the two groups and, by doing so, again benefits 
from bilateral network effects. The more demand by end users, the more 
attractive the platform is for developers; conversely, the more applications 
offered by developers, the more attractive the platform is for users. In this 
case, too, the company is interested in strengthening the network effects and 
acts accordingly.
How this goal is followed with a particular strategy for the pricing 







of Facebook, since during the Cambridge Analytica scandal that shook 
the company a large number of  documents were published showing how 
the company developed, exercised, and refined its strategy toward third- 
party developers. Revealing in this context is the correspondence between 
Facebook’s founder and CEO Mark Zuckerberg and other executives of  the 
company, in which the basic principles for the interaction with developers 
were discussed on the occasion of  a new release of  Facebook’s API (named 
“Platform”). As becomes clear in this correspondence, it was decided to 
keep the price for the developers’ engagement as low as possible in order to 
guarantee their presence on the platform. At the same time, ensuring access 
to data collected by the developers was defined as an overarching principle. 
This principle has been described with the term “data reciprocity.” Mark 
Zuckerberg explains:
After thinking about platform business model for a long time, I wanted 
to send out a note explaining where I’m leaning on this. […] The quick 
summary is that I think we should go with full reciprocity and access to 
app friends for no charge. Full reciprocity means that apps are required 
to give any user who connects to FS a prominent option to share all of 
their social content within that service […] back to Facebook.
(Zuckerberg 2012)
He explains further:
[T] he very first question I developed an opinion on was what we should 
be optimizing for. There’s a clear tension between platform ubiquity and 
charging, so it’s important to first fully explore what we’re trying to get 
out of platform. The answer I came to is that we’re trying to enable people 
to share everything they want, and to do it on Facebook. Sometimes the 
best way to enable people to share something is to have a developer build 
a special purpose app or network for that type of content and to make 
that app social by having Facebook plug into it. However, that may be 
good for the world but it’s not good for us unless people also share back 
to Facebook and that content increases the value of our network. So 
ultimately, I think the purpose of platform— even the read side— is to 
increase sharing back into Facebook.
(Zuckerberg 2012)
What becomes clear here is that from the perspective of the provider Facebook, 
Inc., interaction with developers has a primarily instrumental purpose. The 
developers are intended to contribute to the transparency and surveillance of 
end users. In order to ensure this, the provider minimizes barriers to the par-
ticipation of the developers while obligating them to assist via their apps in 
the collection of data on the platform.
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How significant the collection of data from third- party developers is 
becomes particularly clear when considering the case of Cambridge Analytica. 
In this case, an app (named “thisisyourdigitallife”), developed by a third party, 
namely Global Science Research, was used to gather the personal informa-
tion of around 50 million Facebook users. The data was then acquired by the 
company Cambridge Analytica in order to use it for manipulating end users 
during several US elections, including the presidential election of 2016. The 
case was widely perceived as the greatest surveillance scandal in the history 
of Facebook.
Strategy toward advertising clients
A third set of relevant actors that needs to be considered in order to under-
stand the platform providers’ interest in transparency and surveillance, in this 
case consists of those individuals and organizations that use the platform for 
the purpose of advertising. The advertising clients can be understood as resem-
bling another demand side in the multisided market that Facebook decided 
to cater to. On the opposite side are the end users whose attention is supplied 
to the advertising clients. The network effects here, however, are unilateral. 
An increase in the number of users leads to an increase in the value of the 
platform for advertisers. Conversely, an increase in the number of advertisers 
does not (or at least only in a very small fraction of cases) lead to an increase 
in the value of the platform for users. In such a situation, the option preferred 
by the platform provider is usually not (as in the case of the end users or the 
developers) to lower the barriers of entry to the platform as far as possible. In 
contrast, the preferred option is to restrict and price this access. Facebook’s 
annual reports state that in the year 2020, more than 98% of the revenue of 
Facebook was derived neither from end users nor developers but from adver-
tising clients (Facebook 2020). As this number shows, Facebook is following 
a subsidizing strategy according to which profits are generated on the part 
of advertising clients to finance the participation on the part of end users 
and developers. This strategy allows Facebook to strengthen desired network 
effects regarding end users and developers while at the same time ensuring 
revenue from the advertising clients, thus ensuring successful competition and 
ultimately profit maximization.
However, this strategy also comes with obligations regarding the platform’s 
design. The platform must be designed in such a way that it provides a particu-
larly useful service for the only customers directly financing the platform— 
the advertisers. At this point, it is important to emphasize that the service 
that advertisers are purchasing is the modification of the end users’ behavior, 
which rests on the surveillance of these end users and their contacts (Zuboff 
2019, 68). Most of the demand for this service derives from companies that 
want to ensure that end users purchase certain products or services that they 




cases is far ranging, from a decision about the brand of one’s next winter coat, 
for example, to a decision regarding a future place of residence or the choice 
of one’s next employer. However, the spectrum of affected suser decisions 
ranges even further since it is not only actors with economic interests that 
are demanding the service. Religious groups, political movements, political 
parties, NGOs, and government authorities may also have an interest in 
influencing a platform’s end users. Decisions that can be affected thus also 
include, for example, the users’ religious and political orientation. The adver-
tising systems of Facebook are open to a wide range of clients and mainly 
leave it to the clients to decide the content used for the advertising.
In any case the effectiveness of the advertising is furthered by relying on the 
gathering of large amounts of data. First, the data is used to allow clients to 
select those end users whose behavior they deem particularly easy or particu-
larly useful to manipulate. For a client advertising for yoga courses it may be 
important to address users who are interested in yoga. For a political party it 
may be particularly relevant to address users who are “swing voters,” or who 
live in “swing states.” Second, the information on end users allows the clients 
to address the users in particularly effective ways. A user may, for example, be 
informed that a contact is interested in a yoga course or particular political 
content. Thus, the users’ trust in their contacts and their contacts’ decisions 
is utilized for the advertising. Importantly, the information gathered on end 
users allows clients to evaluate whether a particular marketing campaign was 
successful or not. The client may learn which advertising was most successful 
by considering the percentage of users that reacted to their content by 
following external links, for example. Thus, the advertising clients may learn 
and find the optimal approach for running an advertising campaign. As this 
shows, the effectiveness of advertisement rests to a high degree on the surveil-
lance of end users. Only if  the provider, in this case Facebook, has extensive 
information about the end users can it target those end users whose manipu-
lation is profitable. Only extensive information about these end users allows 
effective modification of their behavior, and only continuous monitoring 
allows the advertising clients to learn from their attempts.
To summarize, Facebook’s goals of maximizing the participation of end 
users, third- party developers, and advertising clients leads it to promote the 
transparency of its end users. What bears mentioning is that this transpar-
ency of end users stands in stark contrast to the level of transparency of 
the platform provider itself. One telling example also in this context is again 
Facebook’s internal communication (Facebook 2013). Among this commu-
nication is an email from February 2015 in which Michael LeBeau, then a 
product manager at Facebook, informed his colleagues about plans to use the 
Facebook app for gathering data on users’ call history— another important 
step toward increased end user transparency and surveillance. In order to 
enable the gathering of data, the permissions for the app needed to be changed, 
which was expected to trigger the Android operating system to start a dialog 
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with the users and to inform them about new far- reaching authorizations. 
Knowing that users would likely object to this step toward more transparency 
and surveillance of themselves, and knowing that the change would therefore 
be “a pretty high- risk thing to do from a PR perspective” (LeBeau 2015), 
Facebook’s managers searched for a solution. What they finally proposed was 
a procedure that “would allow [them] to upgrade users without subjecting 
them to an Android permissions dialog at all” (Kwon 2015). Thus, as the 
internal communication shows, the goal of the platform provider here was 
not to find alternatives to the newly introduced surveillance practice but to 
simply leave users unaware of it.
As the example shows, the relation between end users and the platform 
provider Facebook can be described as highly asymmetrical. Facebook has 
acquired a favorable position in a highly centralized market, and it uses this 
position to further surveillance and behavioral modification while it also uses 
the position to shield itself  from critical views.
Conclusion: (asymmetric) transparency and 
surveillance on social media platforms
In academic as well as in public discourse, transparency is usually described 
as a positive feature. In the context of surveillance, however, it proves to be of 
ambivalent character. As has been argued in this chapter, transparency can be 
considered a precondition of surveillance. Surveillance, in turn, is a problem-
atic practice insofar as it implies power imbalances. Such imbalances become 
visible in single incidents of surveillance in which a surveillant is always able 
to exercise control over a surveilled other. Furthermore, imbalances are visible 
also at the macro level, as the means of surveillance are not evenly distributed 
in society but rather concentrated with specific actors. As authors like Trottier 
(2011, 2012), Fuchs (2012, 2014), and Zuboff (2015, 2019) have pointed out, 
in the last decades the means for surveillance have become accumulated par-
ticularly by specific economic actors, among which social media platforms 
play a central role.
In order to understand the reasons for the providers’ engagement in sur-
veillance, it is necessary to identify the economic factors affecting these cor-
porate actors’ interests. Among these, two specific factors are particularly 
important. Firstly, economies of scale cause the markets for social media to 
take a centralized form and promote a situation in which individual providers 
have the possibility to surveil a large number of end users. Secondly, the fact 
that the providers utilize this possibility is due to the nature of the multisided 
markets in which the providers operate. Many providers offer communica-
tion services for end users, while their revenue is generated by customers 
paying for influence over these end users. In order to explain the intensified 
surveillance taking place on social media platforms, it is important to under-






factors relevant to explaining transparency and surveillance on social media 
platforms like Facebook.
In order to gain a more complete picture of  the political economy of 
social media surveillance it is imperative for future research to consider 
additional aspects of  the platform economy. These should include add-
itional factors conducive to platform surveillance, such as mergers and 
acquisitions among platform providers, which further the centraliza-
tion of  markets and possibilities for platform surveillance. Such research 
should also include, however, factors that work against platform surveil-
lance (which were not the focus of  this chapter), such as the practice of 
multihoming, which reduces centralization of  markets and possibilities for 
platform surveillance.
Notes
 1 The nontabloid newspaper with the largest circulation in Germany.
 2 See, for example, the ruling of the German Supreme Court of December 15, 1983, 
in which it acknowledged the so- called “right to informational self- determination” 
as one of the constitutional rights.
 3 This chapter differentiates between the platform provider (an organization, usu-
ally a corporation as in the case of Facebook, Inc.) and the platform— a technical 
artifact.
 4 In this chapter, the end users are divided conceptually into two groups, and the net-
work effects are therefore categorized as indirect (between groups of actors) and 
bilateral. If, in contrast, the end users were considered as one homogenous group, 
the network effects would have to be categorized as direct (among one group of 
actors).
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An odd couple or a perfect pair?
Fredrika Björklund
Introduction
Fifteen years ago, David Lyon predicted that the introduction of pervasive 
surveillance would destroy trust between individuals and trust between citi-
zens and governments (Lyon 2003). Indeed, at first glimpse trust and sur-
veillance appear to be an odd couple. The surveillance relationship between 
government (public institutions) and citizens is asymmetrical and built on a 
basis of distrust. In general terms, a society completely based on trust should 
have no need for surveillance, while a society based on distrust should more 
readily perform and justify logics of surveillance such as control, monitoring, 
and verification.
However, recent empirical studies based on social surveys tell a different 
story and register a positive correspondence between trust in public 
institutions and acceptance of surveillance (Friedewald et al. 2015; Pavone, 
Degli- Esposti, and Santiago 2015). In these studies, high levels of trust predict 
positive attitudes to surveillance. Thus, trustful citizens allow state authorities 
to monitor them; or, formulated in a more pejorative way, citizens give legit-
imacy to (trust) governments, which in turn distrust their citizens. How can 
we make sense of this counterintuitive finding? This chapter asks how these 
results from social surveys should be theorized and understood in relation to 
more dystopic forecasts about the effects of surveillance on trust.
Without doubt, “[t] rust is a primary constituent of the relational dynamic 
of most surveillance systems” (Ellis, Harper, and Tucker 2013, 1). Still, 
interest in the relationship between trust and surveillance has been low 
as compared to the interest in how surveillance impinges on other social 
goods. Normally, the fundamental opposition in the surveillance context is 
situated as the individual right to privacy versus surveillance (Goold 2009, 
207). Although scholarship has recognized that privacy also has public value 
and can be considered a constitutive public good that is a basic ingredient 
of a democratic system (Bennett 2011, 486; Raab 2012), public framing of 
privacy as the main problem with intrusive surveillance policies continues to 










into an individualization of the risks associated with surveillance. Obviously, 
individual security and privacy must be protected, and surveillance must be 
performed in ways that are consistent with citizens’ personal integrity. But this 
is too narrow a perspective on the problems with surveillance. I argue that we 
need to focus more on the impact of surveillance on societal values and soci-
etal well- being, and thinking about trust is a productive way to do this. Trust 
is recognized as a collective asset essential for “the most basic cooperation 
in our economic, political, and social relationships” (Freitag and Bühlmann 
2009, 1538). Trust enables and makes meaningful citizen contribution and 
participation in social and political activities. But, if  trust flourishes also in 
the presence of surveillance, as suggested by social survey research, what is 
the problem? Notwithstanding the importance of the issue, the findings from 
social surveys concerning trust and surveillance are not sufficiently theorized. 
We don’t know how this seemingly contradictory positive correlation between 
trust and acceptance of surveillance comes about.
This article aims at mapping some issues that must be carefully probed in 
order to theorize convincingly the relationship between trust and surveillance. 
It suggests a reasonable way to construe the relationships found in empirical 
research by focusing on our understandings of trust. Three main issues will be 
addressed: first, what is the nature of the causal connection between trust and 
surveillance; what is expected to explain what and under which conditions? 
The fact that there is an association between trust and affirmative attitudes 
to surveillance does not automatically mean that trust explains surveillance 
attitudes— although studies based on social surveys often more or less take 
for granted that trust should be considered the independent variable (Patil 
et al. 2014; Svenonius and Björklund 2018; Friedewald et al. 2016). But, in 
theory, surveillance may also produce trust— if, for example, citizens feel safer 
knowing that an area is monitored this might increase the inclination to trust. 
The chicken and egg problem of temporality needs to be addressed in a theor-
etically informed way. Certainly, in this context it is also important to discrim-
inate between different kinds of surveillance— I attend to this issue below.
Second, we need to make sense of the positive association found between 
trust and acceptance of surveillance. In order to do this, the very origins of 
trust need to be explored. What does it mean to trust, and how should the 
emergence of trust be explained? Trust is a highly disputed academic con-
cept, and different conceptualizations of trust must be addressed since this 
affects the way we construe the trust– surveillance nexus. The crucial issue 
here is whether we consider trust as an outcome of institutional performance 
or whether we see it as determined by sociocultural factors.
Third, the chapter ends by problematizing the idea of trust as practiced 
in contemporary societies. A deeper understanding of modern surveillance 
practices implies that we need to consider how the meaning of trust might 
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The relationship between trust and surveillance
Does trust really predict particular attitudes to surveillance, as 
demonstrated in social surveys, or does extensive surveillance under-
mine trust, as suggested by David Lyon? There is a plenitude of  studies 
engaged in the ways in which trust predicts issues such as the presence of 
corruption (Richey 2010; Bjørnskov and Tinggaard Svendsen 2013; Graeff  
and Tinggaard Svendsen 2013), the size of  the welfare state (Rothstein 
2010; Bjørnskov and Tinggaard Svendsen 2013), democratic success 
(Inglehart 1990; Jamal and Nooruddin 2010), as well as the relationship 
between different kinds of  trust (Mishler and Rose 2001; Rothstein and 
Stolle 2008; Sønderskov and Thisted Dinesen 2016). These studies relate 
trust— regularly understood to be a good quality— to social conditions 
and phenomena that we normally consider desirable. Surveillance, in con-
trast, is hardly regarded as inherently good, at best rather as a necessary 
evil that serves functional purposes such as the reduction of  crime levels. 
Therefore, we should expect the relationship between trust and surveillance 
to be more complex. Surveillance ought to have the potential to ruin trust 
given its often highly intrusive measures.
Still, trust in public institutions and governments is, in several quantitative 
survey studies, found to be associated with an affirmative attitude toward sur-
veillance. The PRISMS (Friedewald et al. 2015, 2016), the SurPRISE (Pavone, 
Degli- Esposti, and Santiago 2015), and the PACT (Patil et al. 2014) surveys 
covering citizens in European states report these findings. The PRISMS pro-
ject, whose main focus was on privacy and security but also covered trust, 
uses a number of items to measure attitudes to different kinds of surveillance, 
from foreign state surveillance to police surveys of football matches. Trust 
in institutions is measured as a composite variable consisting of five items, 
among them trust in government. The study concludes that among European 
citizens “trust in institutions has a strong and significant effect on the accept-
ability of the described surveillance practices” (Friedewald et al. 2015, 76). 
The SurPRISE project focuses on trust in security agencies specifically 
and finds that trust in these institutions affects acceptance of surveillance- 
oriented security technologies (SOSTs) positively (Pavone, Degli- Esposti, and 
Santiago 2015, 135). The PACT project, also covering citizens in European 
states, uses trust in government as one component (besides confidence in the 
voting system, the role of technology, and attitudes to business) in an index 
variable labeled as “general trust” and finds that this is associated with posi-
tive attitudes to surveillance (Patil et al. 2014). In addition to institutional 
trust, social trust— that is, trust in other people— also has been shown to have 
a positive, although weaker, correlation with positive attitudes to surveillance 
(Friedewald et al. 2015). But, as Friedewald et al. (2015, 93– 94) note, social 
trust is a predictor of institutional trust, and although it has a weak inde-








people trust in public institutions (and in each other) the more content they 
are with surveillance.
The abovementioned studies focus mainly on open surveillance and not on 
secret surveillance. But there is some evidence that the findings on association 
between institutional trust and surveillance hold also for the latter. In studying 
three postcommunist societies, Poland, Estonia, and Serbia, Svenonius and 
Björklund (2018) find that trust in institutions (measured as trust in the 
police, the intelligence agency, the courts, the tax agency, and in government) 
predicts acceptance of secret surveillance. Surveillance in the aftermath of 
terrorist attacks has aroused similar academic interest. In a survey on support 
for surveillance and security legislation in Canada and the United States after 
9/ 11, Nakhaie and de Lint find that trust in the government, trust in airport 
officials, and low tolerance of minorities are key predictors. They argue that 
these factors, and in particular trust in government, tend to drive people “to 
cede civil liberties for security and surveillance” (Nakhaie and de Lint 2013, 
160). Denemark (2012) notes a difference between countries when it comes 
to acceptance of counterterrorism surveillance policies. In countries with a 
legacy of a controlling state (in this case Russia and Taiwan), trust deficits 
work as a constraint against support for extending police surveillance, while 
in traditional liberal democracies, trust in government seems to be irrelevant 
to surveillance attitudes. The evaluation of institutional past performance is 
a better explanation in these cases. Since recognition of performance is fre-
quently regarded as a condition for institutional trust, Denemark’s findings 
are not immediately comparable with other studies. But his study points to 
democratic traditions as an underlying factor that might explain how trust 
interacts with surveillance attitudes. Steinfeld, also engaged in the issue of 
counterterrorism, finds that political (institutional) trust, among other 
factors, plays into opinions on surveillance. She argues that, when confronted 
with terrorism, citizens show “a tendency to just trust authorities and sur-
veillance systems” (Steinfeld 2017, 1671). In addition, Steinfeld distinguishes 
between private sector surveillance and state surveillance and finds that they 
are predicted in different ways.
The studies discussed above all have in common that they attend to trust 
as the explanatory factor accounting for surveillance attitudes. However, 
Pavone, Degli- Esposti, and Santiago (2015, 142) point out that the opposite 
may also be true, namely, that the use of more acceptable technologies might 
increase trust in security agencies. This remark leads us on to studies with 
a different approach to trust and surveillance, i.e. studies that highlight the 
(negative) effects of surveillance.
In addition to social surveys, there are several qualitatively oriented case 
studies, representing various disciplines, that address the relationship between 
trust and surveillance. Frequently, these studies concern the consequences 
that surveillance has or may have on trust and other social or individual 
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Data Retention Directive and forecasted, among other things, a loss in citi-
zens’ trust as a consequence of this regulation. In another study, Ali (2016) 
explores police monitoring of Muslim students and community organizations 
in New York City following 9/ 11. He finds that monitoring resulted in 
decreasing intercommunity trust as well as a decreasing sense of solidarity 
within the Muslim group (but also self- censoring and a culture of fear). Alam 
and Husband (2013) draw similar conclusions in a study of British counter-
terrorism policies toward Muslim communities. The securitization of urban 
life, including surveillance, that affects these communities not only resulted 
in a breakdown of trust toward state agencies but also caused declining 
trust between community members. In a similar vein, Duck (2017) notes 
that constant surveillance activities toward residents in black neighborhoods 
may corrode trust between residents and law enforcement agencies. Craven, 
Monahan, and Regan (2015) highlight the complex relationship between 
state surveillance and public trust with an empirical study of Department of 
Homeland Security Fusion Centers (with the objective of enabling different 
agencies to share resources and information relevant for counterterrorism 
activities). Sorell (2011) contrasts intrusive surveillance techniques, among 
them secret bugging, wiretapping, email, and covert camera surveillance of 
suspects in public places, against the value of building trustful relations with 
the community for combating terrorist crimes. But we see similar effects also 
in welfare institutions. Perry- Hazan and Birnhack (2018, 60), for example, 
investigate the increasingly widespread use of CCTV in schools and draw 
the conclusion that surveillance changes the nature of school activities by 
diverting “the educational realm to the semi- legal realm” and by signaling to 
children that they cannot be trusted. Szrubka (2013) studies the effect of sur-
veillance on the Polish healthcare system, such as cameras in ambulances, and 
finds that this kind of surveillance has the potential to alter the meaning of 
trust. Thus, from the abovementioned case studies, we learn that surveillance 
may produce distrust.
In sum, empirical studies point in different directions and draw conflicting 
conclusions. Quantitative survey studies tend to see trust as the cause of more 
positive surveillance attitudes, while the qualitative cases studies referred to 
above see surveillance as a practice that has a harmful impact on trust. How 
can we make sense of this contradiction in findings? Rather than reducing the 
explanation to a problem of methodological differences, I instead suggest that 
the incompatibility of findings might be best explained by considering the 
different types of trust addressed.
While survey studies focus on institutional trust and so- called generalized 
social trust— the abstract trust in “all others”— the case studies often con-
cern social trust on a more relational level between people living in a commu-
nity, and trust as it is enacted in direct contact with a particular institution, 
such as the police. The latter is commonly called particular social trust— in 









features of  different types of  trust, as well as on how institutional and social 
forms of  trust relate to each other. Are they totally different constructs, 
or should they be regarded as interrelated? In order to further discuss this 
issue, we need to investigate how trust emerges. In the literature, we find 
two disciplinary orientations, the institutionalist perspective and the socio-
cultural perspective, that represent different beliefs on the origins of  trust. 
The relationship between institutional and social trust, I propose, is at the 
very heart of  the academic debate on the relationship between trust and 
surveillance.
The emergence of trust
Some scholars distinguish between three kinds of trust: trust in institutions 
(political trust), generalized social trust, and particular social trust (Newton 
and Zmerli 2011). Institutional trust refers to people’s confidence in public 
institutions of various kinds, including trust in governments and polit-
ical entities. In social surveys, institutional trust often refers to a composite 
variable bringing together several survey items regarding trust in specific 
institutions. The definition of institutional trust may vary from study to study, 
but trust in government, trust in the police, trust in intelligence agencies, 
trust in tax agencies, and trust in courts are common items used that, when 
combined, are regarded as a representation of institutional trust (Svenonius 
and Björklund 2018).
Social trust, in contrast, refers to trust in fellow human beings, and 
generalized social trust concerns whether people trust the anonymous 
other. It is a mental model of the trustworthiness of people you don’t know 
(Rothstein and Eek 2009, 83). Typically, generalized trust is measured by the 
survey question, “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be 
trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” (Nannestad 
2008; Björklund 2019). These two kinds of trust— institutional trust and 
generalized social trust— are often, in difference to particular trust, ascribed 
the role of important building blocks for a good democratic society (Newton 
and Zmerli 2011).
Particular social trust refers to trust in close relationships such as within the 
family, among neighbors, and in social networks or communities. There is a 
growing academic interest in this kind of trust, although until recently it did 
not appear in social surveys. Two issues dominate studies on particular trust. 
First, is it related to the more abstract generalized social trust and, if  so, in 
what ways (Freitag and Traunmüller 2009; Newton and Zmerli 2011; Welzel 
and Delhey 2015; Cao et al. 2015)? Second, may trust in close relations substi-
tute for generalized social trust and institutional trust in societies where these 
kinds of trust score low— and thus have political significance in its own right 
(Gibson 2001; Khodyakov 2007; Ford 2017)? The discussion below ties into 
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Scholars find that trust in institutions and trust in other people (gen-
eral social trust) often covary in people’s attitudes (Rothstein and Stolle 
2008; Sønderskov and Thisted Dinesen 2016). This seems also to be the 
case concerning trust and attitudes to surveillance (Friedewald et al. 2015; 
Svenonius and Björklund 2018). Still, the core question is whether institu-
tional trust should be understood as the ultimate origin in the explanatory 
chain or whether social trust is the building block on which institutional trust 
rests. As we shall see, this is important for correctly understanding the associ-
ation between trust and surveillance.
Theories on how trust emerges concern, to a large extent, the association 
between different kinds of trust. Roughly speaking, the literature provides 
two approaches with different takes on the relationship between institutional 
trust, generalized social trust, and particular social trust: the institutionalist 
perspective (Rothstein 2004, 2005) and the sociocultural orientation, or social 
capital theory (Sztompka 1999, 2005; Putnam 1993; Inglehart 1990). Simply 
put, the difference between these two schools of thought may be described as 
different ways of understanding the order in which the types of trust occur. 
While institutionalist theorists set trust in institutions as the origin of social 
trust, sociocultural theorists see social trust (Lühiste 2006, 478; Mishler and 
Rose 2001), and especially particular social trust, as the root of all other kinds 
of trust. Institutionalists care less about particular trust.
Institutionalist scholars argue that “social trust comes from above and is 
destroyed from above” (Rothstein 2005, 199). The root to trust in a society 
is a well- performing and noncorrupt public administration (Freitag and 
Bühlmann 2009). Good quality of public institutions is a fundamental con-
dition that allows trust in these institutions as well as general social trust to 
develop (Rothstein and Stolle 2008; Rothstein and Eek 2009). Trust relies 
on the condition that institutions are fair, efficient, and ruled by law. If  
this is the case, people will learn that, in relation to these institutions, and 
in meeting representatives of public institutions, the best strategy is to trust 
and to be trustworthy (e.g., refraining from offering bribes). Since institu-
tional officers are human beings, trust in them spills over also to people in 
general (Rothstein 2004; Rothstein and Stolle 2008). Not only will people be 
more likely to act honestly, but they will also expect others to refrain from 
corruption, and thus trust becomes a general quality. If  public institutions do 
not live up to noncorrupt and fair standards, people will be forced to adapt 
to the current practice and also engage in corruption— and will expect others 
to do so as well.
Thus, institutionalist theories of trust lean on the evaluation of perform-
ance. This means that trust comes from rational deliberation on the basis of 
information that we have on the trustee’s previous behavior (Coleman 1994; 
Offe 1999; Gambetta 2000). The level of trust in public institutions rests on 
citizens’ expectations, which are based on previous experiences of good or 







and efficient, trust in this institution will be high. If  the police have done a 
bad job, trust will diminish. Thus, trust is quite vulnerable and changes if  
expectations are not met.
In contrast, according to Luhmann (the foremost theorist among those 
who represent a sociological perspective on trust), trust is a communicative 
means to reduce complexity (Luhmann 1979, 8). It should be separated from 
confidence, which corresponds to systemic trust and comes from socializa-
tion. The latter concerns functional systems such as the economy and politics 
and is not founded on interpersonal relations, but as with trust it works in a 
complexity- reducing way (Luhmann 1979, 102). Luhmann’s seminal work is 
a source of inspiration to sociocultural approaches to trust.
From a sociocultural perspective, in contrast to institutionalist theory, 
trust emerges from below. Sociocultural theory on trust provides an alter-
native view of trust as dependent on societal patterns and attitudes based 
on people’s personal and social history. It accommodates several different 
orientations with partly different focuses, such as normative standards as 
a condition for trust (Uslaner), social capital theory (Putnam), and trust 
understood as routinized behavior (Giddens). But bringing these together is 
the idea that trust has other causes than rationalist deliberation on the per-
formance of the trustee. From Putnam we learn that the root of any kind of 
trust is found in close relationships within a strong civil society and in social 
networks, which lay the foundation for social capital (Putnam 1993). Giddens 
separates trust between people— facework commitments— from trust as 
faceless commitments. The latter concern the way people handle the uncer-
tainty associated with what he calls the abstract incomprehensible systems 
that comprise modern societies. For Giddens (1990, 1991), both kinds of 
trust rely on the continuity of daily life and habitual routines, that is, the 
ability to “bracket ignorance.” Uslaner (2013, 630), who developed the idea 
of trust as a norm, argues that trust is “the belief  that we ought to trust others 
because they are part of our moral community.” Moral dispositions to trust 
are grounded in close relations and in early childhood, where trust is learned 
from families and relatives (Uslaner 2000, 571). This is where essential par-
ticular trust is built. Positive experiences of particular social trust will gain a 
norm- like quality, and this positively affects the confidence in people whom 
you don’t know (general social trust). Norms work as guidelines in our social 
contacts and do not require rationalist deliberations in every situation.
From a sociocultural perspective, trust between people close to you, that 
is, particular trust, is where it all begins. Trustful experiences in families, 
neighborhoods, communities, and networks create a social capital of trustful-
ness and normative structures favorable to more abstract kinds of trust in a 
society. It would be a misunderstanding to think that sociocultural theorists 
are less interested in institutional trust than institutionalists. Rather, they 
argue that trust in public institutions originates not in performance but in 
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emerges out of particular social trust or, formulated from a different con-
ceptual angle, social capital. From trust in close relationships, social trust is 
generalized to wider circles of people and also promotes political trust (trust 
in institutions) (Newton and Zmerli 2011).
A sociocultural perspective also means that trust and distrust are regarded 
as quite stable things, once established. In a society long characterized by 
distrust, it is likely that distrust will persist. Trust and distrust are only 
to a very small extent sensitive to how institutions (or people) perform in 
the short run. This is a crucial difference when comparing this perspective 
to an institutionalist theory focusing on the evaluation of performance. 
Performance- based institutionalist theories imply that there is no relevant 
difference between different societies other than the quality of government 
and institutions. The fact that trust is higher in some states than in others 
results from better functioning state administrations, in which it is appro-
priate to trust. From the sociocultural perspective, in contrast, variations 
in institutional trust should be traced to legacies or structures not directly 
related to institutional performance. These legacies may be theorized in terms 
of social capital, norms, early socialization into trustful dispositions, or 
routinized behavior.
The institutionalist take on trust and surveillance 
attitudes
Since surveys find a stronger association between institutional trust, as 
opposed to social trust, and positive attitudes toward surveillance, it may seem 
reasonable to assume that the institutionalist perspective has explanatory 
leverage. This would mean that people’s attitudes toward surveillance follow 
from their evaluation of institutional performance. An institutional perspec-
tive requires that people have an opinion on the performance of institutions 
(quality of government) in the country in which they live. If  people appreciate 
government, which is most likely in democratic countries, they should also 
be more content with being monitored by the state— or to put it differently, 
they should be less concerned about the risk of governmental abuse when it 
comes to surveillance (Denemark 2012). Thus, the arrow goes from institu-
tional trust to affirmation of surveillance.
However, the relationship between evaluation of institutions, or govern-
ment in general, and trust remains obscure— a problem that is manifested in 
the practice of using a composite variable when operationalizing institutional 
trust in social surveys. There is a cumbersome gap between trust in a number 
of institutions and attitudes to surveillance. Therefore, Watson, Finn, and 
Barnard- Wills (2017) argue that rather than studying institutional trust in gen-
eral, studies ought to focus more on trust in particular surveillance institutions. 
If  we are interested in what performance means for attitudes to surveillance, 




institutions need to be defined for the type of surveillance that respondents 
are asked to relate to. Enumerative definitions are sometimes useful, but they 
are also problematic, since they often have a rather weak theoretical founda-
tion (Schneider 2017). Likewise, it is important to carefully define what kind 
of surveillance respondents are asked to have an opinion about (Steinfeld 
2017). Narrowing the take on institutions— for example, a focus on secret sur-
veillance agencies or the police— as well as specifying the type of surveillance 
in question make it possible to theorize more thoroughly on the direction of 
the causal arrow. In fact, from an institutionalist perspective focusing on per-
formance, it seems reasonable to treat surveillance, and not trust, as the inde-
pendent variable. Surveillance is institutional performance and may go into 
the evaluation of the institution, underpinning or undermining trust.
Still, in order to bring about trust in an institution, knowledge about insti-
tutional performance is needed. Knowledge, in this context, usually comes 
from access to information. Thus, transparency is a fundamental ingredient 
in a performance- based approach to trust, and this is a difficult thing when 
it comes to surveillance policies, which often, by nature, lack transparency. 
Certainly, some surveillance activities are more open than others, and some-
times governments prescribe a certain amount of transparency, for example, 
in requiring signs indicating camera monitoring. Generally, however, surveil-
lance is based on the condition that everything cannot be made transparent. 
In the words of Monahan and Regan (2012), surveillance practices create 
“zones of opacity.”
The importance of transparent institutions has been a focus of both aca-
demic debate and public policies for some time (Kafer 2016). On the one hand, 
transparency is associated with governmental accountability and legitimacy 
(Taylor 2011; Brucato 2015) and discussed as a measure to enhance trust in 
governments and public institutions (Cucciniello and Nasi 2014; Kim and Lee 
2012). On the other hand, Moore (2018) and others relativize the apparent 
objectivity in transparent policies and argue that facts and information are 
not always intelligible without contextual references. Grimmelikhuijsen (2012) 
finds that the effect of transparency on trust in government is small. Since 
trust is a mix between knowledge and feelings, increased knowledge stemming 
from open government may have a very limited effect. More disclosure when 
it comes to police brutality in the United States, for example, did not change 
public attitudes toward the police (Brucato 2015). Mason, Hillenbrand, and 
Money (2014), in a study on attitudes toward the British police, find that 
respondents with more initial trust did not change their opinion regardless of 
whether they were exposed to negative or positive information on police per-
formance. Other conditions, beyond facts, influenced their opinion. In some 
cultural contexts, increased transparency may even have a negative impact 
on trust. Where the power distance between government and citizens is trad-
itionally large, citizens may be sensitive to a disclosure that “construes their 
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In sum, there are three interrelated problems with applying an institutionalist 
perspective to the results of survey studies. First, it can hardly account for the 
idea that institutional trust affects surveillance attitudes unless we circum-
scribe trust to mean trust in particular surveillance institutions. Second, if  we 
do this, we still have the problem that surveillance policies are seldom open to 
scrutiny by the public and, thus, cannot be fully evaluated. Third, the closer 
we get to particular surveillance agencies and particular types of surveillance, 
the harder it becomes to discern the causal direction, making the chicken and 
egg problem intractable without further theorizing.
Thus, this discussion casts doubt on the direction of the causal arrow from 
institutional trust to surveillance attitudes. Since surveillance policies are 
performance, and performance is regarded as the basis of trust, the sensible 
conclusion should be that attitudes to surveillance may also influence trust 
in institutions. Moreover, the institutionalist perspective is particularly prob-
lematic in the surveillance context since surveillance policies and practices, 
to a large extent, are not open for rational deliberation. Trust in the context 
of surveillance policies seems to come from other sources than information 
about institutional performance. This is where sociocultural aspects enter the 
discussion.
A sociocultural perspective on trust and surveillance
Is the relationship between trust and positive attitudes to surveillance easier 
to grasp if  we understand trust in terms of norms rather than performance? 
Norms are less sensitive to facts than what is required for evaluations of 
performance— at least in the short run. Trust toward people or institutions 
is not based on rational consideration but on more unreflected practices— a 
personal or collective code of behavior.
Although there are large variations in levels of trust in public institutions in 
democratic societies, it is still common for a fairly large group of people state 
that they trust institutions at least to some extent. From a sociocultural per-
spective, it should be argued that the reason for this is not primarily that people 
have made an evaluation of the quality of government. Rather people may 
trust authorities simply because they adhere to a societal norm (or routines) to 
trust governmental institutions. People who trust the government in this way 
should be prone to accept policies, such as surveillance, without reflecting so 
much on its implications. Thus, the causal arrow goes from trust in institutions 
to attitudes to surveillance, and a positive association makes sense even in the 
absence of satisfactory performance. Possibly, these trust norms strengthen in 
times of perceived threats from crime and terrorism (Steinfeld 2017). However, 
the problem here is that, if  we take this approach too far, we run the risk of 
underestimating people’s ability to think for themselves and to evaluate the 
pros and cons of surveillance. If we are completely subordinated to social 
norms, debates on surveillance practices will be harder to accomplish.
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The real merit of a sociocultural perspective on trust and surveillance 
is that it can account for movements coming from below that reflect what 
happens in people’s everyday lives. Norms are not easily changed, but from 
a sociocultural perspective trust as a norm originates in experiences that 
we have from people we meet in our daily contacts and personal networks. 
Therefore, a sociocultural perspective accommodates the possibility that sur-
veillance may destroy trust as we know it. If  trust is about socialization and 
comes from experiences in close relations, then negative experiences with, for 
example, the local police may destroy trust from below with long- term effects 
on other types of trust and on norms of trust in a society (Ali 2016; Alam and 
Husband 2013; Duck 2017). Thus, although social survey studies find a posi-
tive relationship between trust and acceptance of surveillance, the more quali-
tative case studies referred to above, indicating a negative association, may 
tell something about what we should expect from the future. The sociocul-
tural perspective opens space for considering how social changes may affect 
the trust– surveillance relationship (see, e.g., Lyon 2018). This perspective also 
promotes a discussion on alternative ways to enact trust.
A short historical retrospective will help to illustrate this argument. Scholars 
with a sociocultural orientation suggest that trust develops in relation to the 
overall organization of social relations in a society (Misztal 1996). Premodern 
agrarian society was characterized by closed and predictable social structures 
at the local level. Small- scale relations dominated, and rules, roles, and social 
control associated with these relations set the agenda for trust— which were 
confined mostly to people with whom one was already familiar. Modern soci-
eties are more complex, and in order to adapt to the anonymous relations 
featured in large markets and welfare states, more general and abstract forms 
of trust were required (Seligman 1997). But is this the last step, or may other 
forms of trust and ways of enacting trust emerge? We need to reflect on the 
fact that social trust levels are dropping in many countries and relate these 
findings to increased surveillance in society (Craven, Monahan, and Regan 
2015). Is it that surveillance destroys trust, or do we witness a transformation 
in the way people relate to each other that mirrors alternative forms of the 
social contract? These questions can be addressed by exploring the relation-
ship between trust and control. With control I here mean the social control 
over individuals within a society that substantiates a social order.
From a sociocultural perspective, social trust is to a certain extent about 
control. Trustworthiness and compliance with norms favoring trust may 
form the basis for social inclusion, while noncompliance might justify exclu-
sion. General social trust can be described as a control- like norm- conformity 
(Offe 1999).
(W)hen actors generalize trust, in the sense that within particular social 
structures the assumption of benevolent agency is no longer tied to 
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generalized trust gains a control- like quality as actors become embedded 
in it.
(Möllering 2005, 292)
Knights et al. (2001, 315) refer to “the production and maintenance of 
‘trust’ as itself  closely related to particular systems of power and control.” 
The control element in social trust is crucial to the understanding of the 
trust– surveillance nexus as it appears in the late modern era of constantly 
expanding surveillance policies.
Normally, we perceive trust as associated with informal social control. But 
increasingly complex societies set the scene for different ways to pursue con-
trol (Giddens 1990). Today, “people do not need to trust one another since 
they can rely upon institutions to rectify problems that arise” (Gibson 2001, 
66). A bit simplified one could say that you don’t need to build trust between 
yourself  and your neighbors since the police will do it for you— which is fre-
quently accomplished with the use of cameras or other surveillance methods. 
The eyes of cameras replace the eyes of people (Fyfe and Bannister 1998). 
Social informal control is replaced by institutional “control at a distance” 
(Monahan 2009). Differently put, citizens trust governments and public 
institutions, such as the police, to distrust (and control) their fellow citizens— 
those who are suspected of not having “pure flour in their bags” (Björklund 
2011). Szrubka (2013) gives a telling illustration of how traditional informal 
social control— trust— may be replaced by control at a distance— i.e. surveil-
lance. In his study on the use of cameras in Polish ambulances, he notes that 
cameras in the cars transform trust between the personnel and the patient. 
The intention behind camera surveillance is to protect the patients against 
theft in a situation where they cannot protect their belongings and to protect 
the personnel from theft accusations. Thus, surveillance of medical author-
ities (at a distance) replaces trust between human beings or, in other words, 
the nature of trust changes. To the satisfaction of all involved, trust is enacted 
as surveillance.
A sociocultural perspective, allowing for changes in the very nature 
of  trust, opens space for new interpretations of  the positive relationship 
between institutional trust and the acceptance of  surveillance. It implies 
that the positive relationship mirrors a new understanding of  trust, one 
that conflates trust with surveillance and thus makes the question of  what 
explains what in trust and surveillance less relevant. Surveillance fills a 
trust deficit, which becomes increasingly significant, thus altering the very 
meaning of  trust.
Conclusion
Now we can revisit the tension outlined in the introduction between survey 








the more dire expectation that surveillance has a destructive effect on trust. 
The discussion above shows that although trust may be related to positive 
attitudes to surveillance, it is hard to comprehend this in terms of institu-
tional performance. From a sociocultural perspective, predictions from social 
survey studies on the positive association between trust and surveillance 
attitudes do not stand in opposition to warnings about a future ruled by dis-
trust. This perspective also opens space for studying transformations in the 
idea of trust over time and suggests that this might be a fruitful direction for 
further research.
Findings that trust in institutions increases the likelihood to consent to 
surveillance do not make much sense in the absence of  a theory of  the origins 
and dynamics of  social trust relations. Trust approached as a social prac-
tice seems to offer more explanatory leverage to the contradictory empirical 
results with respect to surveillance. In this context, it is of  great import-
ance to focus on the relationship between trust and surveillance at the micro 
level, in local communities, and trust between people and toward the local 
police. Most likely, it is here that processes begin that may in the end erode 
or transform trust between people. This insight suggests that we need more 
empirical research on the effects of  surveillance in peoples’ everyday lives. 
This could be, for example, long- term studies on how the introduction of 
camera surveillance affects the relations between residents in a living area. 
Does it have any effect on how people practice trust, and in case it has— how 
so exactly?
In this chapter, I demonstrate that the way trust is approached affects the 
analysis of the trust and surveillance relationship. The results from survey 
studies on the relationship between (institutional) trust and attitudes to 
surveillance are of little interest if  we do not engage in a theoretical discus-
sion on what these results really stand for. The narrower take offered by an 
institutionalist perspective on trust is not sufficient in this context, and since 
it rests on institutional performance its applicability is limited in the con-
text of a surveillance that is mostly hidden from the public. A sociocultural 
approach to trust, in contrast, has great benefits if  we want to gain a deeper 
understanding of the trust and surveillance nexus. We should not be con-
tent with noting that the association between social trust and attitudes to 
surveillance is weak according to findings in social surveys. There are social 
mechanisms around trust and surveillance that may affect the association and 
reveal that surveillance tends to become a substitute for social trust. Control 
at a distance, in terms of technology, replaces informal control, in terms of 
social trust. A sociocultural perspective gives the opportunity to context-
ualize the relationship between trust and attitudes to surveillance and to sub-
stantially contribute to the understanding of how this relationship may work 
in the long run. A sociocultural approach helps us to understand how trust 
works with surveillance in societies where surveillance has become, more or 
less, the new normal.
Trust and surveillance 197
References
Alam, Yunis, and Charles Husband. 2013. “Islamophobia, Community Cohesion and 
Counter- Terrorism Policies in Britain.” Patterns of Prejudice 47(3): 235– 52.
Ali, Arshad I. 2016. “Citizens under Suspicion: Responsive Research with Community 
under Surveillance.” Anthropology & Education Quarterly 47(1): 78– 95.
Bennett, Colin J. 2011. “Review. In Defence of Privacy: The Concept and the Regime.” 
Surveillance & Society 8(4): 485– 96.
Björklund, Fredrika. 2011. “Pure Flour in Your Bag: Governmental Rationalities of 
Camera Surveillance in Sweden.” Information Polity 16(4): 355– 68.
Björklund, Fredrika. 2019. “Vilken roll spelar risk i tillit? En diskussion om begreppet 
generaliserad tillit.” Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift 121(1): 45– 63.
Bjørnskov, Christian, and Gert Tinggaard Svendsen. 2013. “Does Social Trust 
Determine the Size of the Welfare State? Evidence Using Historical Identification.” 
Public Choice 157: 269– 86.
Brucato, Ben. 2015. “The New Transparency: Police Violence in the Context of 
Ubiquitous Surveillance.” Media and Communication 3(3): 39– 55.
Cao, Liqun, Jihong Zhao, Ling Ren, and Ruohui Zhao. 2015. “Do In- Group and Out- 
Group Forms of Trust Matter in Predicting Confidence in the Order Institutions? 
A Study of Three Culturally Distinct Countries.” International Sociology 
30(6): 674– 93.
Coleman, James S. 1994. Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge: Belknap.
Craven, Krista, Torin Monahan, and Priscilla Regan. 2015. “Compromised Trust: DHS 
Fusion Centers’ Policing of the Occupy Wall Street Movement.” Sociological 
Research Online 20(3): 5, DOI:10.5153/ sro.3608.
Cucciniello, Maria, and Greta Nasi. 2014. “Transparency for Trust in Government: How 
Effective is Formal Transparency?” International Journal of Public Administration 
37(13): 911– 21.
Denemark, David. 2012. “Trust, Efficacy and Opposition to Anti- Terrorism Police 
Power: Australia in Comparative Perspective.” Australian Journal of Political 
Science 47(1): 91– 113.
Duck, Waverly. 2017. “The Complex Dynamics of Trust and Legitimacy: Understanding 
Interactions between the Police and Poor Black Neighborhood Residents.” 
ANNALS AAPSS 673: 132– 49.
Ellis, Darren, David Harper, and Ian Tucker. 2013. “The Dynamics of Impersonal 
Trust and Distrust in Surveillance Systems.” Sociological Research Online 18(3): 8, 
DOI:10.5153/ sr0.3091.
Ford, Nicole M. 2017. Measuring Trust in Post- Communist States; Making the Case for 
Particularized Trust. University of South Florida: Scholar Commons. Dissertation.
Freitag, Markus, and Marc Bühlmann. 2009. “Crafting Trust: The Role of Political 
Institutions in a Comparative Perspective.” Comparative Political Studies 
42(12): 1537– 66.
Freitag, Markus, and Richard Traunmüller. 2009. “Spheres of Trust: An Empirical 
Analysis of the Foundations of Particularised and Generalised Trust.” European 
Journal of Political Research 48: 782– 803.
Friedewald, Michael, Marc van Lieshout, Sven Rung, and Merel Ooms. 2016. “The 
Context- Dependence of Citizens’ Attitudes and Preferences Regarding Privacy 





















Privacy/ Data Protection, edited by Serge Gutwirth, Ronald Leenes, and Paul De 
Hert, 51– 74. Dordrecht: Springer.
Friedewald, Michael, Sven Rung, Marc van Lieshout, Merel Ooms, and Jelmer Ypma. 
2015. Report on Statistical Analysis of the PRISMS Survey. PRISMS project deliver-
able 10.1. Karlsruhe: Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Research.
Fyfe, Nicholas R., and Jonathan Bannister. 1998. “The ‘Eyes Upon the Street’: Closed 
Circuit Television Surveillance and the City.” In Images of the Street: Representation, 
Experience and Control in Public Space, edited by Nicholas R. Fyfe, 254– 67. 
London: Routledge.
Gambetta, Diego. 2000. “Can We Trust Trust?” In Trust: Making and Breaking of 
Cooperative Relations (Electronic Edition), edited by Diego Gambetta, 213– 37. 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, www.sociology.ox.ac.uk/ papers/ gambetta213- 237.pdf.
Gibson, James L. 2001. “Social Networks, Civil Society, and the Prospects for 
Consolidating Russia’s Democratic Transition.” American Journal of Political 
Science 45(1): 51– 68.
Giddens, Anthony. 1990. The Consequences of Modernity. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press.
Giddens, Anthony. 1991. Modernity and Self- Identity: Self and Society in the Late 
Modern Age. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Goold, Benjamin. 2009. “Technologies of Surveillance and the Erosion of Institutional 
Trust.” In Technologies of Insecurity: The Surveillance of Everyday Life, edited by 
Katja Frank Aas, Helene Oppen Gundhus, and Heidi Mork Lomell, Chapter 10. 
Oxon: Routledge.
Graeff, Peter, and Gert Tinggaard Svendsen. 2013. “Trust and Corruption: The 
Influence of Positive and Negative Social Capital on the Economic Development in 
the European Union.” Quality and Quantity 47: 2829– 46.
Grimmelikhuijsen, Stephan. 2012. “Linking Transparency, Knowledge and Citizen 
Trust in Government: An Experiment.” International Review of Administrative 
Sciences 78(1): 50– 73.
Grimmelikhuijsen, Stephan, Gregory Porumbescu, Boram Hong, and Tobin Im. 
2013. “The Effects of Transparency in Trust in Government: A Cross National 
Comparative Experiment.” Public Administration Review 73(4): 575– 86.
Inglehart, Ronald. 1990. Cultural Shift in Advanced Industrial Society. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press.
Jamal, Amaney, and Irfan Nooruddin. 2010. “The Democratic Utility of Trust: A 
Cross National Analysis.” The Journal of Politics 72(1): 45– 59.
Kafer, Gary. 2016. “Reimaging Resistance: Performing Transparency and Anonymity 
in Surveillance Art.” Surveillance & Society 14(2): 227– 39.
Khodyakov, Dmitry. 2007. “Trust as a Process: A Three- Dimensional Approach.” 
Sociology 41(1): 115– 32.
Kim, Soonhee, and Jooho Lee. 2012. “E- participation, Transparency and Trust in 
Local Government.” Public Administration Review 72(6): 819– 28.
Knights, David, Faith Noble, Theo Vurdubakis, and Hugh Willmott. 2001. “Chasing 
Shadows: Control, Virtuality and the Production of Trust.” Organization Studies 
22(2): 311– 36.
Lühiste, Kadri. 2006. “Explaining Trust in Political Institutions: Some Illustrations 


















Trust and surveillance 199
Luhmann, Niklas. 1979. Trust and Power. Chichester: Wiley.
Lyon, David. 2003. Surveillance after September 11. London: Polity Press.
Lyon, David. 2018. The Culture of Surveillance: Watching as a Way of Life. 
London: Polity Press.
Maras, Marie- Helen. 2012. “The Social Consequences of a Mass Surveillance 
Measure: What Happens When We Become the ‘Others’?” International Journal of 
Law, Crime and Justice 40: 65– 81.
Mason, David, Carola Hillenbrand, and Kevin Money. 2014. “Are Informed Citizens 
More Trusting? Transparency of Performance Data and Trust Towards a British 
Police Force.” Journal of Business Ethics 112: 321– 41.
Mishler, William, and Richard Rose. 2001. “What Are the Origins of Political 
Trust? Testing Institutional and Cultural Theories in Post- Communist Societies.” 
Comparative Political Studies 34(1): 30– 62.
Misztal, Barbara, A. 1996. Trust in Modern Societies. Oxford: Polity Press.
Monahan, Torin. 2009. “Dreams of Control at a Distance: Gender, Surveillance and 
Social Control.” Cultural Studies, Critical Methodologies 9(2): 286– 305.
Monahan, Torin, and Priscilla M. Regan. 2012. “Zones of Opacity: Data Fusion 
in Post- 9/ 11 Security Organizations.” Canadian Journal of Law and Society 
27(3): 301– 17.
Möllering, Guido. 2005. “The Trust/ Control Duality: An Integrative Perspective on 
Positive Expectations of Others.” International Sociology 20(3): 283– 305.
Moore, Sarah. 2018. “Towards a Sociology of Institutional Transparency: Openness, 
Deception and the Problem of Public Trust.” Sociology 52(2): 416– 30.
Nakhaie, Reza, and Willem de Lint. 2013. “Trust and Support for Surveillance 
Policies in Canadian and American Opinion.” International Criminal Justice Review 
23(2): 149– 69.
Nannestad, Peter. 2008. “What Have We Learned About Generalized Trust, If  
Anything?” Annual Review of Political Science 11: 413– 36.
Newton, Ken, and Sonja Zmerli. 2011. “Three Forms of Trust and Their Association.” 
European Political Science Review 3(2): 169– 200.
Offe, Claus. 1999. “Trust and Knowledge, Rules and Decisions: Exploring a Difficult 
Conceptual Terrain.” In Democracy and Trust, edited by Mark E. Warren, 42– 87. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Patil, Sunil, Bhanu Patruni, Hui Lu, Fay Dunkerley, James Fox, Dimitris Potoglou, 
and Neil Robinson. 2014. Public Perceptions of Security and Privacy: Results of the 
Comprehensive Analysis of PACT’s Pan- European Survey. PACT project deliverable 
4.2. Brussels: RAND Europe.
Pavone, Vincenzo, Sara Degli- Esposti, and Elvira Santiago. 2015. Key Factors 
Affecting Public Acceptance and Acceptability of Surveillance- Oriented Security 
Technologies (SOSTs). SurPRISE project deliverable 2.4. Florence: European 
University Institute.
Perry- Hazan, Lotem, and Michael Birnhack. 2018. “The Hidden Human- Rights 
Curriculum of Surveillance Cameras in Schools: Due Process, Privacy and Trust.” 
Cambridge Journal of Education 48 (1): 47– 64.
Putnam, Robert D. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press.






















Richey, Sean. 2010. “The Impact of Corruption on Social Trust.” American Politics 
Research 38(4): 676– 90.
Rothstein, Bo. 2004. “Social Trust and Honesty in Government: A Causal Mechanisms 
Approach.” In Creating Social Trust in Post- Socialist Transition, edited by János 
Kornai, Bo Rothstein, and Susan Rose- Ackerman, 13– 30. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan.
Rothstein, Bo. 2005. Social Traps and the Problem of Trust. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Rothstein, Bo. 2010. “Happiness and the Welfare State.” Social Research 77(2): 441– 68.
Rothstein, Bo, and Daniel Eek. 2009. “Political Corruption and Social Trust: An 
Experimental Approach.” Rationality and Society 21(1): 81– 112.
Rothstein, Bo, and Dietlind Stolle. 2008. “The State and Social Capital: An 
Institutional Theory of Generalized Trust.” Comparative Politics 40(4): 441– 59.
Schneider, Irena. 2017. “Can We Trust Measures of Political Trust? Assessing 
Measurement Equivalence in Diverse Regime Types.” Social Indicators Research 
133: 963– 84.
Seligman, Adam B. 1997. The Problem of Trust. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Sønderskov, Kim M., and Peter Thisted Dinesen. 2016. “Trusting the State, Trusting 
Each Other? The Effect of Institutional Trust on Social Trust.” Political Behavior 
38: 179– 202.
Sorell, Tom. 2011. “Preventive Policing, Surveillance, and European Counter- 
Terrorism.” Criminal Justice Ethics 30(1): 1– 22.
Steinfeld, Nili. 2017. “Track Me, Track Me Not: Support and Consent to State and 
Private Sector Surveillance.” Telematics and Informatics 34: 1663– 72.
Svenonius, Ola, and Fredrika Björklund. 2018. “Explaining Attitudes to Secret 
Surveillance in Post- Communist Societies.” East European Politics 34(2): 123– 51.
Szrubka, Wojciech. 2013. “Video Surveillance and the Question of Trust.” In Video 
Surveillance and Social Control in a Comparative Perspective, edited by Fredrika 
Björklund, and Ola Svenonius, 131– 52. New York: Routledge.
Sztompka, Piotr. 1999. Trust: A Sociological Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Sztompka, Piotr. 2005. “Comments on Paul Dumouchel.” Archives Europeennes De 
Sociologie 46(3): 432– 6.
Taylor, Nick. 2011. “A Conceptual Legal Framework for Privacy, Accountability and 
Transparency in Visual Surveillance Systems.” Surveillance & Society 8(4): 455– 70.
Uslaner, Eric M. 2000. “Producing and Consuming Trust.” Political Science Quarterly 
115(4): 569– 90.
Uslaner, Eric M. 2013. “Trust as an Alternative to Risk.” Public Choice 157 (3– 
4): 629– 39.
Watson, Hayley, Rachel L. Finn, and David Barnard- Wills. 2017. “A Gap in the 
Market: The Conceptualization of Surveillance, Security, Privacy and Trust in 
Public Opinion Surveys.” Surveillance & Society 15(2): 269– 85.
Welzel, Christian, and Jan Delhey. 2015. “Generalizing Trust: The Benign Force of 























Trustworthy humans and machines
Vulnerable trustors and the need for trustee 
competence, integrity, and benevolence in 
digital systems
Sara Degli- Esposti and David Arroyo
Introduction: trust and digital mediation
In the future happening today coders dream of erasing discrimination and 
corruption by replacing traditional institutions with new digital systems such 
as Distributed Ledger Technologies, or DLTs, in an attempt to restructure 
old institutions by means of computer code rather than through collective 
action. Satoshi Nakamoto’s (2008) blockchain proposal to generate elec-
tronic transactions and cryptocurrency “without relying on trust” exempli-
fies this attitude, namely the use of lex cryptographia to restore institutions 
(De Filippi and Loveluck 2016). The problem with these kinds of proposals 
is that dependence on Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) 
may lead to an overabundance of trust in untrustworthy, yet credible and 
sometimes dependable, systems.
Our objective in this chapter is to discuss issues of dependence in the trust 
relationship that limit the ability of transparency to guarantee the trustworthi-
ness of the trustee. We embrace Onora O’Neill’s (2017) invitation to focus on 
what really matters about trust, which is people’s ability to trust the trust-
worthy and distrust the untrustworthy in the context of digitally mediated 
interactions, where cryptography is reshaping the relationship between com-
puter code and legal compliance in unforeseeable ways. We deal with the need 
to establish mechanisms to ensure that trustees— those humans who design 
and operate the machines on behalf  of others whose life depends on those 
systems and machines— are trustworthy.
We argue that a fundamental distinction needs to be drawn between depend-
ability and trustworthiness. We agree with Helen Nissenbaum’s (2004) view 
that visions of trust as security lead to surety— that is, safety and certainty— in 
a best- case scenario, but not to trust conceived as “the accepted vulnerability 
to another’s possible but not expected ill will (or lack of good will) toward 
one” (Baier 1986, 235). We contend that we need to move from dependability 
to trustworthiness to be able to deal with uncertainty. Under “unknown 
unknowns,” which are risks that come from situations that are unexpected— 
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trustees’ competence, integrity, and benevolence are necessary to build trust 
in institutions and organizations (Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman 1995). 
Similarly, when trustors are highly vulnerable and dependent— for example, 
in the case of citizens versus law enforcement agents— transparency plays a 
limited role in giving them control over trustees’ actions. Under these types 
of circumstances, those interested in designing resilient organizational or 
technical systems would look for mechanisms to ensure trustees’ competence, 
integrity, and benevolence. Benevolence, for example, has been demonstrated 
to be particularly important for trust relationships in the context of digital 
surveillance technologies used by law enforcement agencies (Degli Esposti, 
Ball, and Dibb 2021).
This chapter hopes to contribute to the dialogue between social science 
and computer science by replacing the traditional trust- as- control paradigm 
with a vision of trust- as- care. We focus on the implications of this view of 
trust for the field of security engineering, which is devoted to ensuring the 
dependability of systems and devices. We argue that this new vision would be 
better suited to articulating the relationship between humans and machines, 
so important in the path toward trustworthy artificial intelligence, or AI (AI- 
HLEG 2019a, 2019b).
Trust as control: the rationalistic instrumental 
paradigm
Trust represents a sort of leap of faith in another person’s willingness to 
cooperate with us. A trust relationship involves two specific parties: a trusting 
party— that is, the individual rendering trust judgments (trustor)— and a 
party to be trusted (trustee) (Jones and Shah 2016). The trustee seems to be 
motivated either by self- interest or by benevolence toward the trustor. Hardin’s 
(2002, 4) influential definition of trust as “encapsulated self- interest”— “I 
trust you because I think it is in your interest to attend to my interest in the 
relevant matter”— represents the mainstream approach foregrounding self- 
interest. According to Hardin (2002), there are three mechanisms by which 
the trustee can encapsulate the interest of the trustor. First, the two of them 
have established an ongoing relationship, which is valuable for the trustee. 
Second, the trustee loves or is a friend of the trustor; thus, the trustor can 
count on the trustee’s benevolence. Third, the trustee wants to maintain his 
or her good reputation, which provides motivation to behave in a trustworthy 
manner.
The rationalistic instrumental paradigm of trust has been criticized for 
its individualistic, utilitarian assumptions, which emphasize individual self- 
interest over collective benefits. Experimental methods, games and abstract 
dilemmas, and disembodied human interactions have repeatedly questioned 
the validity of this approach. According to Michael Hechter (1992, 34), 
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the solution of real- world collective action problems.” As many empirical 
studies show, there is no society in which behavior is consistent with the self-
ishness axiom (Henrich et al. 2004). The problem is that self- interest does 
not explain sacrifice; sacrifice generated by affection or by a duty of care is 
central to the experience of those who care about other people’s survival. In 
the view of psychologist Roderick Kramer (2009), “human beings are natur-
ally predisposed to trust” because “it’s a survival mechanism that has served 
our species well.” The “care- giving we provide to others is as fundamental 
to human nature as our selfishness or aggression” (Taylor 2014, 4). Trustors’ 
and trustees’ shared experiences and destinies irreversibly forge their iden-
tities. This vision of intertwining paths, which should lead toward beneficial 
collective outcomes, is ignored by players trapped within a utilitarian logic.
Another limitation of the rationalistic instrumental paradigm is its tendency 
to deny the role of history and social norms. Collective history offers guidance 
to individuals on whether norms of trust and reciprocity exist and will be 
respected in each context (Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe 1995). Some scholars 
argue that people appear to follow an “injunctive norm,” which impels them 
to trust the character of the other person (see e.g., Fetchenhauer, Dunning, 
and Shlösser 2017). Those who believe that cooperation is beneficial and are 
willing to cooperate are also more inclined to believe that other people will 
share the same view and will behave accordingly. In ongoing relationships, 
expectations of reciprocity facilitate cooperation (Axelrod 1997) and may 
also influence perceptions of trustworthiness, which relates to the trustor’s 
confidence in the trustee based on experiences or beliefs (Berg, Dickhaut, 
and McCabe 1995). Of course, when the relationship is sporadic— so that the 
trustee does not face any negative consequence caused by the trustor’s lack of 
future cooperation— the incentives to deceive the other person may increase.
To conclude, we may assume that a good proportion of humans are wise and 
willing to care for human survival and thus acknowledge the value of cooper-
ation and reciprocity. These humans may decide to set trust as a default sys-
temic parameter. The assumption that trust— rather than distrust— is taken 
as the default position in many cultures finds additional support in the next 
section, where we consider some psychological studies and introduce a new 
characterization of the trustee– trustor relationship.
Trust as care: on the trustor’s vulnerability and the 
trustee’s benevolence
Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995, 712) interpret trust as “the willingness 
of  a party to be vulnerable to the actions of  another party based on the 
expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the 
trustor, irrespective of  the ability to monitor or control that other party.” 
In their theoretical model, the level of  trust is determined by the trustee’s 
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The way the trustor interprets the context of  the relationship affects the need 
for trust, risk assessment, and the evaluation of  the trustee’s trustworthi-
ness. The tendency to trust another party is a function of  the type of  motiv-
ation attributed to the other: the more a person perceives another person 
to be benevolently motivated, the more likely they are to like and trust that 
person (Colquitt, Scott, and LePine 2007; Van Lange, Rockenbach, and 
Yamagishi 2017).
Thus, questions of trust seem to arise when an individual is in a relation-
ship that entails some risk of becoming vulnerable to the actions or decisions 
of another person (Levi and Stoker 2000). There are scholars who see a 
moral component in trust relationships. For instance, LaRue Hosmer (1995, 
393) defines trust as
the reliance by one person, group, or firm upon a voluntarily accepted 
duty on the part of another person, group, or firm to recognize and pro-
tect the rights and interests of all others engaged in a joint endeavor or 
economic exchange.
Within this second group, we agree with those scholars who highlight the 
vulnerability of the trustor. However, what prevents trustees from taking 
advantage of the vulnerability of the trustors? In other words, what is it that 
makes trustees trustworthy?
The empowering theory of trust suggests that by manifestly relying on 
another person B— by exercising trust— a person A may not only cause B to 
exercise their existing capacity for trust- responsiveness, but A may also cause 
B to develop that capacity, achieving a higher degree of dependability or dur-
ability. According to McGeer and Pettit (2017), three psychological effects 
contribute to what they call the “situational enhancement of dependability.” 
The first is that when player A trusts player B, they display and communi-
cate a belief  in B’s capacity to be motivated by A’s manifest reliance, thereby 
encouraging B to prove reliable. The second is that when A trusts B to do 
something, A often makes a request, explicit or implicit, that B should do 
what is requested. And the third is that when A trusts B, A displays a good 
opinion of B’s dependability, thereby giving B an extra esteem- based motive 
for not letting A down (see also Elster 2007). When player A decides to trust 
player B, this decision has a positive, empowering impact on B’s psychology 
(Pettit 2002).
Thus, the mere fact of trusting— or declaring that one trusts— creates an 
obligation for the trustee to honor that trust, which (assuming some moral 
responsiveness to obligation on the part of the trustee) increases the prob-
ability that the trustee will demonstrate greater trustworthiness than origin-
ally expected. From an instrumental, utilitarian perspective, these reflections 
leave open questions on how to secure trustworthiness in the absence of trans-
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problem of discretion and lack of trustor’s control over the trustee is well 
represented in the principal(trustor)– agent(trustee) model. The principal 
(e.g., a patient) has to delegate a task to an agent (e.g., a doctor) because the 
former lacks the ability to perform it. From a rationalistic, instrumental view, 
the principals can monitor the agents or create economic incentives to ensure 
they act in a trustworthy manner, that is, in the best interest of the principals.
The problem with the principal– agent framework is that it assumes the 
agent knows what is in the best interest of the principal. In other words, the 
theory assumes the agent’s competence. It also assumes the principal has 
the power and the information to make the agent accountable. However, if  we 
observe trust from the vantage point of the vulnerable— the newborn baby, 
the dependent elderly, the sick person— information loses its value and power 
is completely imbalanced. The newborn cannot assess its caregiver’s inten-
tion or ability, even though survival depends on the caregiver’s benevolence 
and competence. A capital of trust is handed over to the trustee as a blank 
check. The return of that investment will become visible in the long term with 
limited initial accountability. In the case presented here, we assume that the 
benevolence of the agents- trustees will motivate them to become competent 
and to act with integrity. Nonetheless, the principals- trustors’ vulnerability 
prevents any meaningful expression of control through transparency on the 
other side of the relationship.
To sum up, we contend that the rationalistic instrumental paradigm offers 
an illusion of freedom and a denial of dependence, which are both danger-
ously misleading. The trust- as- control paradigm resolves any moral hazard 
problem by means of transparency, today achieved through digital surveil-
lance. This vision generates widespread reliance on risk- based methodolo-
gies across different areas and a growing demand for data. We contend that 
mechanisms such as transparency cannot be effective in the presence of a high 
imbalance of power and that only agents on a level playing field can exercise 
meaningful mutual oversight. Furthermore, the trust- as- control paradigm 
offers no indication as to how to inscribe competence and moral principles 
into a trustee’s identity. We stress the importance of benevolence in the trust 
relationship in the presence of vulnerable trustors. Benevolence in this scen-
ario matters because it determines whether humans in power will decide to 
deceive other dependent and vulnerable humans or treat them with care and 
respect.
To better articulate these reflections, in the next section we propose an 
alternative characterization of the trustor– trustee relationship: the caring one 
(trustee) and the vulnerable other (trustor). This vision of trust as embracing 
the care of the vulnerable resembles the one adopted by Gus Hurwitz (2012), 
who takes trust to mean “reliance without recourse” in the context of online 
interactions. It also resonates with Annette Baier’s (1986, 240) definition, 
which says that “[trust] is letting other persons (natural or artificial, such as 
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firms, nations, etc.) take care of something the trustor cares about, where such 
‘caring for’ involves some exercise of discretionary powers.”
The caring one (trustee) and the vulnerable other (trustor)
In the presence of  vulnerable and dependent trustors, trustees need to 
demonstrate their competence, honesty, and benevolence in order to be 
considered trustworthy, that is, able to meet the promise of care intrinsic 
to their role. When trustors are vulnerable and dependent, trustees have 
to care for them in the absence of  direct instructions on what the trustors 
need. The instrumental paradigm of  trust- as- control offers the transpar-
ency of  trustees’ actions as a solution to any moral hazard or conflict of 
interests. However, this framework assumes trustees know how to act in the 
best interest of  the trustors.
But, even assuming benevolence, how can trustees know what is benefi-
cial for the trustors? We argue that the trustor needs not only the trustee’s 
dependability but also their trustworthiness, that is, a mixture of learned new 
knowledge and moral considerations that will lead to some type of wisdom. 
The learning process leading to the creation of this knowledge base would 
start from a capital of affection that would make the trustee responsible for 
the wellbeing of the trustor. This capital, allocated without having previous 
knowledge of the trustworthiness of the trustee, would trigger a learning pro-
cess that would lead the trustee to investigate a trustor’s needs.
When the role is not defined by deep affection, duty of care principles 
could replace affection in guaranteeing effort is allocated to learning about a 
trustor’s needs. Professional codes can instruct about the need to develop spe-
cific methodologies and about the necessity to embed empathy into trustees’ 
professional identities (Kultgen 1988). Even though disciplinary methods can 
be applied to achieve transparency or to monitor professionalism (Fournier 
1999), there are different domination and knowledge- generation dynamics at 
play in each case. In the trust- as- care scenario, norms of care are defined 
and voluntarily embraced by trustees within their epistemic communities 
(Haas 1992).
Mechanisms to foster professionalism differ from those transparency 
measures envisioned by supporters of the trust- as- control paradigm. Even 
though peer- pressure mechanisms may be present, it is the adoption of shared 
norms and mutual learning that makes trustees willing to become competent 
and that keeps them honest in the trust- as- care case. In other words, despite 
both being normative systems, the type of norms operative in the trust- as- 
control paradigm differs from that preached in the trust- as- care case. We next 
move this discussion to the implications of adopting the trust- as- care perspec-
tive in the fluid boundary where “the ordinary language systems terminate in 
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From credible machines to dependable systems:  
drawing a distinction between dependability and 
trustworthiness
As machines are built by humans, we began by talking about the trustworthi-
ness of those human beings acting in institutional or other organizational 
settings who create or operate technological systems. We now move to discuss 
the trustworthiness of the technical system itself; in the end we will recon-
cile the discussion about the trustworthiness of the machines and of their 
creators.
If  we think about whether we trust computers, we will probably see them 
as reliable devices that enable us to perform daily activities such as reading 
emails, managing meetings, or editing and sharing documents. As noticed by 
Fogg and Tseng (1999), mass reliance on ICT would not be possible in a world 
where people were unwilling to trust credible computers. However, users’ trust 
perceptions do not necessarily reflect trustworthiness attributes: malware or 
spear phishing attacks, for example, exploit systems’ credibility to insert mali-
cious code into the machines of their victims (Mitnick and Simon 2011).
The risks associated with the existence of malevolent agents, software, and 
untrusted hardware render trust a broad research topic, which spans areas 
as diverse as security and access control in computer networks, reliability in 
distributed systems, and policies for decision- making under uncertainty (Artz 
and Gil 2007). Even though the concept of trust in these different commu-
nities varies in how it is represented, computed, and used, overall we may 
say that “a trusted system or component is one whose failure can break the 
security policy, while a trustworthy system or component is one that won’t 
fail” (Anderson 2008, 13). For instance, in the realm of the so- called Internet 
of Things (IoT), trust management implies ensuring that the physical percep-
tion layer made of sensors and actuators cooperates with the network layer, 
which transforms and processes sensed environment data, and with the appli-
cation layer, which offers context- aware intelligent services (Sicari et al. 2015).
“Dependability is the system property that integrates such attributes as reli-
ability, availability, safety, security, survivability, maintainability” (Avizienis, 
Laprie, and Randell 2001, 1). Dependable systems have integrity: they per-
form their intended functions in an unimpaired manner, free from deliberate 
or inadvertent unauthorized manipulation of the system (Greene 2014). To 
ensure the dependability of software and infrastructures, secure systems need 
to be able to operate within a context of adversity (Danezis 2014). Dependable 
systems are resilient1: they are able to resist and recover from disruptions and 
attacks.2 Attackers can be passive or active, internal or external, and local or 
global with respect to the system they want to attack. A number of model- 
based evaluation techniques are available along with experimental red team- 
based approaches (Nicol, Sanders, and Trivedi 2004). In general, we may say 
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system upon which the security of the entire system depends (Lysne 2018).3 
The objective of security engineering is “to design systems that are resilient 
in the face of malice, that degrade gracefully, and whose security can be 
recovered simply once the attack is past” (Anderson 2008, 212).
Authentic trustworthy trustees would be willing to draft security and privacy 
policies that ensure system dependability across all hardware and software 
layers. From the root of trust up to the automated decision support system, 
roles and responsibilities of human and machine trustees would become 
more visible and auditable by enabling algorithmic explainability and, hope-
fully, contestability (Vaccaro et al. 2019). We argue that trustworthiness and 
dependability represent distinct ideas, which need to be treated differently.4 
The distinction between trustworthiness and dependability reflects the diffe-
rence between writing a policy and applying a policy. We expect trustworthy 
trustees to write the security policy on behalf  of vulnerable trustors by taking 
into consideration both system owners’ and end users’ preferences. This dis-
tinction is important when it comes to discussing privacy/ security– usability 
tradeoffs. If  we think of digital platforms it is easy to see the conflict between 
platform surveillance capacity and end users’ privacy. To ensure that privacy 
and security policies respond to trustors’ needs, trustees need to be compe-
tent, honest, and benevolent toward all types of trustors. Extending trustees’ 
benevolence to all trustors of a digital system requires the creation of govern-
ance mechanisms promoting ethics- of- care by design, professionalism, and 
integrity.
Trustworthy trustees writing information security and 
privacy policies
If  we assume that those who have the ability to design and develop the system 
are the trustees, and that those who use or own the system are the trustors, 
we may explore their relationship in terms of dependence and vulnerability, 
to guarantee the respect of a duty of care in the development and applica-
tion of security/ privacy policies and procedures. Trustor- users, who do not 
design or deploy the system but still use it, tend to be dependent and vulner-
able. Dependence derives from limited knowledge and a lack of convenient 
alternatives. The vulnerability and dependence of digital system end users are 
often discussed in the computer science literature. Under the famous “Why 
Johnny can’t encrypt” lemma, several studies demonstrate users’ reticence to 
adopt information security measures mostly because of the limited usability 
of available solutions (Whitten and Tygar 1999; Sheng et al. 2006; Ruoti et al. 
2015). These problems affect individual users as well as entire industries, 
nation- states, and corporations, as pointed out by scholars working in the 
field of information security economics (Anderson and Moore 2006).
Widespread adoption of privacy- preserving measures is even more challen-
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that under dependence and vulnerability, transparency is meaningless or 
even detrimental. Privacy policies are very long, obscure, and seldom read or 
understood by end users (McDonald and Cranor 2008; Vail, Earp, and Antón 
2008). This implies that privacy policies do not help firms keep their privacy 
promises— which are viewed by consumers as not credible— or increase trans-
parency and market efficiency (Farrell 2012). Despite all the efforts made to 
increase the readability and usability of these policies (Acquisti, Adjerid, and 
Brandimarte 2013), they still ineffectively communicate privacy risks and do 
not contribute to raising information security and privacy awareness.
Because trust is not interpreted as care but as control, corporations 
(trustees) have no intrinsic motivation or experience no peer pressure to pro-
tect their users’ (trustors’) privacy. Current available measures are designed to 
leverage data controllers’ fear of losing their good reputation. An example of 
such mechanisms is the data breach notification provision present in the EU 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which relies on sanctions and 
negative publicity to force corporations to improve their information security 
procedures. Despite this measure being promising, we argue that information 
transparency is of limited use when the trustors are vulnerable— having no 
ability to technically engage with the system— yet still depend on the system. 
This implies that giving trustors more transparency over the decisions of 
trustees will not serve to increase the latter’s trustworthiness.
By acknowledging the vulnerability of trustors, we implicitly admit how 
difficult it would be for this constituency to effectively negotiate security and 
privacy policies beneficial to them. An ethic of care, not utilitarianism, should 
inform and guide decisions taken by trustees on behalf  of trustors— with the 
trustees being the programmers, standardization body members, scientists, 
and cryptographers, and the trustors being anyone who depends on the ICT 
system. We argue that the adoption of a vision of trust- as- care would foster 
the creation of other types of mechanisms. In the remaining part of the 
chapter, we try to sketch some proposals, after reviewing current mechanisms 
to establish the trustworthiness of the trustees.
On the authenticity of trustworthy trustees: authentication and 
authorization
“Whom do you trust?” and “for doing what?” are typical questions in 
conversations about trust. Are there identity traits or attributes that make 
someone naturally trustworthy? In the field of information security, the 
authenticity of one’s identity— and, most importantly, the attributes of that 
identity— are taken as a given (or assumed as authentic) unless we suspect 
that we are dealing with a malicious entity that is lying about their identity to 
perform an attack. Authentication is a key element of information security. 
Through authentication, we assign information disclosure privileges, assess the 
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conduct audits. Multifactor authentication, which is required by the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST 2017) and compulsory for the 
Fintech sector in Europe,5 is increasingly used to ensure proper authentica-
tion. Trust anchoring and oracles are other mechanisms widely applied in this 
domain. While trust anchoring involves the association of information about 
an object from reliable sources, oracles can be human beings or automated 
agents. These solutions can only be effective if  we ensure the traceability and 
linkability of digital information with its original source. For instance, the 
main requirement in designing machine oracles is that the authenticity of the 
data must be publicly verifiable (van der Laan 2018).
During daily activities, the trustworthiness of another human being and the 
authenticity of their identity are established through face- to- face interactions. 
An example of how physical identities mutate into digital identities are key 
signing parties, which are get- togethers of people who use the PGP6 encryp-
tion system. A Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)7 is an arrangement that binds 
public keys with respective identities of entities (i.e., people or organizations). 
“Key signing” refers to the act of digitally signing a public key packet and a 
user ID packet; the aim is to verify that a given user ID and public key really 
belong to the entity that appears to own the key; in other words, to verify 
that the representation of identity in the user ID packet is valid. Usually, this 
means that the name on the PGP key matches the name on the identification 
that the person presents to you when asking that you sign their key.
In other words, physical, face- to- face contact is needed to assess the authen-
ticity of one’s identity. Bureaucratic systems also envisage analog entry points 
to establish the trustworthiness of the counterparty and the intermediary and 
to set up dispute resolution mechanisms (Werbach 2018a). The European 
eIDAS regulation (EU 2014), for instance, forces people to prove physical 
identity in front of an authority, which is assumed to be a trustworthy inter-
mediary. The intervention of real humans is also necessary to set up dispute 
resolution mechanisms. For instance, the dream of blockchain as a disem-
bodied trustless trust solution ended on June 17, 2016, when cryptocurrency 
worth USD 55 million was siphoned off  by an anonymous user who exploited 
a loophole in the source code of the Ethereum Blockchain platform (Reyes 
2019). The operation was legitimate from the perspective of the software, 
which could not distinguish a customer from a thief  (Werbach 2018b). It 
was also technically irreversible and immutable, which implied that human 
intervention was needed to create a hard- fork, namely a bifurcation of the 
blockchain from the moment before the theft happened and a reimburse-
ment to those affected by the illicit operation. Thus, human intervention was 
required to resolve the dispute triggered by the theft and to shape the his-
tory of the two parallel platforms, known as Ethereum and Ethereum Classic, 
which now exist.
Several authentication procedures exist to establish authenticity, that 
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who or what they claim to be. No procedure, however, asks the entity to 
prove its competence, integrity, and benevolence. Here we argue for the 
need to establish the trustworthiness of  the original source, namely, of  the 
humans building and operating the system, that is, the trustees. We can 
imagine some sort of  “artistic” irreversible signature left by the designer 
and administrators of  the system that certifies their benevolence, compe-
tence, and integrity. Authorship mechanisms may help foster peer- review 
accountability among trustees, show their benevolence, and foster their 
trustworthiness.
Mechanisms to extend the roots of trust
Along the course of this chapter, we have rejected the trust- as- control para-
digm and adopted a vision of trust as care in order to ask questions on how 
to distinguish trustworthy trustees from untrustworthy ones and how to build 
dependability and trustworthiness from the root of trust up to the interface. 
A trust- as- care vision of information security would expand the root of trust 
from the technical layer to the human component by reinforcing peer- review 
mechanisms among trustees who are designers and system administrators. New 
frameworks would see technical authentication mechanisms complemented 
by governance mechanisms designed to inscribe competence, honesty, and 
benevolence into the identities of the human trustees, who would guarantee 
the dependability of the system and the respect of policies. Technologists 
(trustees) need to unite in an epistemic community of practice informed 
by the highest ethical and professional standards to be able to generate the 
knowledge needed to produce next- generation trustworthy technology, so 
important especially in the case of AI- driven critical infrastructures. We argue 
that emerging technologies such as quantum computing demand the creation 
of new spaces of critical and constructive dialogue, enabling trustees to learn 
about trustors’ needs.
Trustees’ trustworthiness is generated by trustees’ competence, which 
demands the leveraging of expert knowledge; integrity, which requires training 
and application of ethical codes of conduct; and benevolence, which demands 
that trustees learn about trustors’ needs and openly discuss their corporate 
mission, business rationale, and technical and organizational methods with 
the needs of clients or users in mind. If  the trustee has a duty of care toward 
the trustor, the respect of this duty of care should be guaranteed by other 
trustees within collegial bodies that underwrite codes of conduct and codes 
of principles, and through mentoring, training, and education (ECA 2019). 
Professionalism, knowledge generation, and peer review should be guaran-
teed and fostered through collegial bodies supporting the activities of, and 
decisions taken by, the trustees. Examples of collegial bodies are standardiza-
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Mechanisms to reinforce collaboration and mutual accountability among 
trustees can protect society against the risk of technological determinism and 
herding behavior in policy and R&D investment decisions. Technological 
determinism and herding behavior may lead policymakers to ignore certain 
policy stages, such as problem structuring and definition, as noticed by Veale 
(2019), or certain problems (assessing the usefulness of computing in any 
given context), while spending time and effort on issues related to economic 
competitiveness (e.g., increasing the availability or intensity of European 
AI). As competition may prevent beneficial exchanges of knowledge and 
expertise, the creation of nonmonetary social markets for auditability and 
accountability could facilitate the exchange of confidential information 
among trustees working in the security and digital surveillance domains. Of 
course, soft coordination mechanisms like these need to be anchored in other 
types of strong enforcement procedures in order to ensure prompt conflict 
resolution and intervention. Ben Wagner (2019, 89– 99) suggests providing “a 
mechanism for external independent (not necessarily public) oversight” and 
“a clear statement on the relationship between the commitments made and 
existing legal or regulatory frameworks, in particular on what happens when 
the two are in conflict.”
To foster a vision of security as a public good, new legal instruments and 
governance methods to facilitate security audits (see e.g., Sanchez- Gomez 
et al. 2018 in the domain of cloud storage) should be envisioned in order 
to facilitate the discovery of system vulnerabilities and other privacy and 
security issues. In the domain of machine and deep learning, “blind trust” 
mechanisms could be devised to enable algorithm auditing and the sharing of 
training datasets. Imagine a scenario in which the management of a company 
developing a predictive algorithm wants to understand the system’s privacy 
and reidentification risks. Data and code could be anonymously sent to a 
Digital Blind Trust (DBT) with instructions on the tasks to be performed. 
The Trust would open a bid and assign the task to an anonymous research 
team, after controlling for potential conflicts of interest. The anonymous team 
would perform the analysis. Results would be sent to the client for rebuttal. 
The revised version of the study would be published on the trusted net-
work and made public according to confidentiality agreements, which would 
balance individual and collective interests. This and similar types of systems 
could be designed to enable peer pressure and peer review among trustees.
The considerations and proposals made here are not meant to under-
mine the role of trustors in fostering the trust relationship. The High- Level 
Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence (AI- HLEG 2019b, 12), in its second 
report on “Policy and investment recommendations for trustworthy Artificial 
Intelligence,” suggests
[i] ntroduc[ing] a mandatory self- identification of AI systems … [Given 
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that they are interacting with a human, deployers of AI systems should 
be attributed a general responsibility to disclose that in reality the system 
is non- human.
We want to clarify that a focus on the trustworthiness of the trustees does 
not preclude “[p] romoting the ability of individuals and society as a whole 
to understand and reflect critically in the information society,” which is an 
important recommendation made by the Data Ethics Commission for the 
Federal Government’s Strategy on Artificial Intelligence (DEK 2018, 1). 
If  trustees have a duty of care toward trustors, they have an obligation to 
maintain a permanent dialogue with the trustors, understand their needs 
and demands, and increase their awareness and literacy. Furthermore, we 
suggest that trustors should retain some degree of skepticism in the form of 
parrhesia (Foucault 1983) to denounce untrustworthy trustees and wrong-
doing. Trustors could also be willing to play parrhesiastic games to help 
trustees demonstrate their ability to listen and calibrate their actions in their 
best interest. Trustees should review each other’s actions and decisions to help 
enhance their knowledge of how to better care for the trustors.
Conclusion
The problem at the core of  this article is how we can ensure that we trust 
the trustworthy and distrust the untrustworthy when we are confronted with 
disembodiment and automated beings to which we cannot direct our gaze. 
Information technology introduces a conception of  trust as dependability, 
reliability, or credibility compatible with visions of  trust- as- control rooted 
in the rationalistic instrumental paradigm. However, as noted by Olav 
Lysne (2018, 18), “we should not make Hardin’s kind of  trust a basis for our 
security concerns about equipment in a country’s critical infrastructure.” 
While the necessity of  shedding light on economic incentives and psycho-
logical biases that shape security policy decisions has been acknowledged 
(Anderson and Moore 2009, 2006), the role that ethics and moral principles 
should play in defining next- generation security policies has received little 
attention.
In this chapter we have challenged the underlying assumption, present in the 
rationalistic instrumental visions of trust, that the trustor enjoys the freedom 
not to trust the trustee. By presenting the caring- one and vulnerable- other 
dyad as an alternative to the utilitarian trustor– trustee dyad, we have argued 
for the need to embed an ethic of care, and not simply a logic of control, 
into the trustors. In the presence of dependence and vulnerability we argue 
that the logic of control, based on transparency, sanctions, and incentives, is 
useless, even detrimental. The issue then becomes how to foster the trustee’s 
trustworthiness, beyond the trust- as- dependability currently pursued and 
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confidence of the trustor that the trustee has attributes, such as competence 
or integrity, that serve the trustee in a beneficial manner (Gabarro 2014). We 
trust our doctor, or the pilot of the plane, to do their job in a professional 
manner; in other words, we expect professionals to perform their duties— that 
is, to follow certain established social norms by showing high levels of com-
petence, integrity, and benevolence.
The emphasis on trustworthiness is meant to reconcile functional, privacy, 
and security requirements with multiparty- negotiated policies and fore-
ground the pivotal role of coders’ and operators’ competence, integrity, and 
benevolence. We acknowledge the continuity between the trust- as- control and 
the trust- as- care models, and simply clarify that in the presence of highly vul-
nerable trustors a logic of trust- as- care should be preferred over a logic of 
trust- as- control, which is better suited for scenarios featuring low depend-
ence and low vulnerability. We argue that in a scenario where the trustor has 
enough autonomy to exercise a certain degree of control over the trustee, all 
they need is the trustee’s dependability. In the opposite case, when the trustor 
is highly vulnerable and depends on the trustee, with limited or no control 
or exit strategy, the trustee needs to demonstrate trustworthiness, that is, the 
ability to take care of the trustor in the absence of control, but in the presence 
of an ethic of care.
If  we are truly moving toward a future in which computer code is the 
new law, the only chance we have to program sensible machines is to train a 
new generation of culturally, morally, and socially sophisticated coders able 
to confront the challenge and embrace the normativity and performativity 
of the system they are designing. From a security engineering perspective, 
the question “is the system trusted?” is underdefined unless we answer other 
related questions, such as “By whom? For which attributes? Against what 
adversary?” As in everyday reality, the question, “Do you trust them?” should 
be qualified with “trust them to do what?” to take into consideration the 
ability of the trustees to deliver on their promise of care.
Some commentators claim that cryptography has a role to play in keeping 
power in check,9 whether in protecting those resisting authoritarian regimes or 
in bringing more transparency to democratic ones (Rogaway 2015). We hope 
that our reflections will help inspire new generations of coders (cryptographers 
and lawmakers) willing to cooperate in the name of human flourishing and 
security as a public good. We also hope that these coders will be inspired by 
new expressions of moral philosophy, different from those which replicate 
“uncaring forms of justice and unjust forms of care” (Clement 2018, 2) that 
amplify unfairness through the denial of basic human conditions, such as 
dependence and vulnerability and the need of care.10 We hope that a vision 
of trust based on a philosophy of care could help us better reflect on the 
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Notes
 1 Dependability represents “the ability to deliver service that can justifiably be 
trusted,” while resilience is “the persistence of service delivery that can justifiably 
be trusted, when facing changes” (Laprie 2008, 8).
 2 Typical examples are: denial- of- service attacks, which limit or jeopardize data or 
system availability; man- in- the- middle attacks, which disrupt the confidentiality of 
communications; zero- day or SQL- injection attacks, which disrupt system integ-
rity through vulnerability exploitation or code injection; and adversarial attacks 
on neural networks (deep learning) that compromise data integrity and system 
performance.
 3 It is worth noticing that “[e] ach virtual machine presumes the correctness (integ-
rity) of whatever virtual or real machines underlie its own operation” (Arbaugh 
et al. 1997, 1). In other words, a technical system is made of many interdependent 
layers; the security of each layer is dependent on assumptions made about the 
functioning of previous layers.
 4 Of course, we are adopting a reductionist logic to produce binary categories and we 
acknowledge that reality is the gray zone which lies in- between these two extreme 
scenarios and that the two ideas need to coexist and complement each other.
 5 Payment services (PSD 2)— Directive (EU) 2015/ 2366, URL: https:// ec.europa.
eu/ info/ law/ payment- services- psd- 2- directive- eu- 2015- 2366_ en. NIST Special 
Publication 800- 63B “Digital Identity Guidelines,” URL: https:// pages.nist.gov/ 
800- 63- 3/ sp800- 63b.html
 6 PGP stands for “pretty good privacy (data encryption).” Public key cryptography 
infrastructure (PKI) has two main implementations. One is done using certificates 
and certificate authorities (CAs) and is described in the X.509 standard. It is best 
suited for structured organizational hierarchies with an implicitly trusted authority 
that vouches for all issued certificates. It is the standard that is behind SSL/ TLS and 
S/ MIME email encryption. However, there is also another widely used standard for 
PKI, which was developed with the explicit intention of avoiding centralized certi-
fication authorities, and instead relies on trust relationships built between regular 
users. It was first implemented in the original PGP software back in 1991 and, since 
then, has developed into a robust open standard, known as OpenPGP (openpgp.
org) for email encryption.
 7 PKI is a set of protocols, standards, and procedures to manage public key encryp-
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 8 E.g., ISO International Standards; the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST), part of the US Department of Commerce; “Bundesamt für 
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik” (BSI).
 9 For instance, Tor (www.torproject.org) has found considerable success as a 
censorship- circumvention tool.
 10 Of course, engaging with ideas of care and control leads us to face two famous 
stereotypical constructions: womanhood (Clement 2018) and blackness 
(Mbembe 2017).
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Why a militantly democratic 
lack of trust in state surveillance 




Contemporary societies are characterized by a global culture of surveillance, 
that is, structured by multiple social, economic, and political policies and 
practices that deploy surveillance to achieve various goals (Verde Garrido 
2015). Surveillance can be understood as “the operations and experiences of 
gathering and analysing personal data for influence, entitlement, and man-
agement,” mostly performed by states and corporations, but “may also be 
carried out by people in everyday life” (Lyon 2018, 6). Additionally, there 
exists a politically and economically “neutral watching or sensing,” termed 
“veillance,” which eschews social hierarchies and asymmetric relations of 
power and knowledge (Verde Garrido 2015, 163– 4). Considering these 
different modalities of collection, analysis, and application of physical, 
social, and digital data is crucial to understanding contemporary notions 
and practices of privacy, security, and trust (Verde Garrido 2015, 164). When 
Edward Snowden’s revelations were reported, it became evident that “global 
surveillance is not only confined to intelligence agencies’ deployment of sur-
veillance technologies, but extends also to the very cultural and economic 
characteristics of contemporary society” (Verde Garrido 2015, 155). Global 
public outrage followed the realization that mass surveillance infringed on the 
right to privacy as well as other vital human rights (Verde Garrido 2015, 164). 
In order to contest these violations and abuses, civil societies have expanded 
their counter- surveillance strategies and practices, strengthened their political 
agency with a nascent digital agency, and furthered demands for the rule of law 
and democratic oversight (Verde Garrido 2015, 164– 5). This chapter focuses 
on the nature and particulars of democratic oversight of surveillance policies 
and practices, questioning the extent to which these require trust and trans-
parency to be most effective. It is important to remember that “the towering 
institutions and processes of high technology and global government […] are 
not relentless and invincible” and that “ordinary people, often acting in con-
cert” can contribute constructively to the “reimagination and shaping” of 
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that in mind, the first section explores trust and transparency generally and 
in relation to surveillance, clarifying the nature of intelligent accountability. 
The second section explains the manner in which, counterintuitively, a lack 
of trust informs several democratic institutions as well as the governmental, 
legal, and juridical notion of militant democracy. The notion of militant 
democracy advances the idea that a liberal democracy can defend its consti-
tutional order from the threat of authoritarian political movements and that 
it can do so through enacting political and legal measures that fulfill three 
criteria: legitimacy, legality, and necessity. This section proposes that a mili-
tantly democratic approach within civil society can further ensure that over-
sight of surveillance is effective, democratic, and upholds civil liberties and 
human rights. In order to illustrate this approach, the third section considers 
specific instances of surveillance in various countries: Germany, Poland, and 
the United States, which share the political encroachment of far- right popu-
lism, although to varying degrees. This section critically analyzes specific 
instances of surveillance policies and practices in these countries and notes 
how these are ideologized to varying extents and fail to fulfill the three criteria 
promoted by a militantly democratic oversight. This chapter ends by offering 
some conclusions and recommendations on ensuring a democratic oversight 
of surveillance policies and practices.
On the relation of trust and transparency to oversight 
of surveillance
The Snowden revelations provoked a global debate on the nature and 
implications of surveillance for state— as well as corporate— intelligence 
functions. There are questions about the levels of privacy intrusion, the 
“accountability” of intelligence and security functions, the “efficiency of 
bulk surveillance practices and their compatibility with fundamental rights,” 
and the manner in which “surveillance- intensive methods” impact the social 
fabric of democratic societies (Ball et al. 2019, 3; Wetzling and Vieth 2018, 
10). The ongoing debate has not changed that “all major democracies 
allow their national intelligence services to intercept communications data 
in enormous quantities” or that court rulings admonish them “for flaws or 
shortcomings” in an oversight regime that must become “more rigorous and 
effective” (Wetzling and Vieth 2018, 10). Understanding that democratic over-
sight acts as an effective bulwark against “the erosion of fundamental rights 
should a government be infested with the illiberal virus that is currently ram-
pant” proves crucial (Wetzling and Vieth 2018, 6). Because “temptations to 
abuse privileges such as government secrecy are omnipresent,” it is important 
to remember that “democratic intelligence governance cannot be taken 
for granted” and “the legitimacy of intelligence action must constantly be 
earned” (Wetzling and Vieth 2018, 11– 12). Therefore, democratic oversight 
of state— as well as corporate— policies and practices of surveillance should 
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consider dynamics of trust and trustworthiness and learn from democratic 
institutions and measures built upon a constructive lack of trust.
Trust can be understood as the belief  and confidence on the part of a 
person or party (trustor) that another person or party (trustee) will reliably 
do what they have stated. There is never a complete guarantee that people or 
parties will be trustworthy, so every interaction requires granting trust to a 
certain extent and involves a risk that others prove that the granted trust was 
misplaced. The “most systematic evidence” to determine whether contem-
porary society is experiencing a “crisis of trust” comes from public opinion 
polls and similar academic research, but these surveys fail to realize their own 
ambiguities (O’Neill 2002, 3– 4). First, surveys do not recognize that people 
“seek to place trust in a differentiated way” and do not grant “every instance 
of a certain type of official or […] person” the same level of trust. Second, 
surveys seldom ask respondents about specifics. Questions about trust in this 
or that type of person should be followed by: “To do what?” (O’Neill 2013). 
Consequently, the status of trust in contemporary societies is better illustrated 
by the fact that “we still constantly place trust in many of the institutions and 
professions that we profess to not to trust” (O’Neill 2002, 4).
Prompted by worries about what states and corporations may do with 
their data, more and more citizens and consumers have “sought ways to 
avoid observation by specific people, organizations or the government.” 
These concerns come from “a lack of confidence in the security of everyday 
communications channels and a lack of trust in all kinds of organizations 
to protect their data” (Lyon 2018, 67– 8). The Snowden revelations showed 
the limitations of data protection legislation and the reduction of corporate 
sovereignty over data and “profoundly undermined the trust and confi-
dence” that private lives, human rights, and civil liberties are respected (Bigo 
et al. 2013, 1– 4). Consequently, citizens and consumers wonder whether they 
should “ever trust that their information is safe on the Web.” While the “main 
byproduct” of digital technologies— data— has great value for “law enforce-
ment, industry, advertising, science, and other fields,” it is even more valuable 
for its owners, representing the “center of trust” of their “interaction with 
technology.” Since individuals must trust their interlocutors to provide them 
with data, government or corporate mishandling of data implies to “com-
pletely mishandle the trust.” Ultimately, “the lack of clarity and consensus 
on rules for government access to data,” added to the “constant stream of 
data breaches, intrusions into government systems, and attacks on service 
providers,” has led civil society to experience “fear and paranoia” and lose 
“trust in technology” (Jordan 2015). Solely corporate surveillance policies 
and practices have also impacted citizen and consumer trust significantly. 
Internet giants such as Facebook and Google, following a business model and 
logics of data extraction and accumulation termed “surveillance capitalism,” 
undermine relationships of trust by eschewing “the mutual dependencies and 
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the “public’s ignorance” of their imperatives and operations and offering min-
imal “meaningful options for privacy self- management,” these corporations 
establish “unprecedented concentrations of information power,” entrench 
new structural asymmetries of knowledge, power, and trust, and obfuscate 
themselves from transparency (Zuboff 2015, 83, 85– 6).
Citizens and consumers have become aware that states and corporations 
deploy mass surveillance and that they employ mendacities and chicaneries 
in order to do so unnoticed. Lack of trust has grown worldwide as a “reason-
able response to growing untrustworthiness” (O’Neill 2002, 12). Accordingly, 
states and corporations must provide citizens and consumers not only with 
information that claims they are trustworthy but also “the means to judge 
that information” independently as well (O’Neill 2002, 17). Transparency on 
its own does not allow others to fully determine trustworthiness or whether 
to grant trust and rarely means more than that certain information is being 
made publicly available. More effective is ensuring that the information in 
question is intelligible as well as assessable. Oversight of surveillance that not 
only demands information on specific practices but that also informs about 
the goals of the surveillance in question can be understood as establishing 
“intelligent accountability” (O’Neill 2017).
Complete openness and transparency have contributed very little to 
building or regaining public trust. Quite often, “trust seemingly has receded 
as transparency has advanced.” This is not because transparency “destroys 
secrecy,” but rather because restoring trust requires those who are untrust-
worthy to “reduce deception and lies rather than secrecy” (O’Neill 2002, 18). 
Most important for reducing asymmetries of power and knowledge resulting 
from asymmetric kinds of transparency are “legal measures to prohibit cer-
tain kinds of surveillance and to impose penalties on those whose watching 
transgresses acceptable transparency” (Lyon 2018, 162). There is no benefit 
in granting trust blindly: “well- directed trust and […] well- directed mistrust” 
are desirable because “we want mistrust in the untrustworthy […] and trust in 
the trustworthy” (O’Neill 2017). States and corporations who deceive citizens 
and consumers are untrustworthy and, hence, do not deserve trust. For these 
various reasons, addressing states and corporations with a lack of trust can, 
counterintuitively, prove to be a constructive approach.
A constructive lack of trust and a militantly 
democratic approach within civil society
The previous section explained that trust is granted without complete guar-
antees, relying on ostensible trustworthiness. Awareness of the nature and 
extent of surveillance has led citizens and consumers to lose much trust in 
states and corporations. This lack of trust comes not only from state and cor-
porate failure to fulfill promises about how surveillance is deployed but also 
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of power and knowledge. Ensuring transparency is neither sufficient for trust 
to be built or recovered nor is it desirable unless there is intelligent account-
ability: clearer explanations and more opportunities to contest and decide 
which goals are desirable in relation to surveillance policies and practices. This 
section will explain why a lack of trust informs certain democratic principles 
and institutions, how it can be embodied by a militantly democratic civil 
society, and why it can prove to be constructive for oversight of surveillance.
Liberal democracies have formal institutions built upon a constructive 
lack of trust. Examples include the separation of powers, secret ballots, and 
whistleblowing. The separation of powers implies a lack of trust because it 
recognizes that dividing government into branches, separate and independent, 
is crucial to avoiding an unchecked concentration of power. Secret ballots, 
which exist in a number of voting systems, also imply a lack of trust inas-
much as they acknowledge that mechanisms to avoid excessive influences are 
required. Institutional whistleblowing implies a lack of trust since it accepts 
that wrongdoings within states— as well as corporations— may be intention-
ally obscured to avoid consequences. Therefore, protections are established to 
shield whistleblowers from suffering retaliatory measures, and protocols are 
designed to investigate and right these wrongdoings. Civil societies can learn 
to constructively apply a lack of trust to oversight of security and intelligence 
functions, even if  certain levels of secrecy are obligatory and limited transpar-
ency is the norm.
Contrary to arguments that security and privacy are incompatible, efforts to 
simultaneously ensure privacy and security can be valuable in terms of “public 
policy” since addressing the intrusiveness of certain instances of security 
and surveillance can maximize “security benefits and privacy protections” 
(Ball et al. 2019, 14). “Good oversight is good security” because it “pushes 
governments to be as effective as possible in allocating their resources and 
selecting their targets” (Wetzling and Vieth 2018, 87). Furthermore, because 
of the contemporary drift toward authoritarianism within liberal democra-
cies (Zeid 2018; Human Rights Watch 2018; Amnesty International 2018; 
Freedom House 2018), a militantly democratic approach to oversight is 
crucial because it can help ensure better and more discerning transparency 
and technical literacy, hold states intelligently accountable for their relations 
with corporations and vice versa (Jordan 2015; Schneier 2015), and enact 
modernized legislation addressing the complexities of domestic as well as 
global surveillance.
Karl Loewenstein developed the notion of militant democracy (i.e., 
streitbare or wehrhafte, defensive, Demokratie) during the summer of 1937, 
shortly before the totalitarianisms of fascism and communism violently set 
off  World War II. He addressed with grave concern why numerous states 
were experiencing authoritarian drifts, and several others had already fully 
devolved into authoritarianism (Loewenstein 1937a, 1937b). Loewenstein 
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their constitutional values: that is, these states needed to enact and implement 
constitutional political and legislative measures restricting the manners in 
which authoritarian political movements weaponized democratic freedoms, 
rights, and institutions in order to consolidate power and ultimately suspend 
them (Loewenstein 1937a, 422– 3, 438– 9). Militant democracy is a decisive 
response to the proven untrustworthiness of authoritarian politics.
Loewenstein differentiated constitutional governments from authoritarian 
ones, noting that the former signified the rule of law, rational and calculable 
administration, and the protection of private law and fundamental rights. 
The latter, in contrast, replaced the rule of law with “legalized opportunism,” 
merged private law into public law, and collapsed fundamental rights and 
the rule of law, their interest being to achieve “unchallengeable command.” 
Because “no government can rely only on force or violence,” authoritar-
ianism relied strongly on raw “emotionalism,” especially nationalist fervor 
and a strategic combination of intimidation, “terrorization,” and coercion 
(Loewenstein 1937a, 417– 8). Constitutional governments can be understood 
as liberal democracies, upholding fundamental rights such as the freedom 
of speech and the press or the freedom to hold public office, which are not 
only liberties and freedoms but also civil and political rights (Altman 2017). 
While constitutional and authoritarian governments contrast starkly, there is 
also a certain kind of government considered mostly democratic, although a 
“new type of ‘authoritarian’ or ‘disciplined’ democracy” (Loewenstein 1937b, 
644). Nowadays, such a “hybrid” regime, neither fully democratic nor fully 
autocratic, is termed an “anocracy.” These regimes may uphold a number of 
freedoms while constraining others and may limit electoral competition as 
well as prevent political accountability in order to maintain power (Colomer 
et al. 2016, 19– 20).
Authoritarianism adapted perfectly to democracy and its tolerance for 
other competing political ideologies. Employing novel “technical wonders” 
and democratic institutions, authoritarian regimes spread discourses that 
inflamed “emotionalism in its crudest and its most refined forms” among the 
masses, set different groups against each other, and discredited “the democratic 
order” as “unworkable.” Liberal democracies responded slowly, concerned 
that restricting authoritarian “use of democratic institutions” weakened their 
legality. Loewenstein proposed that constitutional governments wishing to 
uphold their own values needed to act upon their lack of trust in the outward 
conformance to “the principles of legality and free play of public opinion” 
of authoritarian political movements and confront their dangerous polit-
ical techniques. It is in this sense that “democracy must become militant” 
(Loewenstein 1937a, 423– 4).
Liberal democracy cannot prove the superiority of its achievements and 
counter emotionalism by means of the same emotional techniques. Rather, 
it must employ “political and legislative” measures appealing to “reason” 
(Loewenstein 1937a, 428). Politically, the approach can be to establish “a 
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united and uniform action among the democratically- minded sections of the 
people”; legislatively, it can be to enact antiauthoritarian laws and regulations 
“without flagrant violation of democratic principles,” enabled by means of 
“parliamentary vote and public opinion at large” (Loewenstein 1937a, 429– 
30, 438– 9). Political and civil restrictions serve the purpose of “ultimately pre-
serving these very fundamentals,” and liberal democratic constitutions and 
governance anticipate “emergency powers.” Loewenstein was convinced— and 
World War II validates his contention— that such measures were warranted 
because authoritarianism had “declared war on democracy.” Liberal dem-
ocracies had to “live up to the demands of the hour” and make “every pos-
sible effort” to survive, establishing political unity and counterintuitively 
enacting legislation to confront authoritarian political movements, even when 
it appeared to imply “the risk and cost of violating fundamental principles” 
(Loewenstein 1937a, 432).
Defending democracy through restricting fundamental institutions and 
rights can dangerously lead to the opposite: weakening it and making it more 
susceptible to authoritarianism (Invernizzi Accetti and Zuckerman 2017, 182, 
183– 4). Loewenstein recognized that several European states hollowed out 
their constitutionality and destroyed the rule of law to the extent of becoming 
anocracies and authoritarians (Loewenstein 1937b, 638– 40). This is an 
important lesson in the context of securitization and the expansion of sur-
veillance since history shows that authoritarianism often encroaches through 
claims and proposals that are seemingly those of embattled liberal democra-
cies. Nowadays, the emergency powers of the “state of exception” have increas-
ingly become a “dominant paradigm of government” even in constitutional 
governments (Agamben 2005, 1– 2). Their normalization should be viewed 
with caution as these can radically alter constitutional forms and establish 
the state of exception as the “threshold of indeterminacy between democracy 
and absolutism” (Agamben 2005, 2– 3). Accordingly, it is important to clarify 
the legal and juridical understanding that states and institutions have of a 
“democracy capable of defending itself” (O’Connell 2009, 84).
The Basic Law of Germany and international frameworks such as the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and European Convention 
of Human Rights note, respectively, the duty to prevent “enemies of democ-
racy” from employing the “rights and freedoms of democracy to undermine 
it”; that human rights cannot be used or abused to “undermine the purposes 
of the United Nations”; and that parties to the Convention cannot destroy 
the “rights and freedoms” that it sets forth (O’Connell 2009, 84– 5). General 
legal and juridical understanding is that restrictions to rights must satisfy 
three criteria: these should be “for a legitimate purpose, prescribed by law 
and necessary in a democratic society.” (O’Connell 2009, 86). Accordingly, 
the language of militant democracy is used to confront political violence, 
to combat discriminatory and extremist movements, to secure the transition 
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Even so, restrictions and preventative measures are only legitimate and justi-
fied when states or institutions prove their commitment to democratic means 
and goals. History also shows that “even established democracies fall short of 
the ideal” of liberal democracy (O’Connell 2009, 86– 90). Altogether, a mili-
tantly democratic approach to the oversight of surveillance within civil society 
can constructively employ a lack of trust in order to determine whether state 
and corporate policies and practices satisfy the three criteria of legitimacy, 
legality, and necessity. Doing so further establishes intelligent accountability 
and ensures the defense of liberal democracy while upholding human rights, 
civil liberties, and privacy and data protections.
Oversight of surveillance policies and practices in 
times of authoritarian drift
The previous section explained that various established democratic institutions 
are built upon a constructive lack of trust so as to check abuses of power. 
Questioning whether surveillance policies and practices can further defend 
liberal democracy is especially relevant in contemporary politics, where 
authoritarian drift is rampant. Militant democracy ensures constitutional 
government, avoids liberal democracy devolving into anocracy, and checks 
authoritarianism and its divisive emotionalism. The three criteria that deter-
mine whether militantly democratic means are justified can also be applied 
to the oversight of surveillance. Considering the above, this section will 
explore instances of surveillance policies and practices in Germany, Poland, 
and the United States— countries experiencing the political encroachment of 
far- right populism to varying degrees. It will critically analyze the policies 
and practices in question so as to clarify the manner in which these are also 
ideologized to varying extents and fail to fulfill the three criteria required for 
a militantly democratic oversight of surveillance.
Germany: oversight of intelligence and law enforcement agencies
The historical experiences of having devolved into far- right as well as far- left 
authoritarianisms have taught Germany the importance of militantly demo-
cratic institutions. Once the National Socialist Third Reich was defeated, 
the Federal Republic of Germany (1949) established the Federal Office for 
the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) through its Basic Law. A domestic 
security and counterintelligence agency, the BfV defends the “free democratic 
basic order” of Germany, monitors anticonstitutional activities, mostly those 
of far- left and far- right groups, and formally embodies militant democratic 
principles. The agency reports to the Ministry of Interior, and its principal 
executive agent is its president. A critical analysis of the case of former BfV 
president Hans- Georg Maaßen serves to clarify that a militantly democratic 
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by an ostensibly militantly democratic institution. Maaßen, president of 
the agency from August 2012 to November 2018, was fired when he pub-
licly contradicted the federal government by downplaying antimigrant vio-
lence that occurred during protests against a murder in the town of Chemnitz. 
When several government officials, including Chancellor Angela Merkel, 
condemned the violence, Maaßen not only argued that journalistic reporting 
on far- right gangs hunting foreigners in the streets was “deliberate misin-
formation,” but also— astonishingly— claimed that “arrest records, various 
videos, media reports and photos of protestors doing the Hitler salute” were 
not “reliable information” (Jordan 2018).
The year before, however, Maaßen showed no qualms about arguing 
without any kind of reliable information for the expansion of surveillance 
of the “wives and children of German ‘IS’ fighters” returning to the country, 
stating that the agency should “keep them in our sights” since they “could 
pose a risk” (Deutsche Welle 2017). The children, he warned, “could be living 
time bombs […] brainwashed with a mission to carry out attacks” (Shalal 
and Siebold 2018), and therefore were not an “insignificant potential threat” 
(Deutsche Welle 2018). The state had already lowered its age limit for surveil-
lance from 16 to 14 in 2016, but Maaßen argued that it should be expanded 
to include children under the age of 14. A civil rights organization explained 
that it was “unreasonable to consider children a threat to the constitutional 
order” and that their surveillance represented “a massive violation of their 
fundamental rights” (Deutsche Welle 2018). Remarkably, earlier that year, a 
former leader of the youth wing of the right- wing Alternative for Germany 
(AfD) denounced Maaßen for allegedly advising party leaders on strategies 
to “avoid being placed under surveillance.” As reporting on Maaßen’s contra-
dictory policies intensified, it was revealed that the BfV had “failed for months 
to act on […] concerns about local [AfD] youth chapters” (Reuters 2018).
The BfV denied the leaks and stated that suspicions of party sympathies 
were “entirely without foundation” (Koch and Neuerer 2018). Governmental 
as well as public outcry ensured the removal of Maaßen, but interior minister 
Horst Seehofer proposed he become “deputy interior minister”— which was 
“technically a promotion with a pay rise” (Associated Press 2018a). When 
this backfired, Seehofer proposed Maaßen become his “special advisor” 
(Associated Press 2018a). Even more political and public outcry followed, 
especially when BfV agents blew the whistle on a video where Maaßen told 
“European domestic spy chiefs” that the Social Democratic Party (SPD), 
Germany’s ruling coalition partner, were “radical left- forces” conspiring 
against him. Only then did Seehofer send Maaßen into “early retirement” 
(Escritt 2018).
A militantly democratic approach to oversight of surveillance is crucial 
because the ideologization of policies and practices is a threat to ensuring 
security. Thomas Haldenwang, the new BfV president, announced a signifi-
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violence in Chemnitz illustrated “developments in right- wing extremism,” as 
numbers were rising and more than half  were “violence- oriented” (Associated 
Press 2018b). Questioned whether the AfD has contributed to this growth, 
he replied that “in any case, it doesn’t seem to be detrimental.” The BfV 
announced surveillance of the far- right party, AfD critics claiming “an 
increasing blurring of boundaries between the party and the extreme right 
neo- Nazi scene” (Associated Press 2018b). The monitoring included AfD 
member Björn Höcke— a “driving force” in moving the party to “the extreme 
right” and “a threat to the liberal democratic principles of Germany’s con-
stitution”— as well as the party’s youth wing (JA) (Connolly 2019). When 
Walter Lübcke, a conservative pro- refugee politician, was murdered by a 
right- wing extremist, the debate illustrated a lack of trust whether the BfV 
had “underestimated the threat posed by the militant far right” (Oltermann 
2019). The agency’s annual report, mostly written while Maaßen was BfV 
president, had failed to mention Nordkreuz, a far- right extremist group shown 
to have “close links to the police and military,” which accessed police records 
to create a “death list” including “almost 25,000 names and addresses of local 
politicians” who had contributed to “civil efforts during the refugee crisis 
in 2015” (Oltermann 2019). Investigations of Nordkreuz further revealed 
members to be in the military, law enforcement, and reservists and that it was 
stockpiling of weaponry, ammunitions, and even body bags and quicklime to 
dissolve the corpses of “political enemies” (Bennhold 2020).
News coverage and public outcry led the federal government to propose 300 
additional positions within the BfV to better monitor right- wing extremism, 
focus on early detection of radicalization of law enforcement and mili-
tary personnel, and strengthen international cooperation with similar state 
agencies (Wiedmann- Schmidt 2019). This militantly democratic approach 
to oversight remains necessary, especially considering leaked classified 
documents that reveal authorities arguing to allow state security and intelli-
gence “to read encrypted chats” and reports that the BfV is considering “arti-
ficial intelligence to identify suspicious postings online and on social media” 
(Der Spiegel 2019). Such efforts to further automate surveillance practices 
risk undermining intelligent accountability in the absence of militantly demo-
cratic oversight.
Oversight of surveillance technologies outsourcing
Poland not only has a history of occupation by far- right and far- left 
authoritarianisms, but it also had a pivotal role in the former Soviet sphere’s 
transition toward democracy. In recent years, however, the European Union 
launched an unprecedented procedure to monitor “threats to the rule of 
law in Poland” because of measures enacted by the Law and Justice (PiS) 
party, which presently rules the government (Jankovic 2016, 51). A critical 
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over surveillance technology in Poland sheds light on why a militantly 
democratic approach is recommended not only within civil society but also 
within the political opposition when there is an institutional lack of over-
sight. Importantly, the measures enacted by the PiS include nonacceptance 
of elected judges, which effectively paralyzed the Constitutional Tribunal, 
and “new laws relating to the media, civil service, the police, and prosecu-
tion” that allowed security and intelligence services to “obtain information 
from internet providers without a court order” or informing those surveilled 
(Jankovic 2016, 55, 58). Considered altogether, “the line between democracy 
and dictatorship seems to be very thin” and also “fragile and profoundly 
susceptible to subversion” (Jankovic 2016, 64). Consequently in 2017, the 
European Commission activated Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union 
against the country for “persistently flouting democratic rules.” Years later, 
the vice president of the European Commission warned that it “had not yet 
had any impact on Warsaw’s behavior” (Reuters 2019).
To be clear, the expansion of surveillance in Poland started before the 
PiS came to power, but the party’s willingness to threaten the rule of law 
and the independence of the judicial branch has allowed this trend to inten-
sify. The state has exploited events such as the 2016 North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) summit or the papal visit to further surveil foreigners 
without judicial warrants and extend the time that suspects can be detained 
without charges (Szary 2016). In anticipation of the 2018 Conference of the 
Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC), agencies were authorized to “collect, obtain, gather, 
verify, process and use information, including personal data about persons 
posing a threat to public safety and order, including outside the borders of 
the Republic of Poland” with few restrictions (Aronoff 2018). Furthermore, 
information on foreigners attending the conference, including “police records 
and intelligence gathered by state surveillance,” could be collected without 
their “knowledge or consent” and stored several months after the event ended. 
Various UN bodies and special rapporteurs sent concerned letters to Polish 
authorities, warning that the measures “may lead to human rights violations” 
as acts of reprisal against individuals “for their cooperation with the United 
Nations” (Aronoff 2018).
Surveillance policies and practices in Poland, as with many postcommunist 
states, were characterized by “swift commercialisation of […] the police state’s 
security apparatus” during the political transition, blurring the “lines between 
the private security industry” and state security and intelligence agencies (Łoś 
2018, 363– 4). Consequently, members of this industry “became the primary 
providers of risk definitions and risk management technologies” (Łoś 2018, 
364). Unsurprisingly, Poland has continued expanding its surveillance capabil-
ities by outsourcing to national and international corporations. According to 
a technical and academic report, Poland has deployed “Pegasus” surveillance 
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in Israel (Marczak et al. 2018). The report led journalists and political oppos-
ition to inquire whether the malware was purchased and deployed by security 
and intelligence agencies. It is noteworthy that NSO Group has a scandalous 
record of its technologies being deployed to violate human rights and civil lib-
erties (Gera 2019; Bing and Satter 2019). For this reason, a lack of trust in state 
purchases and deployments of Pegasus is entirely advisable. A Polish NGO 
defending freedom and human rights from contemporary technological threats 
argues that institutional lack of oversight of surveillance is the reason for the 
lack of clarity on whether the Central Anti- Corruption Bureau (CBA) and/ or 
the security and intelligence agencies purchased and deployed malware such as 
Pegasus (Panoptykon Foundation 2019). The Civic Platform (PO) opposition 
party has publicly supported the interpretation that the purchase and deploy-
ment of Pegasus would be illegal since there is “no place for such systems in 
democratic countries respecting rule of law” because the malware would pre-
sumably “be used by secret police under the radar of the courts” (Kość 2019).
A militantly democratic approach is evident within political opposition 
and civil society attempts at oversight of surveillance policies and practices— 
and is recommended. Organizations such as Panoptykon Foundation have 
scrutinized previous instances of state untransparency and have questioned 
whether it is defensible to purchase security and intelligence goods from 
corporations that enable the surveillance policies and practices of authori-
tarian regimes and obfuscate the availability of such surveillance capabilities 
(Panoptykon Foundation 2015). Furthermore, they argue, the deployment of 
such surveillance technologies is worrisome for at least four other reasons: first, 
deploying Pegasus, “even if  a court order were obtained,” would most likely 
“not [be] legal under Polish law”; second, “oversight over secret services” in 
Poland is lacking, and “there is no obligation to inform people” who are being 
surveilled; third, parliamentarians are concerned these surveillance technolo-
gies are being deployed “against independent journalists” and “opposition 
politicians”; and, fourth, Poland “does not follow human rights standards,” a 
claim supported by the fact such malware is “used by authoritarian regimes to 
spy on citizens” (Gera 2019). Civil society and the political opposition should 
continue their attempts at oversight with a militantly democratic approach, 
especially considering that Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki merely 
responded that everything “will be explained in due time” (Kość 2019), and 
Deputy Prime Minister Jacek Sasin entirely dismissed any concerns, offering 
discursive platitudes as divisive as the claim that “honest citizens” do not to 
worry about such matters (Kość 2019).
United States: oversight of governmental agencies and outsourcing 
of surveillance and intelligence technologies and services
The United States has not experienced devolution from liberal democracy 
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only on its economy and culture but also on the power of its military and 
intelligence. Moreover, no other liberal democracy has more state and cor-
porate surveillance capabilities than the United States. A critical analysis of 
how these functions are increasingly outsourced clarifies why a militantly 
democratic approach to oversight is vital to limiting abuses of power and 
defending the political agency of civil society— especially those resulting 
from the ideologization of surveillance. It is clarifying to consider the ways 
in which immigration is being ideologized at the same time as securitized. 
Ongoing debate, domestically and globally, on this matter intensified after 
the revelation that thousands of immigrant children were separated from 
their families and detained in facilities without relatives (Aguilera 2019). 
This family separation practice was later disclosed as a “migration deterrent” 
within the wider scope of a “zero tolerance” antiimmigration policy (Miroff 
and Dawsey 2019). The extension of the state and corporate surveillance 
assemblage built in order to realize these and other immigration policies and 
practices is entirely unprecedented (Fox Cahn 2019).
This state– corporate nexus partners federal departments and agencies such 
as Homeland Security (DHS) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE) with corporations as recognizable as Amazon, Microsoft, and Hewlett- 
Packard (Corbett 2018) as well as other, more obscure, ones. Palantir 
Technologies, focused on big data mining and analytics, is such a corporation. 
The state has extensively outsourced matters concerning the military, intelli-
gence, and law enforcement agencies to it. When public outrage against family 
separation began, Palantir insisted that it provided goods and services for 
“cross- border criminal investigations,” not “interior civil immigration enforce-
ment”— i.e., the deportation and detention of undocumented immigrants. 
However, an advocacy network obtained documents revealing that ICE 
employs “Investigative Case Management” (ICM), a Palantir software plat-
form, to build “profiles of immigrant children and their family members” and 
facilitate their arrest and prosecution. The corporation’s untrustworthiness 
was further exposed by the fact that ICM allows ICE agents to also access the 
intelligence platforms of various “other federal and private law enforcement 
entities” (Biddle and Devereaux 2019).
The function creep and drift of this surveillance assemblage is evidenced 
by the fact that fusion centers established for counterterrorism “not only 
monitor and target immigrants” but political activists as well. Diverse kinds 
of biometric information are collected in “cases of mass arrests at protests,” 
stored, analyzed, and then shared with a multitude of federal agencies 
(Corbett 2018). Surveillance of those documenting, protesting against, or 
working with the consequences of present- day immigration policy goes fur-
ther. A DHS whistleblower leaked documents revealing a secret database on 
people concerned with immigration to the United States as well as the migrant 
caravan approaching San Diego from Central America in late 2018. Alerts 
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included political activists, lawyers, journalists, advocates, and social media 
influencers— to screen them at the border with Mexico and stop them from 
entering and working there as journalists or lawyers. Others were “arrested, 
interviewed, or had their visa or [expedited travel] pass revoked.” These 
revelations confirmed previous reports from journalists, who denounced 
becoming “targets of intense inspections and scrutiny by border officials.” 
Besides ICE, the database was made available to other federal law enforcement 
agencies, including Customs and Border Protection (CBP). The whistleblower 
warned that the creation of the dossiers constituted an abuse, since the DHS 
focuses on “criminal investigation” and not “intelligence.” When local news 
media confronted the CBP with the leak, it confirmed neither the authenticity 
nor the legality of the dossiers. The agency only stated that assaults on law 
enforcement agents were made after the caravan arrived and the border wall 
was breached, which represented crimes and a “risk to public safety.” As such, 
the event was being “routinely monitored and investigated” and evidence was 
collected “to determine if  the event was orchestrated.” Once the leak was 
reported, the CBP stated that those surveilled “were present during the vio-
lence” (Jones et al. 2019).
When dozens of civil society and nongovernmental organizations as well as 
senators sent letters of protests to the DHS acting secretary, the agency stated 
without evidence that those surveilled had “some level of participation in the 
violent incursion events.” Only several months later did the DHS inspector 
general promise the senators to launch an investigation into “the creation of 
the secret dossiers” and “specific allegations of targeting and/ or harassment” 
(Hussain and Cope 2019). Not only did the faltering CBP statements expose 
the agency as untrustworthy, but the instance of surveillance in question also 
failed to satisfy the three criteria of legitimacy, legality, and necessity. The 
American Civil Liberty Union (ACLU) qualified it as “outrageous,” violating 
the constitutional freedoms of speech, of the press, and of assembly, and 
serving as “the latest example of abuse of power by the CBP,” underscoring 
the “dire need for meaningful agency oversight and accountability” (Jones 
et al. 2019).
Although travel and immigration not only in the United States but world-
wide, have greatly decreased as a result of the global COVID- 19 pandemic 
(Connor 2020), it is worth remembering that shortly before the pandemic 
began, the administration of President Trump proposed collecting DNA 
samples from immigrants detained by law enforcement agencies, dubiously 
arguing that it could help “detect fraud and solve cold criminal cases”— even 
though multiple studies have shown immigrants commit less crimes than 
native- born citizens (Trotta 2019). It is reasonable to respond to the emotion-
alism underlying such a discourse with a lack of trust. The ACLU has warned 
that biometric surveillance can seriously impact privacy and civil liberties, 
with DNA collection employed in “criminal investigation” becoming used for 
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immigrants as security “threats” (Trotta 2019). A militantly democratic over-
sight of surveillance can ensure that a liberal democracy does not devolve 
into an anocracy when ideologized policies and practices become common-
place, and that state accountability is not obfuscated behind the outsourcing 
of security and intelligence functions to corporate partners.
Some lessons for and from militant democracy
An examination of recent political dynamics in the United States, Poland, and 
Germany, provides evidence that contemporary liberal democracies are never 
exempt from experiencing authoritarian drift. Furthermore, while the exact 
circumstances and actors involved can vary widely, these diverse examples 
have in common the fact that surveillance policies and practices require strict 
oversight, lest they contribute to obscuring emotional appeals to ideology 
and make violations of civil liberties even more opaque. Surveillance, whether 
state or corporate or a synergy of both, trusted blindly and left unaccount-
able, can become a peril to liberal democracy. However, when guarded against 
by a militant commitment to values, institutional mechanisms, and political 
actions that are liberal and democratic in nature and realization, the potential 
of this threat can be kept from being actualized.
Conclusions and recommendations
This chapter began by addressing the dynamics of trust and transparency in 
relation to oversight of surveillance. It explained that granting trust to others, 
whether people or organizations, depends on their trustworthiness. Because 
the Snowden revelations proved a number of states and corporations to be 
untrustworthy in their surveillance policies and practices, the resulting lack 
of trust within civil society on the part of citizens and consumers requires 
constructively confronting the fact that these technologies can be deployed 
in manners that are obfuscated by untransparency, deceptions, and authori-
tarian emotionalism, oftentimes concealed within discourses of securitization 
and transparency that prevent intelligent accountability. Oversight of sur-
veillance should not only demand clearer information in order to be trans-
parent but also more instances to contest and resemantize— i.e., reinterpret 
and establish a new meaning for— surveillance policies and practices so as to 
ensure these are democratic, respecting and upholding human rights and civil 
liberties.
Accordingly, this chapter continued by arguing that democratic principles 
and institutions should be built on a constructive lack of trust, which only 
grants trust to the trustworthy. It was explained that the contemporary 
threat of authoritarian drift can exploit surveillance technologies to struc-
ture power and knowledge asymmetries that can threaten liberal democ-
racy. Consequently, a militantly democratic approach within civil society is 
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recommended to oversee surveillance deployed by states, corporations, or 
the state– corporate nexus. Actors within civil society, governments, and cor-
porate institutions can employ the three criteria of legitimacy, legality, and 
necessity to ensure that surveillance policies and practices establish security 
in a democratic manner, not only within their national contexts but within the 
global context as well.
This chapter addressed and critically analyzed contemporary experiences 
and lessons learned in Germany, Poland, and the United States concerning 
the oversight of surveillance, illustrating the manner in which a militantly 
democratic approach is practiced to check untransparency, emotionalism, 
and encroachment on civil liberties and human rights. Liberal democracy is 
not a state that is achieved and then maintained evermore, but a state that 
is accomplished by means of recurrent decisions to strive toward principles, 
establish institutions, and commit to courses of action that are liberal and 
democratic.
This chapter offered these explanations and recommendations in order 
to argue that a militantly democratic approach to surveillance oversight 
enables political agency within civil society to democratically reimagine and 
resemantize the direction and consequences that technologies have in struc-
turing our societies, economies, and politics. Oversight of surveillance can be 
understood as a modality of resistance, contestation, and resemantization of 
policies and practices of surveillance so as to further enable a nascent digital 
agency, which can contribute to constructively structuring a “meaningful data 
politics” in which “human dignity and especially agency” decide the courses of 
action required to establish “alternative futures that embody holistic, reflexive 
and democratic imaginaries and practices” (Lyon 2019, 73). A constructive 
lack of trust and a militantly democratic approach to contemporary surveil-
lance technologies and socioeconomic- political dynamics can loudly voice 
two crucial questions for reimagining and resemantizing our societies: “Do 
we really need this?” and “How does it contribute to the common good and 
human flourishing?” (Lyon 2019, 75).
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It is no exaggeration to say that the issues of surveillance, transparency, and 
trust have never been as important as in the early twenty- first century. This 
bold assertion rests on the observation that today’s complex global condi-
tion is the product of a heady— some would say toxic— mix of techno-
logical, social, economic, political, and cultural change. We inhabit a global 
world of high technology— the digital— in which major corporations vie for 
supremacy, challenging conventional nation- states and their varying “democ-
racies,” which are themselves simultaneously buffeted by new authoritarian 
nationalisms and the negative consequences of globalization.
Surveillance has become an everyday feature of social, economic, and pol-
itical life in the twenty- first century. At an infrastructural level, the systems 
for organizing daily life are data dependent and surveillant. This has occurred 
faster than the development of appropriate norms and legal instruments for 
ensuring that surveillance is practiced for the common good (Stoddart 2021), 
including data justice based on trust, especially between state and citizen and 
corporation and consumer.
The unwelcome insertion of the coronavirus pandemic has sharpened 
debates over precisely these issues (French and Monahan 2020). At every 
level, COVID- 19 exacerbates the acute threats to both person and planet, 
across various dimensions. Responses are overwhelmingly reliant on digital 
systems and devices, in a multitude of ways. This is not surprising; the pan-
demic was the first to occur in a context of developed platform companies, 
and it inspired imaginative digital responses. However, the lack of common 
regulation, along with resistance to government restrictions on the part of 
some large corporations, makes for an ambiguous situation, the consequences 
of which will be debated for years to come (Lyon 2021).
On the one hand the pandemic prompted a wholesale shift to remote 
working for millions of people, where feasible, and the massive global reli-
ance on many highly surveillant platforms for communication, education, 








and systems for combating the effects of the virus, from ubiquitous contact- 
tracing apps to enhanced health data platforms for tracking its spread and 
distribution. Surveillance capitalism— the monetization of personal data by 
platform companies— is implicated in each.
Throughout 2020, state and corporate surveillance capacities were rap-
idly enhanced in many countries around the world. There was unprece-
dented pandemic- propelled growth in data gathering, analysis, and use, 
which within a few months had affected literally billions of people. China 
and India— with their huge populations— were among the many nations that 
expanded their ability to probe details of citizens’ lives and made participa-
tion in smartphone- based schemes to obtain such data mandatory. Countries 
with small populations, such as Israel/ Palestine or Iceland, also joined the 
COVID- 19 surveillance rush to rapidly establish strengthened health data 
systems and to seek innovative digital applications designed to warn everyday 
smartphone users if  they had been near a possibly infected person.
The global pandemic also inspired much welcome innovation in medical 
treatment and hospital care as well as numerous attempts to learn about and 
check the spread of the virus. These include multiple surveillance responses 
to COVID- 19 as a public health condition. Such initiatives included efforts to 
chart the spread of the virus, to learn which geographical areas and popula-
tion groups were the most vulnerable, and to allow as many people as pos-
sible to contribute meaningfully to reducing the ravages of contagion. The 
collection and curation of data were, however, not always accompanied by 
adequate explanations of how, why, and with what implications those data 
were being used for profiling and predicting or what expectations citizens 
could have about issues such as data protection and privacy. Transparency 
was often lacking and trust was eroded. In the Indian state of Kerala, for 
instance, legal objections were raised about the threat to civil liberties of the 
mandatory phone app.
At the same time, the surveillance responses to COVID- 19 as a social con-
dition have also been enormous and at the time of writing are also ongoing. 
There is a worldwide plethora of new surveillance initiatives— responding to 
developments such as working, shopping, and learning from home— that have 
been appearing with great rapidity but have been less in the limelight than 
those relating directly to the pandemic. Remote monitoring and policing of 
employees, urban residents, and students, along with enhanced routine com-
mercial surveillance of consumers, is booming. These systems and devices 
are touted as supposed “solutions” to the social condition of a health emer-
gency but, despite being inherently surveillant, are under even less ethical and 
legal scrutiny than usual. Yet their production bodes ill for those who care 
about the long- term consequences of the pandemic. Accountability for such 
innovations is often minimal to nonexistent (Deibert 2020).
Back in 2001, a perceived crisis of national and international security was 
prompted by the attacks on Washington and New York, and these were met 
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by a similar explosion of concern to find digital means of predicting and 
preventing terrorism. Although much was clear about the massively increased 
scope of US national security at the time— it affected many others globally, 
not least through air transportation requirements— it was not until the much- 
publicized disclosures by Edward Snowden in 2013 that the enormous reliance 
on so- called open- source data— that is, largely from social media— became 
clear. These prompted major, international queries about transparency— 
who knew?— and trust in relation to security- surveillance data (Lyon and 
Murakami Wood 2020, Laidler this volume).
But if  that was true of 9/ 11 then how much more is the wholesale move to 
digital technologies evident in the global coronavirus pandemic that began in 
2019? The Economist commented on the rapid growth of a “Coronopticon” 
as early as March 2020. While noting the need for urgent attention to be paid 
to the origins and spread of the disease, with a view to its containment, they 
did observe that many countries were using an array of apps and data systems 
to keep tabs on the pandemic— “and also, in the process, on their citizens” 
(The Economist 2020). While the emerging structure surpasses in multiple 
ways the unidirectional transparency of Bentham’s 1791 “panopticon” prison 
diagram, certain similarities not mentioned in the The Economist briefing do 
bear mentioning.
First of all, it is clear that, as with so many apps and systems, those built 
or modified for the pandemic aspire to make the lives of ordinary citizens 
visible to the organizations that produce or use the technology, while little or 
no attention is paid to ensuring the transparency of the apps or systems to 
their subjects. Secondly, the reliance on digital technologies is often achieved 
through very close collaboration between government health departments 
and platforms along with private corporations. Public health tasks were often 
outsourced to private companies, with little oversight or accountability, either 
for completing tasks effectively or for safeguarding civil liberties or privacy. 
This also extends into other areas such as employment, commerce, and educa-
tion. It is often unclear— think of the noteworthy case of the Google– Apple 
API offered for contact- tracing worldwide— exactly how government regu-
lation applies or how these businesses are handling or storing data. This 
challenges notions of trust, in both business and government. Thirdly, the 
very framing of these emergency initiatives suggests a purely utilitarian spirit, 
much like that which energized Bentham in his quest for the greatest happiness 
of the greatest number. In the case of the pandemic, the emphasis is often on 
a calculus of how many deaths are acceptable in the effort to balance public 
health with economic dynamism.
In what follows, we shall examine these issues in more depth, with a view to 
considering the complex challenge of agency for human flourishing. This in 
turn depends on transparency and trust, each of which is threatened by many 
kinds of surveillance but which themselves require better definition and prac-
tical application. Why focus on flourishing? Because all too often the weight 
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of technological development and public policy pulls the questions down to 
the level of technocratic and deterministic criteria. To assert a need for con-
siderations of human agency and flourishing is ambitious, of course, but as 
many contributions to these debates demonstrate, there is a crying need for 
ways to lift familiar constructions of the situation to a higher level.
Pandemic surveillance: transparency and trust
Since the late twentieth century, surveillance has grown exponentially— I 
choose these words carefully— in tandem with the development of digital 
technologies. Watching, monitoring, and tracking have shifted, in less than 
half  a century, from being targeted and operated within specific siloes such as 
policing, workplace management, and government administration, to some-
thing experienced in everyday life as an unremarkable occurrence. Whereas 
machines such as video cameras were once placed where they might capture 
images as people pass by, we now see smartphones carried in personal pockets 
and bags that constantly record the time and place of communications and 
transactions between identifiable individuals, such that they may be mapped 
and traced. Of course, the surveillance cameras are still present, now 
enhanced by facial recognition technology, and are used by countries such as 
China, India, Russia, and South Korea to help enforce pandemic quarantines 
(Roussi 2020). These basic changes, orchestrated by both public and pri-
vate organizations, now shape human life in unprecedentedly subtle yet ser-
ious ways.
The global pandemic that began in 2019 and spread in waves of conta-
gion throughout the world was met with increased modes of surveillance that 
accentuated the vexing issues of data circulation. These were already the stuff  
of government commissions, academic research, company policy, and privacy 
and data protection regimes the world over. But now they presented them-
selves as even more troubling conundrums. While one might well be skep-
tical about the “security theater” and “terrorist threat” scares spawned by 
9/ 11, COVID- 19 was a palpable peril. Many thousands of ordinary people 
got horribly sick and died in many countries— and at the time of writing, are 
still being infected and, all too often, dying. The dismal toll does of course 
affect some population groups— predictably, the already disadvantaged and 
vulnerable— more than others, but it is nevertheless the case that millions 
more people around the world are at serious risk than were ever affected by 
terrorism.
At the same time, the situation also catalyzed the accelerated adoption of 
many new technologies. Consumer and business digital adoption skyrocketed 
(McKinsey 2020) with leaps of speed and scale. Online shopping and cashless 
transactions grew faster than anyone anticipated, while communication 
platforms such as Zoom grew from 10 million users in December 2019 to 





Surveillance, transparency, trust, and COVID 247
analysis of surveillance capitalism becomes strikingly relevant. Platforms 
are driven by the impulse to collect, analyze, and act upon such everyday 
data, exponentially. Beyond the directly commercial context, schools and 
universities switched, when “necessary,” to remote learning, complete with 
apps for everything from checking attendance to policing exams, and many 
employees still lucky enough to have jobs remained at home to work— all 
the while monitored by newly installed software. And of course, in obvious 
areas such as health, doctors switched rapidly in many countries to online 
consultations. The public health innovations were just another aspect of this 
generalized digital shift. However, while Zuboff’s (2019) primary concern is 
how behavioral manipulation constrains what she sees as “autonomy,” this 
hardly touches upon the urgent questions of how surveillance capitalism also 
magnifies socioeconomic inequalities, compounding systemic injustice.
The most immediate effects of the pandemic are those relating to healthcare 
and the imperative to reduce the risk of infection and its spread. A central 
conundrum is that those at risk wish to feel safe, but the proffered “solutions” 
are often ones that themselves carry risks. Contact- tracing, for instance, which 
in many cases offers to alert the users of an app when they have been close 
to an infected person, is replete with such contradictions. Systems may be 
either centralized, as the initial program in the UK, or related ones in China 
and Israel– Palestine, or decentralized, the latter often taking advantage of 
the Google– Apple API, offered so that health departments may create their 
own apps. Decentralized systems also include the European Decentralized 
Privacy- Preserving Proximity- Tracing protocol used in several countries. 
More data may be acquired through centralized systems, deemed useful for 
risk modeling and analysis, but critics object that without clear limits, once 
in government hands, those data could easily be used for other purposes. 
Beyond privacy and security concerns are important ethical and justice issues 
(Kitchin 2020; Muller 2020; Scassa et al. 2020).
Such issues, beyond what might be covered by privacy or data protec-
tion law, include simple failure to do the right thing, such as warning citi-
zens about the limitations of digital tracking for contact- tracing. They can 
easily produce false positives— for instance if  carried down a grocery store 
aisle. Again, the Bluetooth versions may have insufficient uptake, thus redu-
cing their reliability. On a wider level, the use of contact- tracing apps may 
be used by employers to prevent workers from returning to work or, if  used 
as “COVID passports,” could undermine their “non- mandatory” status. The 
lack of access to such apps by those without cellphones could exacerbate 
other forms of inequality.
These kinds of complications, common to surveillance in the twenty- first 
century, have been widely accentuated during the global pandemic. Extensive 
public– private cooperation, for example, is visible in just about every juris-
diction, whether authoritarian or democratic. Chinese COVID- 19- inhibiting 
initiatives, for instance, feature major corporations such as Alipay, which runs 
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the major contact- tracing app with its three- color “Health Code” scheme but 
is also answerable to the State Council. Indeed, the initiative with Alipay is 
also seen as a test- run for China’s “Social Credit” schemes, set up, paradox-
ically, with precisely the aim of ensuring trust in a society that lacks Western- 
style credit cards. Critical discussion of these issues was sparked on Weibo 
(roughly the Chinese equivalent of Twitter), suggesting that much mistrust 
exists regarding the responses to the pandemic (Lin 2020).
The politics of  trust and transparency are also observable. For example, 
South Korea was frequently cited in contrast to the Chinese case with 
respect to trust in government COVID- 19 schemes. Much was made— by 
UNESCO for example— of  the “openness and transparency” of  South 
Korea’s response to the rapid spread of  the virus in that country (UNESCO 
2020). It is interesting that the government’s greater “transparency” was 
in response to complaints about damaging government secrecy during the 
MERS pandemic of  2015, when little was reported about virus hotspots. 
In 2020, after an explosive early outbreak, testing and tracing were 
implemented much more rapidly, plus public mapping in which citizens 
could check the movements of  patients identified only by gender and age, 
and even see whether their homes were disinfected or if  they were wearing 
masks (Thompson 2020).
Public trust in government is crucial to the effective working of digital 
systems established to counteract the pandemic (Ball et al. 2018), and such 
trust is based on the perceived trustworthiness of  the government departments 
concerned. Furthermore, such trustworthiness must depend on the keeping 
of commitments, a feature of trust that applies in both interpersonal and 
institutional contexts (Hawley 2012). Some governments lost citizen trust, at 
least for a time, as was the case in Mexico in November 2020, when a program 
using QR swiping for contact- tracing was announced— including the fact that 
participation would be mandatory. This lacked democratic process, to which 
Mexico is officially committed. The former Data Protection Commissioner 
tweeted her disapproval, asking citizens to resist, and just before the rollout 
the government back- pedaled, stating that the initiative was voluntary 
(Martínez 2020). But of course, such episodes are not merely products of the 
pandemic. They relate to much longer- term shifts in patterns of governing 
and especially to the democratic deficits seen in contemporary populism and 
neoliberal practices and policies.
Many issues have arisen also concerning transparency. Transparency 
may be demanded by citizens and pressure groups but may also be imposed 
by the powerful. As Shaul Duke (this volume) notes, the tensions between 
“imposed” and “voluntary” transparency are profound and are worked out 
in a range of  moves and counter- moves in the case he discusses— Israel/ 
Palestine. During the pandemic, Israel required Shin Bet— the security 
agency normally involved in checking on Palestinian “terrorism”— to 






Surveillance, transparency, trust, and COVID 249
about civil liberties were raised about this in Israel and internationally, Shin 
Bet continued to run the contact- tracing system until March 2021 (Amit 
et al. 2020). This is hardly reassuring for those who see Shin Bet as a key 
means of  minimizing Palestinian self- determination through its debilitating 
suspicion of  both Israeli Arabs and Palestinian communities in the West 
Bank and Gaza. Transparency was in fact missing from the start, as the Shin 
Bet contact- tracing system was set up after an overnight cabinet meeting, 
thus bypassing parliamentary approval.
Both transparency and trust also have to be placed in a larger con-
text, however— that of the rapidly expanding world of reliance on digital 
infrastructures. While the decades following World War II saw the applica-
tion of computing and communication technologies to bolster and support 
surveillance activities, both commercial and governmental, the present stage 
of digital development means that the infrastructures themselves are deeply 
surveillant. The platform companies and surveillance capitalism represent 
this shift, in which value is located in the metadata generated by the everyday 
use of social media in particular and the internet in general. Transparency 
is seriously lacking among the platform companies; even when Facebook’s 
Mark Zuckerberg faces high- level public questioning he refuses to acknow-
ledge what Facebook routinely does with its users’ data. And as Twitter’s Jack 
Dorsey admitted at the October Congressional hearings, “We realize we need 
to earn trust more, we realize that more accountability is needed, to show our 
intentions and show our outcomes” (Romm et al. 2020).
Understanding trust and transparency sociologically
The concept of transparency has been debated in relation to the digital realm 
for several decades. It is unlikely to subside any time soon. Over time, it has 
taken wildly different forms, from the bright optimism of David Brin’s (1998) 
The Transparent Society to Byung Chul Han’s (2015) gloomy pessimism in 
The Transparency Society. Each of these books deals mainly with social trans-
parency in the context of the putative loss of privacy in contemporary society. 
Brin argued that the quest for government- protected privacy is ultimately 
futile and that worries about growing surveillance could be assuaged by giving 
everyone the means of surveillance. This is an old argument, also sometimes 
used by those who optimistically engage in sousveillance or “watching from 
below.”
But as technology critic Bruce Schneier (2008) observes, Brin discounts the 
already existing power differences between the parties involved, which place 
strong limits on hopes for transparency understood in this way. This relates 
closely with the arguments often made about inequalities associated with sur-
veillance as “social sorting,” especially in a big data context (Lyon 2003, 2007; 
Eubanks 2018). The power differentials are clear in a world where surveillors 










complex and inaccessible data analytics, without revealing how that process 
occurs or that its effects are consequential on those groups (Lyon 2014).
Byung Chul Han, on the other hand, while also acknowledging what 
he views as the diminution of private life, maintains that easily obtainable 
information means that transparency— that is, primarily, of those targeted 
by surveillance— creates a society of control, not of trust. Politics becomes 
increasingly short- term, with little sense of responsibility for the future. He 
sees this worsening with the COVID- 19 pandemic, arguing that the state of 
exception engendered by the pandemic will be made permanent through the 
expanded use of digital tools against the coronavirus. Thus, the isolating ten-
dencies of pandemic controls will strengthen the capitalist state (Han 2020).
Beyond such debates, in which participants often seem to talk past each 
other, it makes sense to consider some more specific problems with transpar-
ency as a goal among those who wish to increase democratic participation in 
digital times. One astute critic is David Pozen, who shows how easily the word 
transparency can be— and is— subverted in contemporary political discourse. 
While many still cling to the concept as a critically important aspect of good 
governance, or of data protection and policy, “it is increasingly suspected of 
facilitating antiregulatory or neoliberal agendas and of undermining the very 
values it is meant to promote” (Pozen 2019: 326; see also Viola this volume). 
Pozen very sensibly notes that as a concept, transparency is not coherent and 
thus that different and opposing views of its usefulness are bound to prolif-
erate (see also Bjorkland, this volume). And he argues that a “sociological 
turn” is required to examine the historical, legal, cultural, and other contexts 
in which transparency concepts are developed and used.
Pozen quotes Darin Barney, who insists that transparency is never a “thing” 
but a social process, a means, not an end (Pozen 2019: 327). This is why socio-
logical clarity is required. Human flourishing, or the flourishing of the earth 
itself, are ends, within which we may locate, in the present context, derived 
goals such as data justice. Transparency, on the other hand, is merely a means 
to such ends and has to be evaluated in each context for its contribution to 
human and social benefit. If, for instance, the opacity of the terms of service 
advertised by platform companies could be reduced, then the transparency 
of the provider to the user would be enhanced. But for this to serve genuine 
goals, other requirements, such as that users know how to respond to the 
information to which they now have access (see e.g. Raab 2012a), would have 
to be met. But greater platform transparency is only one limited step toward 
proper accountability. The latter has been developed more fully during the 
present century and has been given teeth within some data protection and 
human rights contexts (Raab 2012b). But neither transparency nor account-
ability in themselves could bring anything like a satisfactory condition of data 
justice into being. Why? Because if  data justice means ensuring how people 
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then merely to see more clearly how users are unfairly dealt with will not con-
tribute much to desirable outcomes.
So, can transparency contribute to more trust in government, as was fre-
quently suggested in the later twentieth century? Again, it depends. As 
Matthew Hall (this volume) eloquently argues, the act of publicizing power 
can itself  have chilling effects. As he observes, the very fact that one could be 
harmed by surveillance may damage our freedom as citizens; such domin-
ation is a present threat. Theoretically, at least, Pozen is correct to say that the 
transparency– trust relationship is not self- evident (see also Bjorkland, this 
volume). But he also pleads for careful empirical analysis of the social situ-
ations in which transparency is sought, analysis that is highly attentive to con-
text. The kinds of research that are required for a proper understanding of 
transparency in relation to rapidly expanding surveillance capitalism would 
do well to heed the suggestions made by Pozen. They are highly germane to 
the goals of any study of transparency, especially as it affects trust. As he 
concludes, “sociological inquiry, broadly conceived, gives our best hope for 
developing a deep understanding of transparency policies and their many and 
varied impacts” (Pozen 2019: 330).
What conditions are required for human flourishing?
As noted earlier, all too often, the weight of technological development and 
public policy pulls questions about surveillance down to the level of techno-
cratic and deterministic criteria. There are many examples of how this 
happens. One is that the increasing range of public– private partnerships has 
made it more difficult to demand full accountability from corporations, which 
are sometimes seen as extensions of government activity rather than as entities 
subject to rules, regulations, and laws. Beyond this, of course, is the massive 
power of today’s giant tech companies— the platforms in particular— that 
seems to lend them a sense of invincibility and immunity from criticism. Then, 
as they are tech companies, they depend on computing scientists and software 
engineers, who— despite some shining contrary examples— often dissociate 
themselves from the social contexts and consequences of their work and dis-
engage from the politics of their endeavors (Möllers forthcoming).
Intellectual and practical work is needed to reverse the apparent guiding 
principle of much technological innovation, which is that human beings 
should constantly adapt themselves to the new. This chapter urges, rather, 
consideration of ways in which technologies could be shaped to truly human 
ends. Thus, in our present context, for example, the development of surveil-
lance systems, devices, and apps should be guided by criteria whose short-
hand here is “human flourishing.” And if  that sounds like a rather vague 
term, substantive content follows. It is deliberately broad, denoting a cluster 




Of course, human flourishing is seen in diverse ways around the world, 
but many— perhaps classically, Aristotle— have seen such flourishing as 
dependent on living life with others, with people helping one another to 
develop virtues— good habits— which, as they continue to be practiced, con-
tribute to love and justice. Such ideas are common to the world’s religions, 
especially the Abrahamic: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. As Miroslav Volf 
(2017) argues, such religions are inherently globalizing, and in an intensively 
globalized world, they continue to offer themes to guide contemporary soci-
eties. Love and justice are two pursuits related to flourishing, and in the con-
text of surveillance they can be given specific aims— to an ethics of care with 
data on the one hand and to data justice on the other. One way of seeking 
these would be to ensure specific forms of transparency from those who 
surveil, such that they could demonstrate their willingness to be accountable 
to others, particularly when the plight of vulnerable population groups is 
obscured by the data (Taylor 2020). It would also contribute to trust if  they 
were thus shown to be open to assessment. But this is only a first step to the 
goal, not the destination.
What social, technological, and political conditions might help promote 
human flourishing? Flourishing is more than health or security; it comprises 
a complex amalgam of varying features (Volf  2017). Nor is it appropriate to 
reduce flourishing to autonomy. There is a need to go beyond Zuboff’s excel-
lent work on surveillance capitalism here. Her target— not inappropriately— 
is the manipulation and behavior modification sought by Google and other 
platforms that emulate Google (Zuboff 2019). But, firstly, claims about 
autonomy can easily be reduced to an individualistic level and thus to a 
denial of the intrinsic sociality of humanness. And, secondly, the shaping of 
personal behaviors is not the only product of surveillance capitalism, which 
also systematically reproduces and reinforces social difference and disadvan-
tage. Thus, a key aim of any desire to recalibrate the current mode of predic-
tion to quite different ends would be rather to promote and struggle for “data 
justice” (Taylor 2017).
For Taylor, data justice goes beyond current data practices, which tend to 
be driven by technical, governmental, and commercial goals rather than social 
ones. Data- driven discrimination is widespread and relatively unimpeded by 
law or regulation. The root of the problem is that algorithms are constructed 
that make people visible in particular ways and that visibility is highly conse-
quential for life chances and choices. To seek data justice is to demand fairness 
in the ways that people are made visible, represented, and treated as they con-
tinuously produce data. Doing this leads to the discovery of ethical paths 
through a datafying world. For Taylor, international data justice involves (in)
visibility, (dis)engagement with technology, and antidiscrimination (Taylor 
2020). Transparency and accountability are crucial here, especially in relation 
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Governments employ few data scientists and generally rely on corporate 
bodies to provide such assistance.
Taking this further, many grassroots concerns and activities are evidence 
of social involvement and the search for local and global person- and- planet 
practices and orientations. In terms of technological involvement, movements 
to reinscribe social responsibility in technical education, reengaging com-
puting and software professionals with the wider purposes of their expertise, 
is a vital contribution. Sara Degli- Esposti and David Arroyo (this volume) 
make an excellent case for trust- as- care, as opposed to mere control, which 
also speaks strongly to the matter of computing and software education. This 
can be reinforced, in the pandemic context, with Taylor’s (2020) call for an 
ethics of care over and against the dominant utilitarian calculations, espe-
cially in countries where neoliberalism has taken root. This places emphasis 
on the collective rather than the population. People, with their unequal 
positions, are the focus.
Such social awareness may be complemented with more properly polit-
ical activities in the quest for data justice— which also questions utilitarian 
calculation— and in the search, for instance, for ways of giving citizens the 
opportunity to help decide the rules of transparency (Hall, this volume). In 
addition, Verde Garrido (this volume) also insists that surveillance overreach, 
as exposed by Edward Snowden, requires citizens not to trust certain gov-
ernment agencies. These general orientations also have to be considered in 
the context of local historical cultural conditions. These include not only 
the massive and now long- term influence of tech giants based in California’s 
Silicon Valley, but also, today, the huge influence of China and, increasingly, 
India. While the US platforms still affect millions in many parts of the globe, 
the influence of the newer digital economies of China and India have far- 
reaching impacts in emerging countries of the Global South in particular 
(Chakrovorti 2018).
Mobilizing publics, from grassroots to global
How can human agency and human flourishing be asserted in an age of  sur-
veillance? This appears as an unattainably high- level question at the best of 
times, but especially during a global pandemic. Yet a moment’s reflection 
on the alternatives may place this aim in a better, and more realistic, light. 
Platform and related companies in many countries are frequently monopol-
istic, hugely powerful in their control of  resources, markets, and employees, 
and arrogantly confident that they can do a better job of  governing than 
democratically elected officials. Although much surveillance is carried out 
by government departments, security agencies, and the police, their activ-
ities are very often dependent on systems, software, and data originating in 




company guidance exude utilitarian, technocratic, and “tech- solutionist” 
approaches.
There currently seems to be little enthusiasm for transparency among the 
leading players of the platform world. Their multibillionaire CEOs, such as 
Jeff  Bezos, formerly at Amazon, and Mark Zuckerberg, at Facebook, show 
no signs of opening their corporate activities to scrutiny, any more than 
Sundar Pichai at Google— the company credited with creating surveillance 
capitalism— does. In the United States, Facebook’s reputation has slipped 
significantly, mainly due to a lack of user trust in its handling of personal 
information, while Microsoft holds a high place and Amazon likewise— no 
doubt credited with keeping people supplied with the goods no longer avail-
able in brick- and- mortar stores at the start of the pandemic (Verge 2020). 
At the same time, the Verge (2020) survey supported earlier findings by 
Pew researchers that around half  the US population believes that the big 
platforms do indeed require more government regulation (Smith 2018). But 
will governments step up and actually challenge the platforms? Former UK 
Information Commissioner Elizabeth Denham stands out for her challenge 
to Facebook after the Cambridge Analytica scandal in 2018. But the max-
imum fine she could levy was GBP500,000— a drop in a bucket for Facebook. 
This is a critical question that will have to be faced head- on in the coming 
years, if  trust is to be restored.
How can the public be mobilized to reflect and deliberate on these issues? 
Post- Snowden, many have been retreating even further from public debate. 
And in some countries, of course, meaningful public debate has been muted 
by rising populist authoritarianism and nationalism. In Europe and the 
United States, some public debate has been growing, mostly in relation to 
the apparent unreliability of platforms and their unwillingness to listen to 
criticism— think Facebook, Amazon, Google, but also Airbnb and Uber. 
However, some security surveillance activities are still under scrutiny (e.g. 
Lyon and Murakami Wood 2020).
Of course, it may well also be possible to add surveillance trust- and- 
transparency concerns to other public issues. The Black Lives Matter 
movement is an obvious case in point in the northern hemisphere, as that 
cannot but be associated with police surveillance technologies, particularly 
body cameras and facial recognition technologies, in which data justice is 
manifestly lacking. Specific data- justice- promoting proposals relating to 
COVID- 19 systems include data trusts (Dawson 2020) and distributed ledger 
technology (Demos Helsinki 2020). In addition, environmental and green 
concerns have to be considered in relation to the increasingly heavy energy 
requirements for server farms to service the internet, and these can be tied 
in with surveillance and data justice concerns (cf. Deibert’s (2020) Massey 
Lectures emphasizing civil society).
A final, crucially important argument is prompted by the currently dom-
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culture of surveillance manifests a multiplicity of modes of online involve-
ment, in which data politics (Bigo et al. 2019; Lyon 2019) is increasingly 
important and within which data justice becomes increasingly paramount 
(Taylor 2017). If  agency is to be recovered in this area, it will come from those 
actively engaged with the internet, whose involvement is constructively polit-
ical. The attitude of the platform companies, as Zuboff (2019) often observes, 
is that their activities are inevitable and their consequences unavoidable, and 
behaving as if  such doctrines are true will indeed undermine agency. But the 
evidence of much online activism (cf. Verde Garrido, this volume) gives that 
doctrine the lie. Indeed, within the internet and social media itself  many work 
to demonstrate that care and justice should govern both our considerations 
of transparency and the pressure to create new grounds for trust in the world 
of the digital.
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